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| Maryland's Optical Scan System |
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| Author |
Message |
    
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 1
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 22, 2006 - 7:21 pm: | 
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Do Maryland absentee machines use memory cards that can be hacked by Hursti attack?
Maryland uses the (Diebold)Global Election System Model ES-2000 optical scan machine for their absentee ballots. Is this system as vulnerable as the AccuVote-OS to a Hursti attack?
Do we know if the memory cards for AccuVote-TS touch-screen machines used in Maryland have the same type of executable code? |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3339
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 22, 2006 - 9:19 pm: |
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The question is, which version are they using.
CC 2.0.12
HSCC 2.0.12 (a totally different system than CC 2.0.12)
1.96.6
1.96.4
1.94w
If you can find that out, we can answer your question with more precision. In general, all of the 1.9x.x versions are susceptible to the Hursti-style hacks and all of the 2.xx.xx are extremely vulnerable to the Herbert Thompson hack.
More Details
1.9x.x versions use memory cards, 2.0.12 versions don't
The 1.9x.x versions have a results tape come out of the voting machine. This results tape is produced by a memory card. Tampering with the memory card, as Hursti did, will adjust the results and if the memory card is preloaded with negative and positive votes, it will leave no trace and incorrect results will appear both on the poll tape (results tape from machine) and the central tabulator (results accumulator). Thus, the 1.9x.x versions are susceptible to the Hursti hack.
GEMS susceptibility
Now, the 2.xx.x versions don't use a memory card. They feed their results directly (and ONLY) into GEMS. The GEMS program is defective, from a security standpoint, in that it can be manipulated quite easily (and very precisely, affecting only the set of votes you want). These votes are especially susceptible to the Herbert Thompson hack (using a Visual Basic or Java Script to tamper with GEMS).
Some people say the memory cards (= results tapes) protect against GEMS hack
The 2.0.12 versions don't have results tapes. Therefore, they do not act as a "check and balance" against tampering with GEMS. The machines that don't use memory cards are entirely at the mercy of GEMS.
This is especially perilous for absentee votes, which have totals that begin before the election and are updated frequently over a 1-2 week period of time. (Most states prohibit looking at the totals before the election, but many states run ballots through the machines ahead of time). Simply by tweaking GEMS, the candidate ID numbers can be flipped, and in a close race it will simply look like the other guy "pulled ahead" at some point during the long days of counting absentee votes. Using either MS Access or a Visual Basic script, the numbers can be flipped again whenever the wrong guy pulls ahead.
What are the 2.0.12 machines used for?
Counting absentee votes.
Difference between the CC 2.0.12 and the HSCC 2.0.12
The CC 2.0.12 is basically a precinct-based optical scanner that has a different program and sometimes a feeder tray. It connects directly into GEMS. It is used to count absentee votes.
The HSCC is a much larger machine, is very fast, (HSCC stands for High Speed Central Count), and unlike the CC machine, the HSCC creates a digital photocopy of every ballot, which you can request in a public records request and use the free VotoScope tool to look at and examine and count and do forensics on the ballot images. That's a nice feature.
The CC machines are only about 6 inches tall, and about 2 feet by 1.5 feet (very rough guesses). The HSCC machines are at least 2 feet tall and at least 3 feet by 2 feet (again, very rough guesses.) If you are looking at the scanner that counts absentee votes, the quickest way to tell which one it is is by its height. One person can easily pick up and carry the CC machine. Unless you are a bodybuilder, it will be very difficult for one person to carry the big ol' HSCC.
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Jim March
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 98
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:16 am: |
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Robert, welcome to election ground zero  .
Let's clarify a few things:
According to documents we have, Maryland requires Federal certification for any voting system. As the "High Speed" central count isn't qualified yet, we can assume MD uses the "low speed" (what they call plain ol' "Central Count") and probably the 2.0.12 variant.
(Diebold uses the same version number for both high speed and low speed absentee ballot scanner systems even though the hardware and designs are radically different. It's either stupidity or obfuscation.)
I had a chance to see the low speed variant up close recently in San Joaquin County California. Here's what we know:
* The core hardware piece is the same as an optical scan terminal such as is used in precincts in many jurisdictions, including the Leon County FL system Hursti was able to hack:
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf
* There are however four differences:
1) Instead of sitting on a ballot box, a paper feeder/hopper (100 or less sheets) and output paper "catcher" device of similar capacity are added.
2) The memory card slot is NOT used. The optical scanner is directly wired to the central tabulator (the Diebold "GEMS" product) and feeds it's vote-scanning directly into the GEMS database without retaining it's own copies internally OR on a memory card.
3) The internal "cash register tape" printer is used ONLY to count how many sheets of paper are fed through. On a precinct optical scan system, the end-of-day ticker tape is up to several feet long and produces a record of how many votes were taken in for each issue or candidate. In other words, it'll basically say "I took in 401 votes for Bush, 389 votes for Kerry..." and so on in a long strip. While the contents of that ticker-tape CAN be faked (as Hursti proved in Leon County!) if used honestly it provides a key audit trail, showing what was fed into GEMS before it gets there.
4) The firmware in the low-speed central count is of course different to support the above functional changes.
-------
So what does this mean?
