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| (US) 3/06 - E-Voting machines can be ... |
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Mark Bennett
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Truthiness
Post Number: 1
Registered: 03-2006
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, March 7, 2006 - 1:29 pm: | 
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How the ATM works:
* You put your card in, type in your pin and conduct your transaction, you get a receipt.
* The ATM machine accesses your account by talking to your banks computer. Your transaction is instantly recorded at your banks database, and your account is updated. The ATM also records the transaction on it’s own hard drive
* Let’s say you have a home computer and have online access to your bank account. Some people have telephone access.
* You can go to your home computer minutes later, go online, and see that ATM transaction there.
Why ATM’s have virtually a 100% accuracy rate:
* Most ATM users would find errors sooner or later.
* If errors were reported often in ATM transactions, banks would not use them because fixing the errors would become too costly.
* Comparing the ATM receipt to an inaccurate electronic transaction would be a proof enough for a legal dispute against the bank and Diebold.
Let's Add A Recipt Printer to the Voting Machines. A 'Voter Receipt' is the KEY.
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Receipt:
* Like ATM’s, the voting machine gives a receipt to the machine user.
* The voting machine does not know who is using it so no personal information is on the receipt.
* The receipt contains a unique ‘vote number’ similar to an ATM transaction number.
* The receipt does not have the votes printed on it.
* Your receipt is physical evidence of fraud, if it happens, and is needed to file a complaint
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Machine:
* No ATM card needed, just touch the start button. The machine never knows who you are
* It will ask you twice for any 4 digit PIN that you will remember.
* Cast your votes.
* The machine has you verify your votes by listing them on the screen.
* You are given a choice to accept the votes or go back and correct them once you accept, your receipt is printed.
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Pollsters:
* Check you in like they regularly do.
* Hands you documents on how to use the machine and how to verify your vote online or by automated phone
* Doesn’t let you leave without your receipt. This ensures you have completed the entire voting sequence.
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Database:
* Takes your inputted pin number, your receipt vote number, and actual votes together in a database.
* The final database to be used for the election results is sent to various watchdog groups, accounting firms, courts, etc. minutes before the counts are made official. The watchdogs must confirm receiving the database copy before the election results are official.
* An individual can check within hours either on the internet or by telephone, using the vote number on the receipt and the PIN you put in when you voted, how their vote was counted
This is how it solves the problem:
* Watchdog groups would know within instantly of database manipulation if the official numbers did not match sent to them.
* The online database must match exactly the original watchdogs assure this.
* If foul play occurred before the databases were sent out and the votes were inaccurate by just 1%, tens of thousands of complaints (for a presidential election) would be heard from voters checking their votes online or by phone.
* Enough complaints would legally warrant fraud investigation.
* The American voter can be assured that their vote was actually counted correctly. A historical first. A very high percentage of voters will use this checking system.
* Secrecy is kept at all times. If a person drops the receipt outside, and a nosey neighbor picks it up, they can not check the vote online because they do not know the pin number unless the are willing to try all 10.000 permutations. The website and phone site can boot a potential snoop out after 3 wrong PIN numbers.
* If a voter is very concerned about secrecy, the check can be done on a payphone without using ones voice.
* The only way to cause problems would be is if an individual voted for the candidate they want to lose, then later claimed they voted the other way. How many people would risk charges of vote fraud to do this. Or how many voters would risk conspiring with hundreds or thousands of others to try to pull such a scam that could put them in prison if just one of them blew the whistle.
* Some complaints will be filed every election, mostly from voters who made mistakes at the machine. That number would be minute in an honest election though and the Human Factor will be added in by the watchdog groups.
* Diebold’s intellectual property is never compromised.
* The system needs no new technology and is quite a bit cheaper and more efficient in the long run if done universally. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3794
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, March 8, 2006 - 6:46 am: |
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Thanks Mark. I moved this to the General Discussion area, since the on-on-one consulting area is used for specific assistence to citizens who are working on election integrity projects. |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 430
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, March 8, 2006 - 12:48 pm: |
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As has been brought up as an argument against my idea, they threaten you and get you to go back and get your vote changed.
They don't like my idea (see tech central, a proposed hack resistant voting system) because it gives the voter a copy of the vote ( there are claims made for other reasons, as well), yours has the flaw of no existing proof from the original vote that what you're asking for is what you originally voted, allowing the possibility of a coerced vote change.
I personally believe that a voter should be able to check his vote and correct his vote to a legally-binding copy that he gets to keep. That the ballot have a number that the voter can check to see how the ballot was recorded, and get it corrected to how that legally-binding copy reads. |
Pat Vesely
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 72
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, March 8, 2006 - 3:10 pm: |
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The biggest problem with the voter getting an 'official' copy of their ballot is that it is written into the US Constitution, and echoed in the wording of State Constitutions across the country, that your vote must remain 'secret'. You are not likely to get those provisions changed so spending a lot of time arguing the point seems counterproductive to me.
