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| 2-20-07: Voting machines as a Ponzi S... |
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Bev Harris
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Site_admin
Post Number: 676
Registered: 10-2006
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 9 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, February 19, 2007 - 11:32 pm: | 
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by Nancy Tobi
Intro by Bev Harris
A Ponzi Scheme, by definition, is an artifice that is insolvent from its inception, thereby defrauding its funders (in this case, the taxpayers). Ponzi schemes work on the "rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul" principle, as new investment (taxpayer) money is needed to fulfill promises made on earlier investments (tax monies) until the whole scheme collapses.
Our nation has already suffered an incalculable blow from the use of expensive computerized voting equipment, which, by all accounts, has been an abysmal failure by every reasonable criterion: product quality, reliability, accuracy, and security.
Taxpayers are now being required to invest in a certification and voting machine procurement program built on a cycle of lag, non-implementation and obsolescence:
• Products procured before guidelines are established for them;
• Guidelines and testing programs, while trying to catch up to features in already-purchased equipment, add new requirements;
• Each new wave of guidelines obsoletes existing equipment;
• Successive waves of new investments (by taxpayers) are required to catch up to previous assurances
When you peel back the veneer of the whole Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Certification program, with its National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and its National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) testing process, what you learn is that the entire system is, in effect, insolvent. Meanwhile, your tax dollars continue to flow into the system (to the tune of nearly $3 million in the EAC's 2005 budget plus nearly $5 million in 2006 and a requested $6 million in its 2007 budget).
When the inevitable collapses occur, as we are now seeing with DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting machines, we are told that we need to keep investing in them because ... well, because we now have so much invested in them. To that end, we are now hearing talk about turning existing DREs into "ballot marking devices" – that is, voting machines that don't count the vote, just mark the ballot for you -- basically, turning each DRE into a $5,000 pencil. And when that doesn't fly, we hear that DREs are needed for adding new features, like text and language converters.
The proposed Holt Bill (HR 811) attempts to require a text converter in every precinct – a demand which originates from groups that, it turns out, are the same ones that lobbied for the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to require the multibillion-dollar DRE purchase in the first place.
What is a "text converter" and what does it mean? Details on the text converter and its utterly impossible timelines are provided later in this report, but for one thing, the new billion-dollar unfunded mandate for "text converters" helps organizations that lobbied for HAVA's massive DRE purchases save face by preventing the entire DRE investment from crashing into the ground like the Hindenburg blimp.
Taxpayers and elections officials certainly did not realize in 2002 when HAVA was used to mandate the purchase of billions of dollars in new voting equipment that this was just the initial investment in what would become a continuing hemorrhage. The proposed Holt Bill furthers the investment in a certification and procurement system that is permanently in arrears. There is one difference between the Holt Bill and HAVA: If passed as written, Holt Bill costs will come out primarily from your local municipal and county coffers.
CERTIFICATION AND PROCUREMENT IN A NUTSHELL (as it was intended to work):
1. EAC approves guidelines (Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, "VVSG"). To help you track this process, let's follow an example. Suppose the guideline says "We've decided the buttons on voting machines must be RED."
2. EAC-certified test labs, in conjunction with the National Standards and Technology Institute (NIST), write "TEST SCRIPTS" to match the guidelines. For example, the test script says "Check that the buttons are red."
3. The states and federal government signal the industry that there will be adequate funds to pay for a new round of voting equipment (the industry will not begin product development for a specialized product without assurances there will be a market to buy their product). Upon legislation saying "every precinct must now feature a voting machine with a red button" industry starts making red-buttoned voting machines.
4. The industry uses the "TEST SCRIPTS" from Step 2 as specifications and requirements for building their product. In-house quality control will confirm "Did you make sure the buttons are red?"
5. The industry submits their new product to the test labs. "Here's my machine with the red button. Please check that it complies."
6. The test labs verify that the final product passes testing according to the original test scripts. "Yes, the button is red. This product complies."
7. The products are sold for use in the nation's election systems. ("Elections officials, here is an invoice for your new voting machines with red buttons.")
This is how it's SUPPOSED to work. Unfortunately, in real life the process doesn't sync up. It's implemented out of order, turning US elections into a vast and unreliable confidence game, where one bad investment chases another.
