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| 6-24-08 - Colorado Clerk forbids voti... |
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Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 8610
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, June 24, 2008 - 3:07 pm: | 
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(From BBV admin): Following is a short series of blogs and responses from the Boulder County Clerk regarding the surprisingly widespread new practice of using "Snoop-Friendly" ballots -- that is, ballots containing unique identifiers which can compromise political privacy.
COLORADO CLERK FORBIDS VOTING BY SECRET BALLOT
By Al Kolwicz
ColoradoVoterGroup.blogspot.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2008 11:54 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Subject: Anonymous ballots
Hi Hillary,
Yesterday, at the Public Demonstration, HART demonstrated how to set up ballots with no unique identifiers (not digits or bar code). They set the bar code value to a constant of "0".
Also, they demonstrated how to set up the ballot with a removable ballot stub. The stub can contain a serial number. They indicated that this is a very commonly used form of ballot. HART produces these ballots.
We recommend that Boulder County use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs. This will comply with the Colorado Constitution, Article VII section 8, and will provide the audit trail needed for ballot integrity.
Can we count on Boulder County to use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs for the 2008 elections?
Thanks
Al
----------------------------------------------
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2008 8:00 AM
To: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Al,
After reviewing the system and how it functions. We will be using the system as it has been designed. While it MAY be able to use the system without bar codes for the primary, we must use the bar codes for the general. Therefore, we will be using the system as it has been designed.
The long term solution to this problem is to purchase a new system. At this point in time, there is neither a system that I could recommend switching to nor the funds to do so.
Hillary
-----------------------------------------
From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 12:35 PM
To: 'Hall, Hillary' [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Colorado Voter Group; CFVI, Paper Tigers
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Ms. Hall,
Your reply is a great disappointment. Based on your pre-election statements, we were counting on you to eliminate Boulder County’s use of non-secret ballots.
We have been told, on the record by HART officials, that the HART system is designed to use paper ballots with removable stubs so that the serial numbers [can be removed before the ballot is cast, and] so that the voter cannot identify their own ballot once it has been cast. After all, if this were not the case it would violate Colorado’s Constitution and the system could not have been certified, could it?
Please reconsider your decision before it is too late. The voters of Boulder County expect and deserve secret ballots. It is your decision alone to deprive us of this right.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Read more: http://coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/2008/06/colorado-clerk-forbids-voting-by-secret.html
(From BBV again): The issue of voter privacy is growing faster than public awareness can catch up with it. The Hart Intercivic-manufactured "escan" system features ballot images containing unique bar codes and/or serial numbers. Most state explicitly ban the use of unique identifiers on ballots. In the exchange above, Mr. Kolwicz points out that Hart has offered to provide a system that does NOT use "Snoop-Friendly" ballots, but the county clerk insists on using them anyway. More in additional posts, below, on this topic.
THANKS TO WASHINGTON STATE VOTING RIGHTS ADVOCATES FOR COINING THE TERM "SNOOP-FRIENDLY BALLOTS" |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 8611
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, June 24, 2008 - 3:37 pm: |
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The issue of unique identifiers on ballots has arisen both with the Hart eScan system and with the ballot tracking mechanisms being pitched for mail-in voting.
In this article, Black Box Voting shows how two products can interact to achieve wholesale privacy theft, scooping votes with bar codes that trace back to voters into databases electronically:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/47220.html
In 2006, Black Box Voting did a series of public records request in an attempt to obtain the ballot image files from Hart scanners. We were rebuffed in four states, but in an answer provided by the Yakima, Washington county attorney, received another confirmation that these unique identifiers were embedded onto the Hart ballots.
Yakima said we could not see the ballot image files because of unique marks on the ballots -- a crime, in Washington State, but that didn't stop Island County, Washington from purchasing a VoteHere ballot tracking system containing unique bar codes on each ballot.
California counties have had other issues. They use ballot tracking devices to let voters know whether their ballot has arrived -- and these are supposed to be only on the envelope. Proper deployment of mail-in voting requires two envelopes -- an outer envelope containing perhaps a bar code and often the voter's signature. After authentication, the inner envelope, called the "privacy envelope" is removed, and this envelope -- divorced from any way to identify the voter -- is removed to another area for counting. However, some California locations skip the privacy envelope, making it possible for insiders to see the votes as they open the outer envelopes containing voter information. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 8612
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, June 24, 2008 - 3:47 pm: |
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Further evidence that Hart scanners were designed to produce ballots with unique identifiers:
From the EVEREST Academic report, page 251 (describes serial-numbered ballots and how the eScan can also be modified to accept duplicates even when election officials think it does not):
"20.3.6 The eScan may be modified to allow casting of duplicate ballots
"The configuration file for the eScan may be modified to allow the eScan to cast duplicate ballots. We confirmed in Section 19.4.1 that the eScan file is accessible over an Ethernet port and may be both downloaded and uploaded. A configuration parameter in this file allows duplicate ballots to be scanned, overriding controls in the eScan that should otherwise prevent this from occurring.