The dark cloud surrounding the silver lining of individual receipts is that if such a system existed, one that could tie every voter back to their completed ballot, the government would ultimately be in control of that system. That leaves open at least two troubling possibilities.
1) The party in power could use that information for targeting people for political persecution. That is one of the very reasons that the provision for ballots to be cast in secret was included in the Constitution in the first place.
2) That system could be rigged by those in control of it to offer a false sense of security to those who opt check their ballot after the election.
I could easily design a system that 'appears' to be secure because every single voter would get a unique code that, when entered, shows them the exact slate that they voted, but still manipulates the totals count in such a way that only a forensics analysis or complete audit of every vote would catch it.
Comparing it to ATMs in a banking system, it would be like an insider embezzling money from the bank through a series of 'hidden' transactions that shift money from one account to another without properly reporting it on their books. Each customer who checks their balance sees what they should in their own account when they check it, but at the end of the year when the bank examiner audits the books, the bank is short millions. This actually happens more often than most people realize. You just don't hear about it because the banks shy away from publicizing anything that might cause their customers to lose faith in their institution.
In banking you just find the problem, adjust the books, and write off the loss to your insurance company. In elections you're stuck with the people who are illegitimately placed in office once the election has been certified, regardless of how illegitimate the tally was.
The laws really need to be changed if we're going to fix the system as a whole.
Pat A. Vesely ;-)
Paper ballots are the 'Currency of Democracy'. They've been helping to curb election fraud since 139 BCE!
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Mark Bennett
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Truthiness
Post Number: 3
Registered: 03-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 6:13 am: |
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I know my ideas are not perfect, perfection will never be achived. The central idea is that if we the people vote, then find out later our vote was counted wrongly, screw the courts, screw Diebold, and screw the elected. Each individual who finds their vote was wrongly counted will be quite pissed off!. I would be!! That would be big problems for washington if enough people got pissed.
If we can start a thread where we combine ideas heavily agreed upon in a listed form as the one I posted, discuss strong and weak points, edit and repost it to a new thread, I am POSITIVE we the people of the Black Box Voting forum can write a law that goes to congress. Only 90% of those bastards are traiterous profiteers!
I propose that if anyone can improved on my ideas, that they copy edit and paste their improvements and we can flame on until we get close. When that happens I will have a congression sponser and we can get a petition drive going.
Let's assume that E-voting machines will be used everywhere someday and Diebold will uphold the intellectual property ruling. I'll start by using Brants thoughts with a list update to follow... |
Mark Bennett
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Truthiness
Post Number: 4
Registered: 03-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 6:32 am: |
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Let's Add A Recipt Printer to the Voting Machines. A 'Voter Receipt' is the KEY.
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Receipt:
* Like ATM’s, the voting machine gives a receipt to the machine user.
* The voting machine does not know who is using it so no personal information is on the receipt.
* The receipt contains a unique ‘vote number’ similar to an ATM transaction number.
* The receipt does not have the votes printed on it.
* Your receipt is physical evidence of fraud, if it happens, and is needed to file a complaint
* The receipt has your indellible fingerprint on it
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Machine:
* No ATM card needed, just touch the start button. The machine never knows who you are
* It will ask you twice for any 4 digit PIN that you will remember.
* Cast your votes.
* The machine has you verify your votes by listing them on the screen.
* You are given a choice to accept the votes or go back and correct them once you accept, your receipt is printed.
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Pollsters:
* Use thumbprint scanner at check in, before entering the vote area.
* Check you in like they regularly do.
* Hands you documents on how to use the machine and how to verify your vote online or by automated phone
* Doesn’t let you leave without your receipt. This ensures you have completed the entire voting sequence.
* As you present your receipt on the way out, your finger/thumb print is applied to your receipt in indellible ink.
Getting ATM accuracy from Diebold voting machines; the Database:
* Takes your inputted pin number, your receipt vote number, and actual votes together in a database.
* The final database to be used for the election results is sent to various watchdog groups, accounting firms, courts, etc. minutes before the counts are made official. The watchdogs must confirm receiving the database copy before the election results are official.
* An individual can check within hours either on the internet or by telephone, using the vote number on the receipt and the PIN you put in when you voted, how their vote was counted
***Brants idea*** The thumbprint is scanned and immediately compared to previous scans at that vote site assuring 1 person 1 vote. the scan data can be combined later for a national audit. The paper receipt has your fingerprint in indelible ink (Iraqi finger if you will)
(Message edited by truthiness on March 09, 2006) |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 434
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 10:11 am: |
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That last you wrote isn't my idea as is currently exists. I want the voter to use a seed number that's input to the hash to avoid the voter's being IDed by someone that has access to the voter's inked or bitmapped thumbprint, thereby recreating the hash and getting the voter's identity. It won't be useful to stop duplicate voters, this is a necessary change if you want to preserve the anonymity of the vote. If you want any secrecy left, you musn't record the unhashed thumbprint.