In real life, you get machines with YELLOW buttons, which are sold to elections officials because the standards stating that the buttons must be RED don't come out until two years after the machines are purchased. Later, in the process of dealing with the yellow button issue -- "No no, it must be red!" -- the guidelines committees also tack on another requirement: "It shall have talking ballots for people who can't read!"
Then Congress makes a law that says every voting precinct shall have talking ballots. So industry thinks money will be appropriated to pay for the new law, and begins to sell machines with red buttons and talking ballots. However the TEST SCRIPTS for the talking ballot feature are not ready until two years after the talking-ballot machines have been purchased by elections officials. And while NIST prepares the talking ballot test scripts, Congress makes a new law: "Voting machines shall now be prohibited from using components made in China on the motherboard."
So while vendors upgrade the talking ballot feature to meet the new requirements, they replace Chinese components with variants made in San Diego, Tokyo, and Minsk. Except that no test scripts have been written for those variants...
DEVELOPMENT TIMELINE FOR VOTING EQUIPMENT PRODUCTS
Bear with us on this. We are trying to keep it simple, but the story is so convoluted that anyone with a logical brain is bound to have trouble assimilating the way the EAC is doing business. You might feel woozy reading this - it is a bumpy ride filled with curves and inexplicable obscurities.
We start our tale with the following premise...
The EAC develops and approves voting systems guidelines, and the voting equipment industry builds products whose specifications meet those guidelines, since the goal is for their equipment to be tested and certified by meeting those same guidelines.
And the following theory...
The EAC-certified labs take the EAC guidelines and uses them to write test scripts so, when testing the final products, the labs can verify those products meet the guidelines.* The requirements are embodied in the test lab test scripts; because it is against these that the product must prove its certifiability.
*This may seem backwards or counter-intuitive, because in the past voting equipment saturated the market even before anyone thought about testing it to any uniform standards for reliability, security, and accuracy. However, today's paradigm appropriately has the process reversed, where requirements are established ahead of product development.
How this works in the real world...
Figuring out how this works in the real world is a challenge, especially when we try to decipher timelines for actually implementing the whole program. It's difficult to figure out because the only thing we know for certain is that it seems to take at least two years for the EAC and its various committees to develop, finalize, and approve the guidelines.
Timelines for the rest of the steps are unknown because we simply have no historical evidence of them ever actually being implemented.
HERE'S WHAT WE DO KNOW ABOUT HOW IT WORKS:
• The EAC publishes the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). (Voluntary because it is up to the states whether or not they want to comply with the federal guidelines, but nearly half of the states have laws on the books requiring compliance of one form or another.)
• The Guidelines are always at least two years behind product to market. So right now the conforming standards are the 2002 Voting System Standards (VSS), which predate the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines, and had been developed by the industry itself under the administration of the National Association of Election Directors (NASED). Under the old system, the industry itself also recruited and paid the test labs, creating an unhealthy conflict of interest and calling into question the validity of the testing and certification program overall.
• With the handover of the testing and certification process from NASED to the EAC, the EAC began working with NIST to develop test scripts for the 2002 standards. The EAC’s 2002 standards had built more rigorous testing protocols on top of NASED’s program. The documented target date for implementation of the EAC’s 2002 standards was for the elections held in November 2006.
• However, the EAC delayed implementation of the new test requirements for the 2002 standards until AFTER the elections. They did this because they knew that NO EQUIPMENT IN USE AT THE TIME WOULD MEET THE TOUGHER TESTING STANDARDS IMPOSED BY NIST.
• So, although the 2002 standards are in place, in fact the EAC cleverly delayed holding the industry accountable to them until Dec. 2006, one month after the November elections. In other words, all existing equipment used in the Nov. 2006 general election had been certified according to previous NASED guidelines (either 1990 or 2002) and not the EAC’s own 2002 testing and certification standards. Some equipment had not been certified at all. (On top of this, most of the equipment had been tested by Ciber, a lab that the EAC secretly decertified three months before the election for failing to perform its duties. Despite the fact that the EAC knew the lab had not properly tested the voting machines – even to the old guidelines – the EAC did not inform election officials or voters that they were about to vote on improperly tested equipment.)
