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| We just got new machines...What to do? |
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| Author |
Message |
    
Jason Reed
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jasonr
Post Number: 1
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 11, 2006 - 4:23 pm: | 
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Coos County, Oregon getting new voting machines, what should I do?
I heard a blip on the radio so I just had to comfirm...
Hi,
I heard a blip on the radio saying we were getting voting machines with software. Is this so?
Thanks, Jason
Check this responce out. She's absolutly giddy! No idea at all.
Absolutely! We’ve actually recently gotten an entirely new election system, which includes two new tabulating (ballot counting) machines & its related software. Another piece of the system is our voter registration system which is now a centralized, statewide system. We’re very excited!
Please give me a call if you have questions – or come by for a tour!
Terri Turi, Coos County Clerk
How should I tell her about the screwing we may be up against?
What should I do, please? |
Denise Zollman
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Azadvocate
Post Number: 7
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 11, 2006 - 4:29 pm: |
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Take a tour AND take a camera AND ask lots more questions!
I'd just gather info rather than discuss the downside of electronic systems.
Where is Coos County? |
Jason Reed
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jasonr
Post Number: 2
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 11, 2006 - 4:37 pm: |
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Hi Denise,
I may be a bit paranoid. As I wrote that post, I got this responce..
No!!!! J
We have purchased through ES&S – Election systems and software. They are the company we have used for years. The ballot counters are optical scan readers, just as we had before. The difference to the voter will be the look of the ballot. Remember you connected an arrow to choose your vote? Now you will be filling in an oval. Just like SAT tests the kids take for college entrance exams. We used them in a small election for the City of Bandon in November and they worked like a charm! I’m really looking forward to our next big election in May!
I know some people have heard about software being programmed by third parties or by vendors and then sent to counties, and therefore feel that is not secure enough. I will tell you that here in Coos County, we program our elections in-house! (I’m kind of a control freak – so want to make sure it’s all good – need to touch it, feel it, smell it, so to speak.) So rest assured there are only 3 people who have access to our election program: myself and my two full time election staffers.
Truly…if you’re ever in Coquille, please stop by the courthouse. I’m either in the Election office or my Recording office. I’d love to give you the tour and show off the new equipment. I think you’ll be impressed.
Thanks for the questions!
We're on the S/W coast of Oregon.
Are these machines certifiable?
(Message edited by jasonr on January 11, 2006) |
Denise Zollman
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Azadvocate
Post Number: 8
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 11, 2006 - 5:01 pm: |
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We have the ES & S optical scan readers in Maricopa County, AZ and they're the ones under review by Dr. Douglas W. Jones/U of Iowa. Have a report due out within days (we hope). ES & S even has an office INSIDE our county elections office! Here's a link to some of the certification requirements from the FEC...I haven't read it all but have been trying to get through some of it today.
http://search.freefind.com/find.html?id=50985594&pageid=r&mode=ALL&n=0&query=vot ing+machine+software |
James Zukowski
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimz
Post Number: 172
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, January 11, 2006 - 5:09 pm: |
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Jason:
A little paranoia is appropriate at times; after all, sometimes someone really is out to getcha.
To start, the best advice is what's already been given: set an appointment, bring the camera (be sure to turn it on), and ask LOTS of questions.
As to whether the machines are certifiable, I think the more appropriate question is whether the County Clerk is...
But seriously. Find out specifically the hardware you're using there. Check with John Washburn (in Wisconsin, he posts here A LOT) as to the types of questions to ask about the specific configurations and certifications.
Since Oregon is all mail-in, you only have equipment at the county clerk's office to deal with; no precincts with their own equipment. Are there still drop-off locations for ballots other than at the clerk's office? Just wondering.
Keep at it. Ask questions here. Ask questions there. Let's help each other get our votes counted properly.
Peace!
James Zukowski
Keep at it
The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything.
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BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3173
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, January 12, 2006 - 10:51 am: |
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1. Take a video camera. Record the answers given to you by public officials and (even better) the vendor, if any.
2. Make sure to get an answer to this: Is it true that the issue of counting backwards at 32,000 votes has not yet been resolved?
What, specifically, has been done to resolve it?
How many locations have had discrepancies due to this defect?