Like Bev says, security in GEMS is absolutely worst-case awful. "Hackable" doesn't even begin..."editable" comes closer to the truth, and via any of several methods available to county elections officials, their staff, any unmonitored Diebold field staff, even the janitor if they're stupid about physical security.
The low-speed central count security relies almost entirely on GEMS security, providing no separate record of the vote or paper trail as to what was fed into GEMS. Only fairly large-scale handcounted spot-checking of the absentee ballots could detect it and we suspect most agencies aren't doing near enough.
Many are doing none at all.
So.
Where that leaves Maryland activists: we need somebody to look into how at least one or two counties are handling the absentee ballots. In particular, are they filing the absentees among the precincts or not? If not, spot-checking them is unlikely and perhaps impossible. Are they spot-checking any ballots at all, and achieving randomness of the spot-check selection how exactly? Are they spot-checking the absentees in any fashion at all?
It's difficult to overstate the importance of these questions. Diebold's low-speed opscan absentee system is a major, grade "A" high risk security issue, arguably the biggest among all Diebold products.
Carrying out an undetectable hack equivelent to the Hursti test attack in Leon County is trivially simple requiring no programming skills.
Jim
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TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
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Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 2
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 4:49 pm: |
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Thanks Jim and Bev for this extremely useful information. I have been trying to find out which exact version of the Accu-Vote ES 2000 optical scanner is used here in MD, but have run up against a wall. No one at various county or state levels has given me the information yet. I suspect that State Administrator Lamone has told people not to reveal any details.
However, we (TrueVoteMD.org) have come into possession of a letter from Lamone to Diebold, dated 12/23/05, in which she reveals how concerned she is about the Leon County test and the actions by California and Pennsylvania. She demanded daily briefings from Diebold. We have just posted this letter from Lamone on our website along with our open letter to Lamone calling for full disclosure to the public and decertification of Diebold in MD.
The lawsuit against Lamone and the Board of Elections is also continuing in the discovery phase. The fact that the latest correspondence between Lamone and Diebold was not shared with the plaintiffs was made public in a hearing in Annapolis this morning.
I will continue trying to get the information about the exact version used here and will let you know ASAP. |
Jim March
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 105
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 5:07 pm: |
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Robert, it's almost certainly 2.0.12 standard ("low speed") central count. Go ahead and confirm but I'd say the odds are so high that working on what the procedures are for recount via the questions I posed is higher priority. You can also ask multiple MD counties those questions as the procedures will be county-administered.
That raises your odds of getting that data, maybe. And lord above help you all if they've all got different answers from different counties.
Oh: just in case they've got the high speed central count, which would be illegal as hell: the low-speed rises no more than 8 to 10 inches off the table, has a paper hopper of 100 sheets or less (might be just 50 sheets) and is easy for one person to carry. The high speed is a monster, weighs well over 100lb, 500-sheet input hopper, it's about 2ft or more tall at one end. Can't miss it. The scanner itself might not say "Diebold" at all, it's a standard high-speed commercial scanner hooked to a PC that sits there and translates the scans to a format GEMS can read...but ignore that, it might be a little ways away (up to maybe 10 to 20 feet I think). Just look at the physical scanner size.
If you DO spot the high speed monster in use, let us know ASAP. That goes for anybody anywhere, sightings of that big sucker are as valuable as Sasquach photos .
Jim
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TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
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Phil McCracken
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Phil_mccracken
Post Number: 10
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 9:22 pm: |
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Jim:
Interesting discussion. Where have you seen the high speed scanner? Also, have you seen other vendor's high speed (e.g., ES&S, Sequoia). What are you thoughts about those products? I notice that you always focus on Diebold. If you are concerned about election consistency and accuracy, should you not be concerned about private companies like ES&S and Seqouia, which unlike Diebold, is not publicly traded?
Also, the absentee ballot system requires paper ballots. Paper ballots CAN be recounted should a need arise. Should you be more concerned about a mandated recount during canvass for a specified percentage of absentee precincts rather than a system that according to a San Diego recount last summer was accurate?
I am interested to hear your comments,
Phil |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 241
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 9:59 pm: |
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Jim - I have reason to suspect (but don't know with certainty) that this, or a more recent version, is the beast that's used on HSCC.
http://www.accservices.com/main/products/Collaterals/vs8000.pdf
that is IF HSCC is actually in use somewhere. |
Jim March
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 106
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 10:38 pm: |
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Phil: Diebold installed a complete HSCC system in Mendocino County California sometime in 2004. It's still sitting there UNused according to registrar Marsha Warff and she's got a good rep for honesty, I believe her. She allowed Bev and I to peer at it right up close.
John, that DOES look like it, or at least something in the same series. Diebold hooks it up to a PC dedicated to doing optical character recognition ("OCR") on the TIF files held locally on the hard disk of the OCR station. The OCR station feeds GEMS a data stream that looks to GEMS much like what comes off of the low speed central count.
The HSCC has one unexpectedly GOOD feature, probably one unexpected to Diebold: the scanned TIF graphics files can be processed by alternate tabulator programs as a check on the honesty of GEMS. One such alternate tabulator exists NOW: BBV's own "Votascope" written by Harri Hursti. This may have thrown Diebold for a bit of a loop .