Essentially, all the work and taxpayer money that the EAC expended in developing the testing standards for the 2002 standards were a colossal waste because these standards were never applied to anything in the real world. Our elections were not made any more secure, reliable, or accurate from any of this.
As we traverse from the 2002 standards to the 2005 guidelines (Version I) to the 2005 guidelines (Version II) –- these are anticipated in 2007 or 2008 -- the timelines still never pan out to any effective implementation.
No equipment in use today is certified to higher standards than 1990 or the 2002 NASED guidelines and none has been through rigorous testing...
The 2002 standards were established by NASED working in conjunction with the industry itself. The subsequent NIST testing program built on top of NASED’s 2002 standards demonstrated that those standards were virtually untestable.
The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, from 2005 and forward, were developed for the EAC under the guidance of NIST, and represent a more substantial and robust system.
THE BOTTOM LINE IS THIS:
In the 2008 elections, there will be few, if any, systems that would be tested and certified to meet any standards established by the EAC/NIST.
NEVERTHELESS, MORE INVESTMENT SEEMS TO BE INDICATED:
Regardless, states wishing now to comply with federal guidelines should –theoretically – invest in upgrades to their equipment at least to the NASED-EAC 2002 standards and testing certification plan. As of December, 2007, the 2005 guidelines kick in, testing to the 2002 standards will cease, and states wishing to be in compliance would, depending on how their state laws are written, likely need to invest in retesting their equipment to those newer 2005 standards.
To this point, none have done so; there has, in fact, been no equipment submitted to EAC test labs for 2005 guidelines testing and certification.
NIST-RECOMMENDED TEST LABS NOT READY
It turns out that even if equipment were submitted for testing and certification to the new, more rigorous standards instituted by NIST, it seems the labs are not yet ready to begin the testing anyway. John Gale, of the EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee, reported in a meeting on November 17, 2006, that he did not believe the NIST labs would be ready to test to the 2005 guidelines even by late 2008:
quote:"Everything that has been purchased so far is only to 2002 requirements. At the December 2007 date, we'll no longer certify anything to the 2002 standards; they will have to meet 05 requirements. In the past, manufacturers have been reactionary instead of futuristic. We have to allow time for the design, build, test, and NVLAP [National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program] certification. NIST test scripts have to be written to the new ones. It's very important that we talk about the time factor - We are not going to have this done in two years."
And while substandard equipment remains in use in the nation’s elections, and taxpayer dollars continue to spin on the indeterminate timeline for 2005 guidelines implementation, the EAC and its relevant committees are working on the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines Version II, which will replace the 2005 version I, rendering 2005-certified equipment (should there ever be any) obsolete in 2010, when those Guidelines are expected to become the testing and certification standard.
Finding our way through the EAC guidelines, testing and certification maze
Lost? That’s understandable. This business model doesn’t make sense.
The EAC claims to have guidelines and testing standards in place for their kick ass certification program to provide reliability, accuracy, and security for America’s voting systems.
The reality is: None of it is ever put into action.
No systems are submitted for testing and certification under current guidelines.
Current guidelines are not applied. And even if they were applied, current guidelines are two years behind product to market. When testing standards and guidelines are improved, they are not implemented until AFTER elections take place. Talk about locking the barn door after the horse has disappeared into the woods!
No wonder things aren't working as planned.
This is an unacceptably inefficient, ineffective, and expensive way to do business, both for the industry itself and for election jurisdictions attempting to use public funding to keep up with an ever changing high tech product line.
EAC assurances (that the voting equipment has passed rigorous testing and certification) can provide NO confidence to America’s election officials, voters, and taxpayers that investing into this equipment is a sound or rational move.
THE NEXT ROUND OF INVESTMENTS:
The Holt Bill, HR 811, mandates untested, uncertified, and unfunded technology for every polling place in the nation.
The new Holt Bill, HR 811, mandates a brand new techno-toy for every polling place in America by the 2008 elections. The new technology mandated by this legislation is a "text conversion" device to help disabled, illiterate, and minority language voters by converting the ballot text to what Holt refers to as "accessible media".
We embrace the right of every American to vote privately and independently. However, we question the method identified in HR 811 —a text-to-digital data conversion device—for achieving this worthy goal.