"Description: The configuration file is common to all eScan devices. It is a text file that is found on the eScan, accessible by connecting to the eScan’s Ethernet port with the correct IP address. 5 An option in the configuration file to allow duplicate ballots to be accepted is commented out by default. Setting this option in the configuration file and uploading it to the eScan via the Ethernet interface will enable the counting of duplicate ballots. These can be photocopies of a single ballot, or the same ballot used multiple times, as described in Issue 20.3.9. The only indication of a duplicate ballot having been scanned is the fact that the serial number of the ballot is logged in the eScan’s audit log. Unless the log was closely scrutinized, however, it would be difficult to notice that multiple ballots with the same serial number were cast, particularly if they were interspersed amongst many legitimate votes.
It is not clear why an option to allow duplicate ballots is available on production eScan units."
http://www.bbvdocs.org/OH/state/AcademicFinalEVERESTReport.pdf |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 2600
Registered: 4-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, June 25, 2008 - 10:18 am: |
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If you SIMPLY refrain from opening ANY ballots until ALL ballots are received, you eliminate the duplicate voting problem.
Of course, that means you have to resist the temptation to "get a head start" on ballot counting.
And people think they want uniform national rules and laws?!?!?! With THIS stuff going on in some states?!?!? I think not! I don't want any of this crap being imported into my state.
==========================================
http://kurtspeak.blogspot.com
(some relevant to subjects here, most not)
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Marian Beddill
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Uu7thprinciple
Post Number: 153
Registered: 8-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, June 25, 2008 - 10:30 am: |
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Sorry, Kurt;
When the Office opens the postal-ballots is not a sufficient factor for duplication prevention. It takes a recording-log of ballots (voters) to do that, which can work (or fail) independently of when they are checked.
My own county uses double-envelopes - the outer one has the voter-ID (and signature under the sealed flap - a modest privacy protection) and the inner one is plain - no ID. The first step after receipt is to slit the flap and register the receipt in a database tied to the voters-file. Thus, any second envelope from the same voter, is red-flagged - never mind when that happens.
MGB
Marian
http://NoLeakyBuckets.org
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V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 2601
Registered: 4-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, June 25, 2008 - 11:06 am: |
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Sorry Marian,
But the BETTER process we use in the "worst place to vote in America" (copyright 2008 - BBV) is to NOT slit ANYTHING on an absentee ballot until it gets counted by hand AT THE PRECINCT at the close of polls on Election Night.
The tracking is part of our SURE system, our Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors. When a duplicate ballot arrives in the office (which CAN happen due to the belief the first ballot has been lost), the SURE system warns IMMEDIATELY that an absentee ballot has been received for that voter, and then the registrar can go get both, and VOID the one with the earlier postmark as per law. If there are two ballots for one voter with the same postmark, well then that's a referral to the D.A, isn't it?
REPEAT: In the "worst place to vote in America" (copyright 2008-BBV) no absentee ballot envelope is EVER opened in the central office at all, unless it is in response to a court-ordered extension for overseas ballots, as happens from time to time. Then, those are opened centrally AFTER the Election Day has passed.
==========================================
http://kurtspeak.blogspot.com
(some relevant to subjects here, most not)
|
Marian Beddill
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Uu7thprinciple
Post Number: 154
Registered: 8-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, June 25, 2008 - 2:49 pm: |
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Where precinct polling-sites exist, and where the law has the delivery cutoff time for mailed ballots as until poll-closure on election day, that does read like a good rule.
But for better or worse, we and many jurisdictions no longer have poll-sites.
Also, WA allows "absentee" ("VBM") ballots to be counted if they are POSTMARKED by election day. The process you cite would ignore the very large number of ballots which are actually postmarked on election day, and dribble in for a week or more. There needs to be a safe and effective system integrity way for these too, while that's the way things are.
Our process meets the needs under our conditions - the one you cite does not. So we are both right.