Phil: paper ballot are only valuable if they're counted. If not, they might as well be printed on soft paper rolls and used for a very different purpose indeed. Some elections officials (San Diego fr'instance) are hand-selecting which precincts to recount, making paper-counting as a fraud check worthless. Los Angeles county takes a worse approach: they refuse to sort the absentees by precinct and hence leave them out of the California-required 1% manual random spot-check.
Six or seven states ban recounting altogether. This is probably a throwback to punchcards where handling ballots tends to change them somewhat.
Most states have no automatic spot-checking at all. Hand-counting only occurs when there's a challenge, when the race is close.
So if they rig blowouts, no checking...oops.
Optical scan is NOT a cure-all. It's part of the answer, yeah, but must be combined with good procedures and honest software.
Jim
* * * * * *
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* * * * * *
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TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Phil McCracken
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Phil_mccracken
Post Number: 11
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 25, 2006 - 9:06 am: |
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Jim:
Thanks for answering some of my questions...
How do you know about the TIF files on the HSCC. Have you seen the scanner in a live operation? There has been rumor the HSCC product has not been used in a live production (e.g., election) environment. How did you find out about the devices functionalities?
Also, can you tell me at least one GOOD thing Diebold has done to improve elections?
Also, you did not answer my question: "Should you not also be concerned about private companies like ES&S and Seqouia, which unlike Diebold, is not publicly traded?" Please answer..
Phil |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 242
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 25, 2006 - 6:50 pm: |
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Phil - I don't speak for Jim nor for anyone else but I'll gladly try to answer one part of your question.
"Should you not also be concerned about private companies like ES&S and Seqouia, which unlike Diebold, is not publicly traded?"
While there may possibly be some validity to the public-company versus private-company question, I think it's fair to say that the issue of election integrity is not exclusively focused on one company. I encourage you to take the time to browse through this web site and read-up on the numerous issues with products and systems from other vendors, including from those you mentioned. I think you'll find that there's concern with the systems from many vendors, regardless of whether they are public or private.
If you are seeing a lot of criticism of Diebold, it may be as a result of there being a lot of information available about their products, resulting in more people becoming more knowledgable.
Enjoy your stay - there's lots to learn here and lots of work to be done.
HG |
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 3
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 25, 2006 - 7:28 pm: |
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The MD State Board of Elections has finally answered my phone request for information. They said I have to submit the request in writing so they can have a record of what was said to whom.
Amazing, this is such a big secret. The written request for the particular version used in MD went out this afternoon. Will keep you posted. |
Jim March
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 107
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 12:58 pm: |
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For some reason my set of answers last night didn't make it through to the board. My apologies for the delays, esp. apologies to Phil as he asked good direct questions I didn't intend to ignore.
quote:
How do you know about the TIF files on the HSCC. Have you seen the scanner in a live operation? There has been rumor the HSCC product has not been used in a live production (e.g., election) environment. How did you find out about the devices functionalities?
We haven't seen it in live use. We do have sets of test data from it, sets of graphic ballot scans from the High Speed Central Count.
We believe it is not federally qualified, and yes we've heard that "hasn't been used live" rumor too. We're not really sure on that point. First, some states allow use of gear that isn't federally certified. We've spot-checked a few Diebold customer counties in such states, so far the claim is that they don't use it.
But more importantly, we're concerned about the duplicate version numbers. Both the low-speed and high-speed central count devices are version "2.0.12" despite being completely different.
So why the same version?
quote:
Also, can you tell me at least one GOOD thing Diebold has done to improve elections?
Well sure, they've provided an excellent example of what NOT to do!
Heh. OK, seriously now.
The idea of graphically scanning each ballot very early in the process is actually a good one SO LONG as a good hash of the graphic scan can be created and stored in a trustworthy fashion. Ironically, the Diebold "high speed" optical scanner thus has part of what may prove to be "the answer" to electronic voting.
We'd like to see copies of the raw graphics given to anybody else that wants them right there on election night. We have a free public source tool, the Votoscope, that will help analyze these ballots quickly.
With the tabulation happening on multiple systems owned by multiple groups (county elections, press, political parties, groups like BBV, etc.) and of multiple types, well NOW we've got an electronic record we can start to trust.
We end up with this bizarre world in which each media outlet goes over to county elections HQ with the beefiest PC they can build so they can get out tabulations faster than other outlets or even beat the county's tabulator!
Diebold's high-speed central count is a start towards that world except they're not doing the hashes right, they didn't envision public distribution of the scans.
One thing we've seen Diebold get truly "right" is the presence of the CD burner drive on every GEMS box for doing rapid data backups -- but now that we at BBV, the Alaska Democrats and others are pointing out that such backups can also be used to distribute GEMS data as public records so we can double-check it, Diebold has proposed with a straight face *removing* those CD burner drives entirely in their latest proposal in California, replacing it with an expensive and totally unnecessary tape backup drive.
quote:Also, you did not answer my question: "Should you not also be concerned about private companies like ES&S and Seqouia, which unlike Diebold, is not publicly traded?" Please answer..
Phil, I can recall discussing this with Bev circa September or October of 2003 in some detail.