* * * * * *
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Protect election 2006: 'Candid America' project. Don't leave home without your camcorder! What to do:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/15733.html
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Steven Holt
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Stockpix
Post Number: 1
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 12:55 pm: |
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Hi Jason,
I'm also in Coos County and interested in this issue.
I'm a still photographer. Let me know if you schedule a tour. |
gordon masao kobayashi
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Gkaba
Post Number: 1
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 4:42 pm: |
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By unaminous vote by the Board of Supervisors, Calaveras County,CA, where I reside has decided to install ES&S M100 and Automark for the 2006 election. There are a number of people in our county has can mobilize to contest this.
I would appreciate any suggestions on what we can do. Sincerely, Gordon Kobayashi |
David L. Dill
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Davidldill
Post Number: 8
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 6:12 pm: |
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I resolved not to post here, but this is so worrying that I feel I need to. I assume the issue here is not being familiar with the pros and cons of different technology.
The ES&S M100 and the AutoMark is the kind of combination that most activists have been pushing for!
The system your county has purchased is EXACTLY the "voter verified paper ballots" (BALLOTS, not audit trails or records) that Black Box Voting has been demanding. You got them! Your registrar of voters not only bought the right system, she seems to be trying REALLY HARD to work with you.
In a place like your county, the next big push needs to be making sure that good procedures are followed. For example, how is the 1% manual audit actually conducted? Do they really choose the precincts randomly, as they are supposed to?
That's not paranoid, and shouldn't be confrontational. The election officials should welcome you to watch how they do things.
(The counting backwards thing is real. It happened in the tally system in the central office as I recall. That's why everything needs to be cross-checked against the precinct totals.)
Nothing will hurt this movement more than punishing good deeds by election officials. |
David L. Dill
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Davidldill
Post Number: 9
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 6:16 pm: |
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Oops, I merged two sets of messages in my response. The Coos Bay system must be for counting mail ballots, since that's what Oregon has. Unless you want to count them by hand, mail ballots are going to be counted on a system similar to this. All computerized systems need to be double-checked by some manual counts. I think that was Doug Jones's main point in Maricopa County, where they won't let anyone see the paper ballots that are sitting in a warehouse.
I don't know how friendly the Calavaras County CA election clerk is. But that's one of the better kinds of systems, and has voter-verified paper ballots for everyone, even blind voters, which is a good thing. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3272
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 8:25 pm: |
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Dave Dill,
Actually, it is the position of Black Box Voting that the one percent spot check is insufficient and does not act as a fraud deterrent, and that the data so far does not show that the ES&S machines are secure.
There is no evidence that the M100s (and the Unity tabulator that accumulate their data) will pass scrutiny any better than Diebold. Nor is there any evidence that they are worse. Dr. Dill, as one of the most famous scientists in the election integrity movement, and as a professor of computer science from Stanford University, would you agree that the scientific method should involve getting the data before drawing the conclusion that a system is "the right system"?
"The system your county has purchased is EXACTLY the "voter verified paper ballots" (BALLOTS, not audit trails or records) that Black Box Voting has been demanding."
Actually, Black Box Voting has been demanding that voters are entitled to full oversight of the entire system, the ability to watch and verify every step of the election, plus the ability to examine public source code.
"Your registrar of voters not only bought the right system..."
Dr. Dill, this is not a criticism of you at all, but of your conclusions (something that, I assure you, having been raised in a family of scientists is entirely acceptable and even encouraged!)
It is my position that your conclusions are not supported by the data. It would not be scientifically valid to state that this is "the right system" without examining the software and doing independent penetration tests, correct?
1) The ES&S machines do not have public source code and have not been examined by the public, or even very widely examined by anyone, except the vendor and a handful of certifiers (who failed to catch security problems with other systems). It would seem that the correct conclusion, therefore, would be that we do not have enough evidence to determine whether the machines are secure or not.
2) The ES&S machines have not been subjected to independent penetration testing, or any reasonably rigorous penetration testing procedures, and therefore it would seem that the correct scientific conclusion would be that we cannot assume they are secure.
3) The 1 percent audit procedure has not stood up to scrutiny. This we know. Citizens who have examined and observed have seen that:
- It is not necessarily random
- It is not necessarily meaningful (i.e. there is no point in a 1 percent audit of absentee ballots if you are pulling the one percent out of a single pool of anonymous ballots.)
- It is not large enough to catch deliberate fraud
- It can be circumvented, especially with absentee ballots, by tampering with the tabulator.
