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| 5-11-05: CANCELLED - Call to action M... |
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admin Board Administrator Username: admin
Post Number: 440 Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?  Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, May 6, 2005 - 11:05 am: |
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by Jim March MAY 11 BULLETIN: DIEBOLD JUST CANCELLED THIS MEETING, apparently because the TSx has still not passed federal certification. We have an unconfirmed report that cert. is being done to 1990 standards, not 2002 standards. If you can confirm this, please e-mail us. (Black Box Voting calls for a moratorium on spending on these new voting systems until problems with procurement and quality are addressed -- because the insanity continues.) May 19 meeting: Diebold will attempt to certify a whole slew of voting products. Now is the time to get Diebold out of the elections business once and for all. WE NEED BODIES to come to Sacramento to say: The madness hasn't stopped, and "WE'VE HAD ENOUGH!" WE NEED TIME WAVERS. Two minutes is not enough time for key speakers to present critically important evidence. You can fill out the speaker card but give your two minutes to key speakers who will present organized arguments in favor of total decertification of Diebold. Come early, look for organizers with black armbands if you can help out in this critical area. You can refer to the SecState's agenda here: http://ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/vsp_agenda_0519a.pdf Note that the original evidence presented against Diebold was so damning that some of it has now been purged from the active links on the SecState's site. BE THERE: Office of the Secretary of State 1500 11th Street 1st Floor – Auditorium Sacramento, California 95814 This is at the "Archives Plaza" light rail station - the station is literally right at the front door of the place. WHEN: 10:00am but show up as early as you can so we can organize. BACKGROUND MATERIAL: A few days before the meeting, the "Staff Report Recommendations" for major agenda items will be posted at the SecState's website next to the agenda. It's not there yet, but look for it and read it over as it's an important guide to what their concerns are, what they're glossing over...you'll find it here: http://ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vs.htm Watch here: http://www.blackboxvoting.org for new investigative information. May 2005 will be a very busy month, and several new stories will be exposed, most focusing on NEW problems with Diebold Election Systems. Public comments written by Black Box Voting director Jim March, analyzing information (without the new exposés) can be found here: http://www.equalccw.com/sscomments9.pdf Issues in brief: Just looking at the SecState's meeting agenda linked above, at least one bit is brand new, a Diebold "paper trail version" touchscreen. In addition, there is the obligatory "update du jure" to GEMS. Most surprisingly, software that Diebold has been distributing all along, while illegally withholding from certification, is now supposedly "Federally certified" and being run through the state cert process. These three bits are all connected to the smartcards and are items complained about by Bev Harris and Jim March as far back as 2003/2004. Among the items: "Spyrus voter card encoder", "Key Card Tool software", "VC Programmer software". Three problems: 1) How come nobody at the state or Federal certification systems noticed these needed certification before Harris and March exposed the problem? 2) How is it that these "newly certified pieces" are certified to 2002 standards, yet are part of the systems certified to 1990 standards? How can two different security process standards be used to evaluate two different parts of one overall package? 3) Why is it that ONLY those pieces of custom code which Harris and March exposed a year and a half ago are now suddenly certified? Guess what: There are more uncertified voting system components. The only difference appears to be that these additional uncertified components were not exposed by watchdogs. There are numerous problems with continuing to rely on Diebold. The legality of the certifications of all their products is questionable. FEC standards from both 1990 and 2002 require individualized log-in. This functionality is missing from GEMS during elections. How did GEMS get certified? There will more revelations on Diebold prior to the May 19th meeting. Watch the Black Box Voting (.ORG) Web site carefully. Black Box Voting recommends a spending moratorium on new voting systems and components until multiple problems with election system design and integrity are addressed. Please broadcast this alert to everyone you know. |
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