First, if you look at Bev's book again, the early chapters focus NOT on Diebold, but rather on ES&S. Bev's early concern was in the convoluted political ties prevalent with some of the vendors, with ES&S being first and foremost in that department! That's what the book was originally going to be about circa late 2002.
But then in January of '03 Bev found that Diebold unsecured website with 40,000+ files on it and that changed *everything*. For the first time we could kick the tires on real voting machine software, examine source code, even look through manuals labeled "not for customer distribution".
That got the "Diebold ball" rolling, and then by summer somebody leaked the 13,000ish Diebold internal e-mails to Bev and that gave the ball another hard push, leading to scrutiny by California, Maryland (the RABA and SAIC reports), the Nevada Gaming Commission report, Compuware in Ohio and more.
So by now, and really by around October of '03, it looked like an "all Diebold all the time" movement.
But that's NOT how Bev and I saw it, not how Kathleen saw it for that matter, not how we see it today.
What Bev and I discussed back in '03 was basically a three-step process:
1) Fully expose Diebold's issues;
2) If Diebold is publicly proven to have defective software, ask "how did the Federal testing labs and oversight process approve this}"?
3) From the lab's notes and "political wreckage" find out what happened at all the REST of the vendors approved by the same labs!!!
In other words, if the labs completely "blew it" with oversight of Diebold, did they similarly goof up oversight of the rest of the industry?
We've been more or less following that gameplan ever since, although when we do get good data on the others we publish and investigate further.
But the overall plan is working. More and more people are commenting on those labs...not just activists but those inside government agencies, especially in California so far.
The brick wall we're up against here is crumbling.
Diebold being "ground zero" has nothing to do with the fact that they're on the stock exchange when the others aren't and everything to do with their massive and repeated information leaks.
We know their products stink, and we can describe the odor in great detail. But we are NOT prepared to say with any assurance at all that they're the most stenchful; for all we know Sequoia, ES&S, MicroVote or some other vendor has a product that's even worse.
Jim
* * * * * *
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* * * * * *
* * * * * *
TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Robert Sawdey
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rsawdey
Post Number: 3
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 4:06 pm: |
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Not the only, not even necessarily the most egreqious... just the easiest to prove... and, personally, I think it'll be a 'house of cards' from there... they're ALL crooks approved by crooks for crooks... bureaucracies rot from the head... once a bad apple is in a position of power, all subordinates are complicit in corruption. |
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 4
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 5:57 pm: |
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It appears that the Maryland Board of Elections will only supply information about the voting system through formal public information requests, despite the recent newspaper coverage:
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/politics/bal-md.voting26jan26,1,962675.st ory?coll=bal-local-headlines
http://www.journalism.umd.edu/cns/wire/060125-Wednesday/LamoneLetter_CNS-UMCP.ht ml
So, I would appreciate any suggestions for specific types of information that I should request in addition to the version number of the Diebold optical scan system.
I read the description of Jim March's investigation in San Joaquin County in November, 2005 and noted that there is now third party software to correct the GEMS defect. I will ask if Maryland utilizes any of these software programs. I'm not a technical person, however, so I would appreciate any suggestions.
FYI We, TrueVoteMD.org, helped craft legislation requiring a voter-verified paper ballot and audit trail. It is being sponsored by a powerful committee chair and we are very hopeful of passage in this election year. The bill (HB 244) can be found here:
http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/bills/hb/hb0244f.pdf
The bill has audit requirements of 5% of precincts in each county. But, I now realize that we did not specify hand-count audits of absentee ballots. Please offer any suggestions for improving this legislation. A hearing will be held on February 1st. There is also a bill mandating a precinct-count optical scan system to replace the Diebold DRE's. |
Kathleen Wynne
Moderator
Username: Admin_ii
Post Number: 193
Registered: 08-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 7:21 pm: |
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Robert,
I have great respect for the work being done by TrueVoteMD and commend you all for your good work, as it's having a positive impact on the rest of the country in achieving real election reform!
In response to your request for help in what to ask for in a public records request, here are some links that I think will help for starters:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/17103.html
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/2197/13150.html
With regard to suggestions on the legislation that TrueVoteMD is hoping will be passed in the Maryland legislature this year, my first question is whether the bill you've given a link to is the "final" bill that will be voted on? Many times, as I'm sure you're aware, at the final vote, the bill presented has been changed significantly from how it was originally written. Just wanted to make sure. If so, I will definitely review the bill, as I'm very interested in such legislation that would have the appropriate formula for conducting a meaningful audit based on percentages.
FYI, Jim March is BBV's most qualified expert in this area and may also see your post tonight and will respond as well. If not, I will make certain that I bring it to Jim's attention.
Hope this helps.
Kathleen Wynne
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TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Robert Sawdey
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rsawdey
Post Number: 4
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 7:26 pm: |
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Sunshine, sunshine, sunshine! Get every aspect of the system, from acquisition to use, out in the public's view, with LOTS of people watching. Who authorized the equiptment, who oversees compliance, do these people have conflicts of interest with the suppliers?
Distribute the power... resist any attempts to centralize ANYTHING... publish all data at the lowest level to permit the maximum amount of observers & checks upon all higher levels of the data aggregation.