- There are no consequences for election officials who fail to follow audit procedures.
I will personally moderate this discussion to make sure there are no personality based attacks, but I would like to debate the data currently available and the conclusions.
Also, the 32,000 vote problem has not been resolved, according to information we have received from Florida. It happened in Orange County as well as Broward, but for some reason the citizens of Orange County apparently were never told. It would therefore appear that the system can not be considered to be accurate.
I hope you don't mind that I ask so many questions, or that I don't happen to agree with the conclusions you posted, because I would very much like to explore these issues with you.
Bev |
David L. Dill
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Davidldill
Post Number: 10
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 11:39 pm: |
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I don't know that we have any substantial disagreement here. The context is that a lot of these counties have to buy new equipment, and I'm so used to fighting an uphill battle to get some place not to buy AccuVote-TSx, iVotronics, or (bleh) Daneher 1242 DREs that it's positively refreshing to hear that someone is buying precinct-count optical scan machines with the AutoMark.
I don't know the specifics of the ES&S M100, except that it's relatively new, and the GENERIC technology is the best. Of precinct-count optical scan systems, I don't know if it's better or worse than others. I do know it has VVPBs!
I completely agree on the auditing points you raise. Some of these are hard, but I don't think we have any choice but to figure out how to solve them. Auditing procedures are the next frontier for all of us, I believe.
I'm too tired to be coherent at this point. I'll check in again today or tomorrow. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3290
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 20, 2006 - 11:51 pm: |
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Dr. Dill,
Thank you and ditto. Note that some locations are now asserting themselves, digging in their heels, and refusing to comply. THAT is what I find refreshing. I know that elections officials are being whipsawed.
However, it is times like these where true courage is required. More and more elections officials are showing real backbone, refusing to capitulate to a law that was, after all, lobbied in by vested interests trying to make a buck on a gold rush they helped create.
It is interesting, isn't it, that the only deadlines in HAVA that anyone seems to be enforcing are the ones dealing with procurement!
And thank you for participating, because we do value your input. I will moderate more strictly than I have in the past to make sure this stays focused on issues. |
David L. Dill
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Davidldill
Post Number: 11
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 3:07 pm: |
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Now that I've had a little sleep:
I want to make it clear that I know little about the specifics ES&S M100. I leave the advice at "precinct count optical scan." It seems that visible light is better than infrared, for lots of reasons, and that actual image processing is better than whatever other obsolete methods people use -- IF the image processing software is good and the machine is properly configured. But I don't have enough information to make specific recommendations.
I actually wonder if we would be better off with machines that blatently malfunction every once-in-awhile to prevent people from being lulled into a false sense of security. The most dangerous voting machine would be one that seems to be completely accurate -- because no machine, no matter how much care goes into it, is completely trustworthy. People really need to understand the need for observation and auditing.
I don't think that means we should eliminate machines. There is a significant part of the activist component that believes we should go back to all hand counting. That's ok in theory, and even in practice in rural areas in the U.S., but it has several problems. One is that it ALSO requires careful procedures and lots of auditing, because those human counters can make mistakes and cheat. Some people have proposed hand counting all the ballots at the polling places right after the close of the election. It would be HARD to mobilize enough observers to watch this process at every precinct! Also, it seems to be a tough sell. Finally, it doesn't seem BETTER than optical scan with extensive auditing, which seems to me to have a much better chance of working out.
Let's look at the auditing points you raised:
- It is not necessarily random
Agreed. I have a report from one county where the "random" choice is done by a Diebold computer! Procedurally this is easy to fix -- just have a public drawing of some kind. The details need to be thought through, but they're not too hard. Note: for this to be trustworthy, you HAVE to have people witnessing the drawing!
- It is not necessarily meaningful (i.e. there is no point in a 1 percent audit of absentee ballots if you are pulling the one percent out of a single pool of anonymous ballots.)
This depends on exactly how the auditing is done. If you have a LOT of precincts, and you recount some precincts at random and compare them with the tallies, it can work (depending on the numbers). If you pull 10,000 ballots out at random and hand count them, the numbers should be very similar to those from the full count -- if they're not, there is a problem.
There are many things that NO ONE has worked out about the best way to do random audits. One big issue is: What happens when the audit shows a discrepancy? There has to be a wider audit, or the original audit is ineffective.