We question the HR 811 voting equipment mandate because most informed sources do not believe the mandated text conversion device even exists, and further—if it does exist, or is currently under development—most informed sources contend it is impossible that such a device could ever be properly tested or certified in time for the 2008 deadline imposed by Holt.
Despite all efforts to provide some clarity on this complex subject, if the explanations provided in this article nonetheless prove confusing, here is the important piece of information everyone needs to understand:
THE UNFUNDED MANDATE IN THE HOLT BILL:
HR 811, if passed as written, contains a significant unfunded mandate, which may incur to every polling jurisdiction in the nation (185,000 of them) an initial cost outlay of roughly $7,000 for new voting equipment (further programming, testing and maintenance could reach a total of up to $20,000 per device).
Furthermore, this equipment, if found to exist (which is itself a controversial matter), will be neither tested nor certified to any standards for accuracy, security, or reliability.
Given this reality, the wisdom of the Holt Bill's mandate of yet a whole new round of untested, uncertified, and unfunded computerized voting equipment into every polling place in the nation for our 2008 elections, must be called into question.
WHAT IS THE TEXT CONVERSION MANDATE, AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Let's look at the new HR 811-mandated techno-toy, and why it could not possibly be available, in tested and certified form, in time for the 2008 elections.
To understand what the Holt Bill means by converting "printed content to accessible media" we can look at two historical sources. The first is the Election Assistance Commission's (EAC) Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG-I) drafted in early 2005 by the EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), revised by the EAC in the summer of 2005, and subsequently finalized and approved in December 2005. The final 2005 VVSG-I, (Section 4.1.1 Accuracy Requirements) includes the following guideline:
quote:a. For all paper-based voting systems:
i. Scanning ballot positions on paper ballots to detect selections for individual candidates and contests
ii. Conversion of selections detected on paper ballots into digital data
In other words, all paper-based systems must have their content converted to digital data. Paper-based systems, in and of themselves, are not enough for the EAC.
The second source for understanding HR 811's techno-toy mandate is HR 939, an election reform bill submitted by Representative Tubbs Jones, and mightily supported by People for the American Way prior to the release of Holt’s competing bill. Tubbs Jones's bill spells out exactly the meaning of text conversion to "accessible media". HR 939 states that the "individual paper record":
quote:shall be available for visual, audio, and pictorial inspection and verification by the voter, with language translation available for all forms of inspection and verification
Putting two and two together, we understand that Holt's "conversion of printed content to accessible media" means that every polling place in the country must have some sort of device capable of scanning the ballot, converting it to digital data, which can then be converted to different media, such as audio and visual (even pictorial).
Why won't there be a tested and certified product to meet the 2008 mandate?
Because the timelines are impossible, unless the process is once again performed out of order, which would render the testing and certification moot, and which is what turned this into a Ponzi operation in the first place.
HERE'S WHY IT’S IMPOSSIBLE BY 2008:
The HR 811 mandate for a text conversion device ostensibly comes from the 2005 Guidelines - purportedly applicable in 2008. SOMEONE stuck the text conversion requirement into the Holt Bill. The Standards Board, a representational body of top state and local election officials from every state, which is responsible for making real world recommendations about the guidelines, had pointedly recommended against including the text conversion guideline into the guidelines.
Despite the clear Standards Board resolution to strike all language relating to text conversion, somehow the guideline was not only reinserted into the 2005 guidelines, but was actually peppered throughout that document wholesale. And the guideline was then used as the convenient rationale for inserting the device into the Holt Bill.
So what's the timeline for creating the test scripts so the new HR 811 -mandated techno-toy products can be developed, tested and certified to the 2005 VVSG, Version I and/or VVSG Version II?
Not an easy question to answer. We need to go through a few more twists and turns to even try to understand how this might play out.
It is our understanding, supported by Mr. Gale's testimony shown above, that the EAC-certified test labs do not yet have any test scripts for 2005 guidelines, which would include the HR 811 -mandated text conversion device. They haven't, in other words, figured out how the device should actually work. They don't know yet if it needs a red or a blue button.