No authority without responsibility... make sure there are PENALTIES for malfeasance, and all decisions & actions are traceable to an individual's decision from a position of authority... an individual who can be held RESPONSIBLE! |
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 5
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 7:42 pm: |
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This is the first version of the bill, Kathleen, and the hearing on the 1st is the first and probably only hearing. So, suggestions are welcome, although we are not sure how receptive the sponsors will be. It is already much longer and more detailed than they are accustomed to.
They generally leave details like this to the Board of Elections in the form of regulations. If we cannot get any ammendments in the law, then we will pursue the regulatory route, but Administrator Lamone is notorious in her opposition to paper. |
Kathleen Wynne
Moderator
Username: Admin_ii
Post Number: 194
Registered: 08-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 8:47 pm: |
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Robert,
I would be most interested in how the sponsors respond to this proposed bill. Particularly, if they should decide to leave it up to the BOE to handle such "details", considering it's their responsibility and duty to legislate in accordance with the Maryland citizens' will and not the BOE's!
Please let me know what they decide to do. If they choose to pass the buck, then they should give a detailed reason for doing so and I'd love to hear it. Accordingly, their decision will govern how you should proceed.
In the meantime, will get back to you with any suggestions. Also, if you need more info regarding the public records request, please let me know.
Kathleen
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TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
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Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 6
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 26, 2006 - 9:58 pm: |
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Thanks. Let me clarify. The sponsors are fine with the details as already written in the bill and will entertain some amendments to strengthen the bill, but they are worried that adding too much more will cause it to lose support and they do not want to delay passage.
Also, the same day as the hearing, there will be a report on a study from the University of Maryland that examined 5 "verification" systems that could possibly be added to the Diebold DRE's. This study was commissioned by Lamone and includes VoteHere, Scytl, an audio, a video and the Diebold VVPAT. As you can see, Lamone rigged the study against paper verification. |
Jim March
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 110
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 27, 2006 - 8:24 am: |
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Hi Robert,
Diebold has proposed loading software on the computer running the central tabulator (GEMS) that restricts access to the database from any program except GEMS itself. They also provide a separate login-name access system for the data files and note any unauthorized changes - in other words, copy the file off to another machine and edit it, load it back to the GEMS box, the add-on software is supposed to alert on that.
The two programs we know Diebold has either mentioned or experimented with are "Tripwire" and "Digital Guardian" - those are two key terms for any records requests.
According to Harri Hursti, these things are REALLY tricky to install correctly - if set up wrong they end up introducing MORE security holes, esp. if there's networking/internet connectivity going on.
Done right, well...GEMS security is so hideous that basically anything would be an improvement!
However, it appears these things also slow down processing on election night, to possibly unacceptable levels.
Without testing that can be trusted, all of this is worthless as no public trust is possible. And the current labs have "blown it" so badly that a whole new test structure, a whole new way of *thinking* about testing is necessary if we're ever going to get public confidence back.
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3394
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 27, 2006 - 10:26 am: |
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Robert - it really sucks that you have to rely on Maryland for your public records requests. They not only have a glacial response time (up to 30 days even to do a preliminary response!) but Linda Lamone in particular seems impervious to actually following Maryland public records law. We have really wrestled with her, ultimately unsuccessfully, to get any answer at all to formal public records requests.
As to what you should ask for:
quote: version number of the Diebold optical scan system.
To get this, you'll probably have to request a document (they don't have to answer questions). The relevant document would be the invoices or billings for the absentee counter, along with the product description sheets which include the version number and machine specs.
quote: third party software to correct the GEMS defect. I will ask if Maryland utilizes any of these software programs. I'm not a technical person, however, so I would appreciate any suggestions.
The software they are trying to use in Ohio is called Digital Guardian, made by Verdasys I think. We have also heard the name "Tripwire" mentioned but aren't sure whether that's for the GEMS defect or something else, nor do we know whether it works. Note that in the CompuWare Report (Jan 2005) the Digital Guardian program did not work to correct the GEMS defect until a patch or upgrade was developed, so version number and patches on Digital Guardian would also be relevant.
quote:FYI We, TrueVoteMD.org, helped craft legislation requiring a voter-verified paper ballot and audit trail. It is being sponsored by a powerful committee chair and we are very hopeful of passage in this election year.
TrueVoteMD.org rocks, as usual. Good luck with the bill. You guys are doing groundbreaking work.
quote:The bill has audit requirements of 5% of precincts in each county.
Great! Devil will be in the details, of course -- selection criteria, monitoring, etc. But you have to have it to monitor it, and 5 percent is getting into the range I'd call "robust."
quote:But, I now realize that we did not specify hand-count audits of absentee ballots. Please offer any suggestions for improving this legislation.
The key to accurate hand-count spot checks of the absentees is to require that the detail report also breaks out absentee votes by precinct. (Make sure the detail report is run before doing the audit, and make sure it breaks out results precinct by precinct -- Diebold calls this the Statement of Votes Cast report, but that term is specific to the GEMS program)
If you don't break out the absentees by precinct, you're asking for insider fraud. True, you can do a lot of accounting by labeling batches and drawing up elaborate chain of custody requirements for the batches, but that is riskier, in my opinion, than having the absentee ballots sorted by precinct and counted by precinct. Others may disagree with me on this.