- It is not large enough to catch deliberate fraud
This depends on the total number of precincts for the election in question. But, often, what you say is correct. We either need a completely different procedure which can match individual paper ballots with corresponding electronic ballots (and this approach is not compatible with current PCOS), OR (better: AND) we have to rely on candidate-requested manual recounts. I think we need to put renewed emphasis on liberalizing recount laws so that manual recounts are inexpensive and easy to get.
- It can be circumvented, especially with absentee ballots, by tampering with the tabulator.
They need to be MANUAL recounts, with multiple observers able to check each individual ballot.
I don't think tabulators can be made tamper-proof.
Maybe you're thinking of a different way of cheating than I am.
- There are no consequences for election officials who fail to follow audit procedures.
Good point. Part of accountability is detection. In many cases, we don't even KNOW how these are conducted because no one has checked. Observers are needed!
Then there's the question of legal recourse if they're not done right. Once we know what "right" is, it's time to push for changes in the law to allow better enforcement (I confess that I don't know now what CA election law says about officials who don't follow the specified procedures).
An important point is that, in some cases, there IS no obviously correct procedure that is spelled out. In other cases, it's obvious to us what the right thing to do is, but it's not obvious to the election officials for various reasons, many of are understandable.
Over time, I think we have to work for partnership with election officials.
If they really bought PCOS + AutoMark in Calavaras county, I'd say it's time to congratulate the elections official on a good purchasing decision, and start finding out how they do their audits. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1555
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 3:29 pm: |
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"If you pull 10,000 ballots out at random and hand count them, the numbers should be very similar to those from the full count -- if they're not, there is a problem. "
One of the problems pointed out previously, is that shifting 5-6 votes from one candidate to another at a number of polling places can be enough to change election results yet avoid detection.
If one audits a certain precinct and finds a difference of "just a few votes", that in itself is not going to look like a serious problem and is unlikely to trigger a full recount. Yet exactly this kind of small discrepancy, if repeated in a few well-selected locations, could easily swing a close race. (Just look at the Maricopa AZ situation where in the first count the difference was only 4 votes.)
Re: hand-counting, there was a recent tight grilling of John Howard, Canadian citizen, on their procedures for hand counting. Their procedures seem water-tight as far as security, and they are also efficient and cost-effective.
If someone has this link easily to hand perhaps they can post it here. |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 18
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 5:06 pm: |
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Rats, I canceled a long post. Here is a much shorter version.
I have been working through some of the issues involved in conducting audits--how to size, what measure(s) to use, what accuracy can we expect. So, I have a little insight on the subject. (At least I hope I do.)
Right now I'm stuck on a technical issue. No vote counting process is error free. According to CALTECH/MIT's Voter Technology Project Working Paper #11 the "…weighted average of the discrepancy between the initial count and the recount [of paper ballots] is approximately 0.83 percentage point with a 95% confidence interval from 0.61 to 1.05." I believe that the Withing Precinct Discrepancy (WPD) measure developed by US Count Votes would be a useful statistic. However, I am hard aground in figuring a way to account for the contamination introduced by tabulation error rate when it comes time to calculate p-levels (odds) for the modified WPD statistic.
I need technical help with that problem and a review of what I have done so far. Is one of the Work Areas here a better place to lay thing out. I have a twelve page Word Doc (not ready for prime time) and an Excel file which is pretty much ok.
A nit on public drawings. Mechanically stirring material objects (slips of paper, poker chips, or colored balls) is not a reliable way to draw a random sample.
(Message edited by Vern_Reisenleiter on January 21, 2006)
Vern Reisenleiter
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Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1557
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 5:25 pm: |
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Is a 95% confidence level high enough?
Can conventional statistics (which assume random distribution of any discrepancies) be safely applied to detection of fraud, which is likely to be non-random?
What about the tactic of a distribution of small changes over a wide number of polling places--no individual one enough to alter results in itself, but taken in conjunction with similar small changes at other polling places, could change election results? Would anything short of a 100% recount be sufficient to catch this?
Small inconsistencies can too plausibly be attributed to human error or machine "glitches" and be deemed irrelevant--even though many small discrepancies taken together can alter election results. |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 19
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 6:41 pm: |
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Catherine Ansboro posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 05:25 pm
Is a 95% confidence level high enough?