Dr. Britt Williams, Professor Emeritus, Kennesaw University, in his Senate testimony, the January 2007 Feinstein hearings on electronic voting, remarked:
quote:"[The EAC 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines] are not required until December 2007. In the meantime, voting systems can continue to be certified under the 2002 Standards and, at present, no voting system has been submitted for Certification under the 2005 Guidelines….The Technical Guidelines Development Committee and NIST are developing what is being called the 2007 Guidelines. [These guidelines] are scheduled to be used in draft form in July 2007. Assuming they will require the same timeline as the 2005 Guidelines for public comment, revision, and final approval, it is likely that these 2007 Guidelines will not be required until December 2008, a month after the 2008 elections."
Dr. Williams' final conclusion almost perfectly mirrors the EAC strategy for improving the 2002 VSS, which were promised for the 2006 election. So, too, were the 2005 guidelines originally promised to be delivered in time for the 2008 national elections.
But see how history repeats itself with the EAC. Mark Skall, Chief, Software Testing Division, NIST, in a presentation dated March 22, 2005, made the following claims about the EAC efforts to improve the 2002 VSS:
• The goal is to provide guidance to states in time for the 2006 election cycle, by providing the following improvements to the program:
• "Augment" and improve the 2002 VSS to:
• Fill in gaps (accessibility and usability, VVPAT, wireless, and others)
• Correct errors in the 2002 VSS
• Help to ensure that installed voting system software is the software that has been tested
• Produce initial work products in April, plans for completion in November 2005
As we now know, these goals were never met because the EAC delayed implementation until one month after those elections.
No equipment has ever been submitted for certification under the 2005 guidelines...
This statement, made in Dr. Williams' testimony, while disconcerting, makes sense, because the 2007 VVSG (VVSG–II) is pending, and the EAC effectively grandfathered all existing equipment to the 2002 standards, when they implemented testing to that standard only AFTER the 2006 elections had taken place.
Testing, after all, is expensive; especially when you know the products won't pass the tests, and you will then be expected to cure conditions of failure.
Why go through that drill when the EAC essentially is telling you not to bother?
Nonetheless, in December, 2007, the 2005 VVSG-I is supposed to become effective, meaning states with laws requiring compliance to federal voting equipment standards theoretically can not get fixes to existing systems unless they are tested and certified to those standards. Additionally, states purchasing new equipment should only buy equipment that is tested and certified to the 2005 VVSG-I.
Theoretically, because according to Dr. Williams’ testimony noted above, these guidelines will more than likely only kick in ONE MONTH AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS in 2008. Just like the 2002 NIST testing standards, which were delayed to a month following the November 2006 elections, when they would do nobody any good, anyway.
If this is the case, the EAC will again carry over existing equipment to the 2002 standards, since thus far nothing meaningful has been done in the industry or in the EAC Certification Program to move beyond those standards.
In his testimony, Dr. Williams continues:
quote:"Historically, the timeline between the implementation of a Guideline and the time the vendors can produce a voting system under those Guidelines is about 2 years. Unless something out of the ordinary happens, we will go through the 2010, and probably the 2012, elections with the currently available voting systems."
This tells us that the EAC continues to waste taxpayer dollars developing standards for certification, but the industry is never required to apply them to equipment used in our elections.
It also tells us that the text conversion mandate in HR 811 is unattainable in any reliable, accurate, or secure manner for the bill’s 2008 mandated timeline for implementation.
REALITY CHECK:
It is now FEB 2007 and every voting system on the market has been certified a) against NASED's 1990 or b) against 2002 VSS, or c) not at all - and certainly not the 2005 Guidelines.
So, with all due respect to Mr. Williams's two-year timetable, we are looking rather at NO LESS THAN SIX YEARS from any given VVSG and its complementary certification testing standards before any product, including HR 811's text conversion technotoy, is introduced to the market in any manner to comply with EAC 2005 testing and certification protocols.
But this is all speculation, because we have not seen any real world product development cycles to meet the 2005 guidelines and are not likely to see anything at all, since soon enough the 2007 standards will make those moot anyway.
What does this mean for our HR 811 -mandated text conversion techno-toy?
For the HR 811-mandated text conversion device intended for use in our 2008 elections, what this means is this:
• This is a device for which standards are identified in the 2005 Guidelines.
• Test labs are only just now being identified by the EAC.