Another key to good hand count auditing is to toss out the popular idea that you just count one race. That makes it easy to substitute ballots into the mix. Make sure that in the hand count audit, ALL the ballot questions are counted for the sample sets.
quote: A hearing will be held on February 1st.
If citizens can ask questions, come in prepared with note cards and get at least some citizen agreement to coordinate what questions are asked. Encourage asking questions/videotape the answers rather than making speeches. Bring camcorder, gather evidence, you never know what you're gonna get.
quote: There is also a bill mandating a precinct-count optical scan system to replace the Diebold DRE's.
Way to go, guys! |
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 7
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 27, 2006 - 11:10 am: |
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Thanks Jim and Bev. That is the specific type of advice that I was seeking. We will keep at the public records requests and also share this with the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, who can get documents through the discovery process (but cannot make them public at this time).
We are a little worried about the study, because the only paper trail being studied (by Lamone's design) is the terrible continuous roll printer by Diebold. If the UMBC study gives it really bad marks it may be used by Lamone against the bill. We'll just have to see. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1595
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 27, 2006 - 11:20 am: |
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Can you do something to suggest hand counting and several key procedures, in any case?
And reference several locations (incl. Canada) where this is done well, with indications of price and procedures that would be secure and cost-effective?
This is the kind of info that is usually missing in relation to manual counting or re-counting. It's not difficult to extrapolate time & cost for multiple elections/issues and to plan accordingly to ensure sufficient staff. |
Kathleen Wynne
Moderator
Username: Admin_ii
Post Number: 196
Registered: 08-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 12:11 pm: |
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Robert,
A few other comments to be considered with regard to Maryland House Bill 244:
P. 4
Line 30
(II)
"...stored for 1 year..." The Federal law requires election data to be stored for 22 months. Shouldn't state law be the same as federal for ballot storage?
P. 5
Line 5
(C)
With regard to the visually impaired having the same access to verify their ballots as those without disabilities; maybe the language could be more specific in detailing that equivalent access for those with disabilities to "verify those ballots that are fed to the printer". Otherwise, it is not really equivalent to what other voters get to verify.
P. 5
Line 11
(A) This is very good, but what about prohibiting any wireless capability in the machines? Just because the data is required to be transferred via physical means, does not prohibit the existence of wireless capability in the system. This is just a precautionary measure.
P. 5
Line 18
(C)
I think a 30-day certification time frame before election, especially for “modifications,” may be cutting it too close. Just in case you ever got the ability to check the software, 30 days wouldn’t be enough time to complete the modifications. In order to avoid a lot of last minute changes and in anticipation of being able to check software in the future, 90 days might be a better time frame.
Kathleen
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 8
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 5:36 pm: |
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Thanks Kathleen for the detailed suggestions. I will pass them on to the TrueVote team working on amending the bill language.
Another question for anyone.
Our opinion is that the Diebold system here in Maryland is non-compliant with FEC standards and should be de-certified by MD. Is there any formal process at the national level (EAC ?) that could compel re-testing of a voting system when it is learned that key components of the system were never tested to see if they met the standards. This is how I view the existence of the interpreted code on the memory cards that your terrific work has uncovered.
Lamone will never decertify the system. Absent action at the state level, like CA and PA, what avenue exists for decertification? The lawsuit is ongoing, but that process is glacially slow. |
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 9
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 6:11 pm: |
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I put several calls to Brian Hancock at the EAC about my questions, but he never answers.
I have just learned that there is some sort of report due from NASED about this. But, it seems very unlikely that they will slam Diebold, especially when Brit Williams and Paul Craft will be writing the report. Any thoughts about how to expose this stinking mess.
Someone said that Black Box Voting has done research on Williams and Craft. Can you point me to any previous work you have done? |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 23
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 6:57 pm: |
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Here is a post that I found at Vote Trust USA on the standards committee. The article mentions Williams and Craft.
It must be pointed out that Dr. Brit Williams and Paul Craft both have individual conflicts of interest. Dr. Williams has been an outspoken defender of DRE voting systems and has worked closely with Diebold as the company’s ally in Georgia. Dr. Williams was one of the architects of the voting system presently being used in Georgia. Can he be expected to approve standards that are counter to decisions that he has made in regards to the Georgia voting system?
Vern Reisenleiter
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Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1602
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 30, 2006 - 2:19 am: |
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Any info about the nature of Craft's conflict of interest? |
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 10
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 30, 2006 - 10:23 am: |
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I recently received this story about Paul Craft:
Craft is the one who certified the crashed ES&S units in 2002. Craft first blamed Miami-Dade officials and then ES&S. Paul Craft, was at the time head of the Division of Elections' certification department, which has to approve equipment and software before it can be used, blamed ES&S for filing an incomplete application for certification. WHAT!
''The [audit trail] anomaly is present in the [touch-screen] systems used in all counties,'' Craft wrote on May 15 2002. The only difference, he said, was that most other counties did not transmit the voting data to flashcards like Miami-Dade does, so the problem took longer to surface elsewhere. Craft and state officials were insisting publicly that the failure of the machines to record the correct serial numbers in post-election audits was just an ''anomaly''. Paul Craft has long been rumored to be part of the ES&S team. I understand some ES&S employee lives next door to him.