IMO no. In the material that I worked up to size and analyze audits I used 99% CIs. In my post I just quoted the source. The 99% limit on tabulation error rate is 0.54 to 1.12.
Can conventional statistics (which assume random distribution of any discrepancies) be safely applied to detection of fraud, which is likely to be non-random?
Oh yes. The whole idea is to build the case that the differences between the audit count and the official (or provisional) vote count are not explainable by random events.
The WPD statistic that I would like to use is new, but the theory behind it is what I would call conventional. My problem is trying to factor in an error source that US Count Votes didn't have to contend with when they analyzed
the 2004 Ohio election.
What about the tactic of a distribution of small changes over a wide number of polling places--no individual one enough to alter results in itself, but taken in conjunction with similar small changes at other polling places, could change election results? Would anything short of a 100% recount be sufficient to catch this?
Most certainly. If a fraudulent vote count is spread over all the precincts in a county it is harder to "see" than if it is concentrated in a few precincts--if you examine those precincts. However, The higher the fraud rate (% of precincts with fraudulent votes) they greater the chances of picking up one or more fraudulent precincts in the audit.
The problem is the seeing the fraud which goes back to your previous question.
Small inconsistencies can too plausibly be attributed to human error or machine "glitches" and be deemed irrelevant--even though many small discrepancies taken together can alter election results.
All too true. That is why you have to build a strong case. Random glitches should cancel out. Fraud is cumulative. (There may also be some unintentional machine errors that don't cancel, but we would want to know that too.)
Are audits a panacea? No. If you are looking for 100%, iron-clad assurance you won't find it in an audit. (Nor will you find it in a 100% hand count for that matter.) Further, you may well have to give up on examining many of the small races in a large county. If they are in the sample at all, you take what the audit gives you and do your best.
(Message edited by Vern_Reisenleiter on January 21, 2006)
Vern Reisenleiter
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David L. Dill
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Davidldill
Post Number: 12
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, January 21, 2006 - 7:23 pm: |
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A technical point: The measures of confidence for auditing generally DO NOT depend on the distribution of the fraud. The reason is that the SAMPLE ITSELF is random. So, we can figure out the probability of detecting x% of the votes being stolen, no matter what the strategy of the vote-stealer was, IF the selection is truly random, etc., etc.
The smaller the fraud, the harder it is to catch. If a few votes change the outcome of an incredibly close election, there's just not much we can do except take whatever comfort we can in the fact that there are a lot of other sources of small and not-so-small error anyway.
I heard a truly horrifying study that claimed that something like 4% of the votes on any technology were just wrong, because the voter made a mistake! The terrible thing is that those errors won't be random and cancel each other out. They'll depend on ballot position, which is fixed in many states.
Figuring out what the right confidence level is and so on is not really answerable. It depends on what enough people will be satisfied with. |
Jim March
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 99
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:37 am: |
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I'd like to back Dr. Dill on one point in particular: the approach to this county elections official SHOULD be friendly. The decision to make things an "adversarial relationship" should never be ours, but sadly it is one sometimes made by them.
Elections officials decide to be adversarial when they discourage all forms of public scrutiny, before during and after the election. That's really the core issue, as it relates to everything else discussed here. Dr. Dill's example of the selection of recount spot-check precincts being public is a good example. Others include:
* Handing out electronic copies of the tabulator data files so we can check tabulator operations on our laptops right there at the county elections headquarters on election night.
* Letting us hear the words spoken by the people tabulating the vote (or operating the computers doing so).
* Letting us see the screen displays of the tabulators or other computers. This may mean projecting them onto screens with a typical "powerpoint projector", or splitting the signal to extra monitors, or just positioning the screens close to the public.
These are just examples. All of this public oversight also applies to the Logic&Accuracy testing.
Now here's the good news.
If the county elections official in Coos are inviting people in for a tour, they're already worlds ahead of at least one elections official, Conny McCormack in Los Angeles. Which suggests they're at least trying, and can be gently educated (if necessary!) to take them the rest of the way towards true public oversight.
Trust me: such friendly guidance will be one heck of a lot easier than years of court brawls.
We know of other elections officials who are trying to do right. The people in San Mateo, Yolo and Mendocino Counties in California fr'instance, we at Black Box Voting would NOT pick fights with those folks and have praised them and others any number of times.
From the tone, Coos is another possibility. Let's hope so and act accordingly  .
Jim
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TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
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