Also a receipt that doesn't have the vote information on it isn't proof of any kind of fraud, nor useful to get the vote corrected, that's going on the voter's word and he could be coerced, or he could be just plain wrong, or he could have stolen the receipt, or just picked it up off of the ground, in order to change the vote. You're not really entitled to get it changed, just because you want it changed, only if it was mis-recorded.
You need a receipt that fulfills the following:
1. It's human legible (on both parts, the part the voter gets for proof, and the other to let him see that they're the same) to show how the ballot was cast,
2. Some human-legible form of demonstrable proof is on the voter's copy that it actually is his ballot (would have to be hashed biometric, for all I can tell),
3. The receipt needs to be legally binding for vote correction. |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 435
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 10:13 am: |
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And Pat, with the provisions that my proposal has, the vote is still secret, although the voter can trace it. |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 436
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 10:18 am: |
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Mark, the unspecific receipt (doesn't detail the vote, doesn't specify the voter) doesn't act as evidence of what you voted only that you hold the receipt. Think about that. I've got a receipt; I could have picked 100 people's pockets to get receipts (especially on election day!), I could have picked it up off of the street, or your dresser, or name-your-place. |
Robert Sawdey
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rsawdey
Post Number: 113
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 12:29 pm: |
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Those cash register style printers are not well liked by the poll workers. The ballots they print are very difficult to use, and are unaffectionately known as 'toilet paper rolls'.
I'd rather see use of the same standardized ballots that can be hand marked, so the machine is only a ballot marking assistive device. Then if there are machine problems it's easy to fall back on good old dependable pencils! |
Mark Bennett
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Truthiness
Post Number: 5
Registered: 03-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 8:18 pm: |
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Brant, I will try to clarify the recipt function I find it easier to read in a listed form:
--You are correct, the receipt is not a legal document in itself, and cannot prove fraud. There is no possible system that can assure secrecy and at the same time provide a legally admissable document proving fraud.
-- If you read the revised list I posted after reading your ideas, I added the fingerprint in indellabel ink to the receipt so having a pocketful of receipts with different fingerprints that do not match does a cheater no good. Furthermore, a pocketful of receipts for a cheat who does not know a pocketful of those specific voter inputted PIN numbers does him no good. Please reread carefully.
**The main function of the receipt is to allow the voter later access to the database to see how his/her vote was recorded.
**A secondary use of the receipt is using it to present to an official only if you wish to file a complaint that your vote was recorded wrong. It only proves that you voted that day.
Again the receipt alone is not a, and can never be by itself, a magic FIX.
IT PROVIVES transparency to ones own vote, which many beleive is the key.
If flipflopping of entire preceinct votes ever did happen this receipt system will assure it doesn't happen again.
I beleive if enough voters know they have been frauded, Demrocy wil take care of the rest.
Robert, I agree and have thought about the receipt quality.  I would be willing to give up those stupid 'I voted stickers' for a little certificate looking card (like S.S. card) that fits into my wallet. this shouldn't be a big problem for the }folks at Diebold. |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 439
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 10, 2006 - 5:30 am: |
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Read my latest under Tech Central about a seed for use with a thumbprint scanner, I believe that it can resolve the issues of a valid, ballot-image receipt that will keep secrecy in all cases except where the item has been forcibly removed or stolen from the voter.
I am personally afraid that without legal proof (and legal standing for the voter) democracy won't take care of the rest. I am very afraid that without actual proof that your ballot was recorded differently than you cast it, our protests won't matter. This fight was fought in Ohio last year and was lost, even though the people fighting it (Fitrakis, et. al) had the law on their side. All of this has to have legal standing or we're going to get stiffed again.
Among the things that are needed are the 'gossip chains' for people to say 'My vote got stolen, did yours?' (these should be internet sites) and then coordinate the class action suit to stop them from awarding the election until it's sorted out. But you will have to have undeniable proof of the way you voted, and what will that be? I believe that it will have to be an originally at-the-poll-booth-issued-receipt that shows the way you voted. What else will serve? Otherwise, diehard partisans will go out and tie up honest elections in challenges that aren't real. |
Mark Bennett
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Truthiness
Post Number: 6
Registered: 03-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 10, 2006 - 6:28 am: |
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another function of the receipt is to assure 150000 votes wern't counted by 50000 voters |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 444
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 10, 2006 - 10:04 am: |
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I'm unsure as to what you mean. Do you mean that 150000 weren't counted as 50000 voters? |
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