Craft looked the other way during the infamous Florida voter list purge - this from the Vanity Fair story:
http://www.makethemaccountable.com/articles/The_Path_To_Florida.htm
"The Department of State spokeswoman, Nicole de Lara, has claimed that the glitch was “unforeseen” and “unintentional.” But according to Jeff Long, a veteran F.D.L.E. official, starting in 1999 with the preparation of the 2000 purge list, his office informed the secretary of state’s office how the F.D.L.E. matched for race. “We provided an extract of what’s in our criminal databases, which included the categories for race,” says Long. “The extract listed five categories for race. Those codes do not include an ‘H’ [for “Hispanic”].” Asked who was in receipt of this information, he cites Janet Modrow and voting-systems chief Paul Craft, both of whom are still working in the secretary of state’s office. James Lee of ChoicePoint told Vanity Fair that DBT and state elections officials had actually discussed the glitch. He, too, cites Modrow as well as Bucky Mitchell. (Modrow, Craft, and Mitchell could not be reached for comment.) The matching flaw was discussed yet again, in 2001, at state voter-file meetings, according to Chuck Smith, elections-supervisor employee in Hillsborough County, who attended them. As for Accenture, whatever flaws emerged were not their problem, claims Meg McLaughlin, president of Accenture’s “eDemocracy Services.” “Accenture’s contract in no way says that we are to validate the data,” McLaughlin said at a recent hearing before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. “The only thing Accenture was asked and contracted to do was to build the tool.” |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 24
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 30, 2006 - 11:25 am: |
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A little more on Craft, some of it from BBV. Robert Ferraro got here first, this complements
his post.
Craft was in charge of putting together Florida's voter purge list in 2004. To his credit he apparently warned Jeb Bush about problems with the list (at the last minute.) Bush denied that anyone advised him of problems and sent out the list.
Sarasota Herald Tribune October 16, 2004
This article at VoteTrustUSA has information on the improper certification of the Diebold TSX.
5. Preferential Treatment of Diebold. We are alleging that the Division of Elections has shown preferential treatment to Diebold and that the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification created a double standard of certification procedures for the Diebold TSX and the ES&S AutoMark. As an example of this preferential treatment, Diebold was required to run 10,010 ballots with only 138 ballot styles. AutoMark was required to recreate the entire Miami-Dade county 2004 general election, comprised of almost 800,000 voters, and 3,400 ballot styles. The Bureau of Voting Systems Certification ran its Phase I and Phase II testing of the Diebold system from March 21-23, 2005. Six days later the Division of Elections certified the Diebold TSX and the blended system. It allowed Diebold to FAX its final application on March 29 and then certified the system that same day! By contrast, AutoMark successfully completed its Phase I testing in October, but the Phase II testing is not scheduled until December 13, 2005. We are alleging that the Division of Elections is attempting to defeat the AutoMark by delaying its certification at every step of the certification process, since the Division knows that all counties must purchase disabled-accessible voting machines no later than midnight on December 31, 2005.
6. Apparent Cover-Up. We believe the Florida Division of Elections, specifically the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification, is obstructing our receipt of other information requested and that the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification appears to be actively involved in a cover-up of its improper certification of the TSX and the blended system. We don't know if these problems contributed to the sudden resignation of Paul Craft, who was until November 21, Chief of the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification, a department of the Division of Elections. If this situation did not contribute to Craft's resignation, it certainly should have.
This BBV post discusses Craft resigning from his position as head of the Bureau of Voting Systems Certification. He then started his own company to provide consulting services for getting voting systems through the certification process. While this November 2005 article at infowars questions why anyone would engage his company.
Missing in action -- Craft's comments on:
1) The Diebold optical scan design flaw allowing manipulation through removable, credit-card-sized "memory cards," which appears to violate the 1990 FEC standards to which he certified the system. This flaw has been characterized as "the mother of all security holes."
Hursti's report
2) The GEMS defect, which has now been acknowledged by Diebold, allows anyone with access to manipulate both ballot design and votes in the central tabulator. Black Box Voting has recently learned that this defect puts mail-in ballots at especially high risk.
This defect is considered so serious that Diebold has taken steps recently to locate third party software to reduce the risk. The GEMS defect is easy to spot, simple to confirm, and was exposed publicly on July 8, 2003.
More on the GEMS defect
Did Craft not know of these defects, or did he just choose not to say anything?
On Oct. 6 and 7, Craft met with Harri Hursti, the author of the memory card study. Hursti's study was also cited in the Oct. 21 GAO report.
But Craft knew how grave the memory card vulnerability was much earlier: On July 28, Craft received correspondence from M.I.T. security expert Ronald Rivest, characterizing the Hursti-identified defects as "stunning" and "startling." Rivest wrote that he had forwarded the report to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), recommending replication. If the findings turn out to be true, Rivest indicated, the system should never have been certified, as it would indeed violate even 1990 FEC standards.
Paul Craft was, of course, one of the individuals who certified the system.