MGB
Marian
http://NoLeakyBuckets.org
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V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 2604
Registered: 4-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, June 25, 2008 - 2:53 pm: |
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Well, you're right. But under our law, except for judicially mandated extensions for overseas ballots, our deadline is RECEIPT by the county by 5PM the Friday BEFORE the election. We don't accept them the day before or ON Election Day, and postmarks don't count at all.
The ballots MUST BE in the hot little hands of the county office by 5PM on Friday, because they must be delivered to the precinct judge on the Saturday before.
If you want to know what happens if someone discovers they need an absentee only after Friday, they don't get to vote, or they figure out how to get to the precinct.
==========================================
http://kurtspeak.blogspot.com
(some relevant to subjects here, most not)
|
Donovan Levinson
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Lofi
Post Number: 29
Registered: 4-2008
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, July 7, 2008 - 3:34 pm: |
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I actually much prefer an accountable and auditable system for counting ballots than the secret and unnaccountable system we have in 95% of the country. I am in favor of having your vote verifiable, that is that you can check that your vote choices were recorded accurately, and see the number of votes cast, etc. This does not necessarily mean the invasion of political privacy. Say for example everyone who votes gets a unique identifier, and they can go online and query their ballot using this identifier to see their vote choices were recorded accurately. A publicly accessible database could store all of the vote choices by this unique identifier, so that any citizen could count up the votes themselves and verify the results. This is only an invasion of voter privacy if there is a way to equate this unique identifier with a person. If no such mechanism exists, or access to it is highly restricted, then I see no such problems. Boulder County has to be one of the best places to vote in America, so I think its really unfair to pick on them here. In the past elections, Boulder County has offered voters the choice of paper or electronic ballot, where the rest of the state only offered the electronic ballot. I may be somewhat biased since I am from Boulder County, but I am really much more concerned about voting accountability than I am about voting privacy. I would definately sacrifice privacy for accountability in this case, although I don't think it has to be an either/or, and unless anyone can look up a person from the unique identifier it is not an invasion of privacy. |
Donovan Levinson
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Lofi
Post Number: 30
Registered: 4-2008
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, July 7, 2008 - 3:42 pm: |
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On an unrelated note, I think its a bit extreme to label Pennsylvania as the worst state to vote in America. Perhaps its the worst "swing" state to vote in America, but definitely not the worst. Take for example.... Kentucky. Sometimes it seems like we are splitting hairs when we scrutinize places like Boulder County, or illegible signatures on mail-in Oregon ballots, and less attention is placed on places with absolutely terrible transparency or accountability. I know this is partly in fact that there is very little (if anything) citizens can even do in some of these states, because the laws are well... unconstitutional. More progressive states it is easier to do things like public records request and get the counties to cooperate, but it draws attention away from the real fraud Meccas. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 8770
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, July 7, 2008 - 3:59 pm: |
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The unique identifier needs to be something known only to the voter and not systematically collected, harvested, with encryption or what have you. Absolutely no unique serial numbers or bar codes should be on cast ballots. It is acceptable to have serial numbers on uncast ballots if they are detached when the ballot is handed to the voter before voting.
The simple and inexpensive way to do this is the new Humboldt County California method. They bought an off the shelf high speed scanner and scanned the over 30,000 ballots into it after sticking them through the voting machines. They have/are making all the ballot images public.
Law in California indicates ONLY THE VOTER can know any identifying marks -- this does NOT include pretending it can't be known if it is encrypted; the voter can secretly by himself do whatever as long as he doesn't tell anybody.
This preserves privacy, gets us past the US Intelligence community privacy pirates and their secret decoder rings, and allows much more public access to the ballots, as public records, than previously.
Still not perfect, but meaningful. Apparently Pima County Arizona has now committed to doing this too.
Sorry to all those guys who wanted to invent the next fancy toy. No fanciness required.  |
Donovan Levinson
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Lofi
Post Number: 31
Registered: 4-2008
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, July 7, 2008 - 4:13 pm: |
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If the unique identifiers are not to be used for a public database of votes, I see no reason to use them at all. What purpose does a serial number on a detachable portion of a ballot even serve?
We all know the simple and inexpensive solution for a fair and accountable election:
1) Use paper ballots
2) Count them in public at the precinct after polls close
3) Post results at the precinct
4) Report results to the county |
Marian Beddill
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Uu7thprinciple
Post Number: 155
Registered: 8-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, July 7, 2008 - 4:21 pm: |
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Mr. Levinson;
With all due respect to your considered position (to allow the computer-system in your jurisdiction to know for whom you cast your votes) I am obliged to disagree, if we wish to keep a democracy running in our governments.
I refer to the present case in Brazil (which was a "proving-ground" for DRE's well before they were widespread in the US.)
My activist colleague working on Elections Integrity there, signs his messages with:
"I know how I voted;
So do they.
But only they know for whom my vote got counted!"
Brazil has a system where every ballot is recorded and identified by the voter-ID who cast it, and it is presumed that the powers-that-be can do two things -- change a vote within the database or how it gets tallied when doing the totals, and review that database after an election to identify voters who "voted wrong".
That ability is only a cyber-step away from the proposal I understand that you are making. Please don't reply with the worn argument that the data will be encrypted and only the voter will have the ability to decrypt it - not true. And even if your system were installed, and a voter IS able to login and review "what they are shown as" their record, there is no way to see how the tally process worked.
And more - even if there were the ability to login and review, and a voter (or dozens of them) "saw" that their vote was "presented as recorded" incorrectly, I cannot image the value of such a "fussing at the system", as evidence in court.
In summary, the paper ballot when delivered must remain absolutely private, in order for our elections systems to be secure.
A way of accomplishing some confidence in the processing of ballots, is the formation of a strong "watchdog" multi-partisan citizens' cadre of Observers, who hover over every activity of the elections management system.
Marian
http://NoLeakyBuckets.org
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Marian Beddill
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Uu7thprinciple
Post Number: 156
Registered: 8-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, July 7, 2008 - 4:29 pm: |
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Mr Levinson asks: "What purpose does a serial number on a detachable portion of a ballot even serve?"
A detachable, ID-coded tag on each ballot serves when preparing the thousands of ballots to be delivered to the voters. Each voter is only permitted to vote in her own jurisdiction and sub-jurisdiction (electoral district), not outside of it. Thus, having each ballot identified by sub-jurisdiction, is a tool to assure the ballots get delivered right - whether by mail or at the pollsite. Once in the voter's hands, it should no longer have any value.
Marian
http://NoLeakyBuckets.org
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Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 8771
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 3 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, July 7, 2008 - 4:32 pm: |
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The purpose of allowing a voter to make his own mark, while making this optional and prohibiting him by law from divulging it to anyone, is that in the interim -- ie, THIS NOVEMBER, in locations willing to release software-independent ballot scan disks to the public, that voter can find his own vote (but no one else's).
Removing political privacy (even requiring a bunch of hoops, like cryptography), is perilous. In Zimbabwe recently, and I think this is on a YouTube video now, people are reporting death threats as it is whispered to them that their vote has been harvested.
This is close to home here in Washington State, where they are already placing unique identifiers on the ballot such that they can be harvested now, or later if they phase things in with a two-step shuffle.
The reason to have the detachable serial numbers is for ballot accounting. It's been done for ages in many locations. It allows a check and balance on # of ballots provided, cast, spoiled, and uncast. |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 2615
Registered: 4-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, July 8, 2008 - 9:53 am: |
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Donovan writes:
"I am really much more concerned about voting accountability than I am about voting privacy."
While I wholeheartedly agree that they are not NECESSARILY in conflict, to the extent they are, I prefer the opposite of Mr. Levinson. I will NOT tolerate ANY diminution of privacy, AT ALL, FOR ANYTHING. No amount of accountability is worth even a scintilla of diminution of privacy.
Do BOTH or forget it, in my book. I'll take what we have now if forced to choose.
==========================================
http://kurtspeak.blogspot.com
(some relevant to subjects here, most not)
|
Luis Henry Garay II
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Sublime
Post Number: 1
Registered: 7-2008
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, July 20, 2008 - 2:28 pm: |
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All arguments aside, the most simplest of answers is usually the best one or so the Law of Parsimony states. In other words the most simple of ballots would work best. One with a detachable serial number for only that particular voter's eyes would not only allow for voter privacy but would also give the voter confirmation that their vote was cast correctly. Mr. Donovan tried to break down the voting process into its most simplest form in order to better tally votes BUT the most problematic statement in his theory is step 2 (count them at the precinct after the polls close). It is highly problematic in that now we raise the idea of depending on voting software to tally up votes again. I'm not even comfortable with having other people count the votes let alone allowing a machine that can be manipulated to tally votes. If we can solve step two, and add a step 5 (Voter Confirmation) I'd say we're on to something. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 8966
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, July 20, 2008 - 7:18 pm: |
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Hi Luis,
Welcome to Black Box Voting. We're not going to discuss yet another permutation of that in this thread. You can find several discussions of what you're talking about in the Tech Central forum. |
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