Rivest letter
Finally, this quote from the Vote Trust USA article that I cited in my previous post.
Dr. Brit Williams, a member of the committee, stated that he opposes any new standards that would make technology already purchased non-compliant. Paul Craft, another member of the committee, then suggested that they hear from the vendor engineers who were in the audience to see what they would do about the proposed standards. At this point, Dr. Semerjian, the chairman of the committee and the Director of NIST, said that the TGDC is not in existence to approve existing voting systems, nor rubber stamp state decisions. The committee then went on a break.
Upon return from the break Paul Craft announced that he had talked to the vendors and that they did not like some of the standards. A vote was then held and those standards were deleted.
Vern Reisenleiter
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Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 11
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 7:22 am: |
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We had a great hearing on the new VVPBAT legislation yesterday in Annapolis. There was testimony from a broad array of citizen groups and individuals, including great testimony by Avi Rubin. He said, he works all the time to eliminate the need for paper, but that he does not know of any way to make computers completely secure for voting and he doesn't know of any alternative to paper that meets the requirements for transparency in elections.
The only people to testify against the legislation were election officials who said that it would be impossible to implement before the Sept. primary. They also made the incredible claim that a 5% audit would require 2 months to complete and therefore would miss the deadlines for certification of election results for federal elections. Absolutely shameless.
The press ignored the hearing, as usual.
My reason for posting, however, is that Lamone claimed that the memory card problem for the DRE's is of no concern because they are encrypted. She ignored the question about the optical scans for absentee ballots.
TrueVote, through my testimony, called for decertification because the system is in non-compliance with federal standards and, therefore, illegal under MD law. I referenced BBV work and the official reports & documents you have posted. Lamone insists that it is not an issue at all.
Does encryption safeguard against the expoitation of the interpreted code on the memory cards as Lamone says?
I asked Avi to help get other experts to weigh in on this question. It would really help to counter their casual dismissal of the seriousness of the vulnerabilities and the question of decertifcation.
Another citizen called for an independent panel of experts to test MD's system as was done in Leon County. She asked specifically for Hursti and Rubin to be involved. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3492
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 8:06 am: |
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Re: the encryption issue -- This depends on how the encryption is done, and what it is designed to protect. This is exactly why BBV is seeking a legitimate testing opportunity for Harri Hursti with the TSx machines.
Note that the parameters of such testing require that Hursti NOT be asked to sign a nondisclosure agreement. (See our article on the truly awful effect NDAs can/have had on elections integrity:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/17717.html
There are actually two issues, with the memory cards:
1) What changes can be made with the AccuBasic code? That isn't so much an encryption issue as one of verification of the integrity of the code on the card using hash marks.
2) Can votes be changed on the memory card?
The AccuBasic programs affect the reporting of the votes and the vote-changing affects the votes themselves, two related but slightly different issues. Encryption would relate to changing the votes, but the devil would be in the details -- how and when is the encryption invoked, and how effective is it?
For example, there are actually some protections built into the optical scan system, but amazingly, they don't protect the key things. For example, I believe it will detect changing the candidate name, but won't detect changing the votes! |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1619
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 8:39 am: |
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If Diebold wants to have proper testing carrying out it would be possible to structure an NDA that would meet any legitimate concerns.
Sounds like Diebold is just using NDAs to obstruct.
Lots of other companies must have proprietary software that must be inspected or audited by a 3rd party. How is this handled by banks? What about fly-by-wire software in the aircraft industry? Or software for regulating measuring equipment which must be calibrated to a certain standard?
There must be plenty of software applications with public safety or reliability issues that require some kind of inspection and certification, and that also involve proprietary software. How are NDAs handled in these circumstances?
Since votes are public property (or should be) that should be an over-arching circumstance that should outweigh any vendor's claim to trade secrets.
What arrangements do vendors have with the ITAs regarding NDAs? |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1620
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 8:41 am: |
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And shouldn't an NDA be overruled if it is in the overriding public interest, or if an NDA is being used to cover up a crime? |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1621
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 8:43 am: |
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It might be good where there are court cases involving discovery, to ask for any Diebold correspondence (internal or external) concerning the preparation or execution of NDAs with any other 3rd parties. |
Robert Ferraro
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Bob_ferraro
Post Number: 12
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 10, 2006 - 11:56 am: |
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OK friends. We have found out that MD uses the AccuVote ES-2000 version 1.96.4 for counting the absentee and provisional ballots.
From your previous posts, I see that this is completely vulnerable to a Hursti-style attack. Is there anything new that you would like to add?
Also, any comments on the California testing for this problem? Did they just send Diebold back to the same ITAs that missed this vulnerability the first time? Why should we trust their examination, especially if nothing is made public? Or, will the State of California be more open?
Maryland officials say they are waiting for the California report. |
John Washburn
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 8
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 10, 2006 - 3:12 pm: |
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missed this vulnerability the first time?
According to NASED there are 13 Diebold systems assigned a NASED/EAC number. This a detection record for the Hursti defect by the ITA labs of 0 for 13.
(Message edited by johnwashburn on February 10, 2006) |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1712
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 10, 2006 - 3:32 pm: |
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And that doesn't include any other vendors' systems which may have similar defects. |
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