• These test labs are only just now beginning to write test scripts for the 2005 Guidelines.
• There are as yet no test scripts for the text conversion product; informed sources believe there would be none until December 2008.
• If the test scripts are available in December 2008, and if things actually played out the way they are supposed to, the industry would then begin to design their products according to those test scripts.
• Give them a year or so to plan and design the product – that brings us to December 2009.
• Give them another year or so to build it – that brings us to December 2010.
• Give them another year or so to test it, and we are looking at certifiable text conversion products no sooner than December 2011.
This timeline, however, is highly optimistic. Let's consider just a few of the rigorous standards the 2005 EAC Voting System Guidelines indicate for the text conversion device, against which the device would need to be tested in order to obtain federal certification:
quote:4.1.1 Accuracy Requirements
For each processing function indicated above [which includes "conversion of selections detected on paper ballots into digital data"], the voting system shall achieve a target error rate of no more than one in 10,000,000 ballot positions, with a maximum acceptable error rate in the test process of one in 500,000 ballot positions.
Yes, to be certified, this new text conversion device must achieve an error rate of no more than one in ten million ballot positions. This is quite a remarkable goal for a new technological device; it would certainly take quite a lot of expensive product development and testing to reach such a lofty target.
Furthermore, the 2005 EAC Voting System Guidelines state the following stringent requirements for the text conversion device:
quote:4.1.5.2 Ballot Reading Accuracy
This paper-based system requirement governs the conversion of the physical ballot into electronic data. Reading accuracy for ballot conversion refers to the ability to:
a. Recognize vote punches or marks, or the absence thereof, for each possible selection on the ballot
b. Discriminate between valid punches or marks and extraneous perforations, smudges, and folds
c. Convert the vote punches or marks, or the absence thereof, for each possible selection on the ballot into digital signals
To ensure accuracy, paper-based systems shall:
d. Detect punches or marks that conform to vendor specifications with an error rate not exceeding the requirement indicated in Subsection 4.1.1
e. Ignore, and not record, extraneous perforations, smudges, and folds
f. Reject ballots that meet all vendor specifications at a rate not to exceed 2 percent
This new high tech product has some pretty difficult government-specified requirements. It would be remarkable if the industry, upon receiving the final test scripts no sooner than December 2008, could develop such a refined and precise text conversion device even by the 2010 elections!
With this in mind, one would imagine that any proposed federal legislation calling for the use of new voting equipment would, at the very least, contemplate and integrate the federal government's own requirements into any such mandates, allowing the requisite time required for the industry to design and develop products that could meet these rigorous federally developed and sanctioned specifications and requirements.
Our timeline allowing for the possibility of a certified text conversion product by 2011 begins to look more and more impossible, given the EAC's own certification requirements. We optimistically projected three years time from test script development to product release, but we know in reality that here we are five years from the VVSG 2002 and there are still no products developed that go beyond those guidelines, and few, if any, that can demonstrate compliance with these relatively weak standards under the more rigorous testing regime developed by NIST.
Follow the bouncing ball - you'll never be able to catch it.
* * * * *
If anyone can refute this logic I will happily retire from this analysis of the EAC Certification Program as a Ponzi Scheme.
-- Nancy Tobi, Chair, Democracy for New Hampshire
For additional background, or further investigation, you can access this PowerPoint presentation that explains the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) voting equipment certification program, and why it is a Ponzi Scheme:
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/2848
For more information on the 2005 VVSG:
http://eac.gov/vvsg_intro.htm
For more information on HR 939:
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-939
For more information on the TGDC discussion of timetables for testing:
http://vote.nist.gov/HFP/HFPteleconnotes111706.htm
For more information on the Standards Board resolutions eliminating text conversion language from the 2005 VVSG:
http://www.eac.gov/docs/Standards%20Board%20Final%20Resolution%20(As%20Amended).pdf
For more information on Dr. Britt Williams’ testimony at the Feinstein hearings:
http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/0207Williams.pdf
For more information on the EAC’s budget for the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines and Certification program:
http://www.eac.gov/docs/Senate%20Appropriations%20Testimony%20FY07%20-%20FINAL.p df
PERMISSION TO REPRINT GRANTED |
Mark E. Smith
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Mymarkx
Post Number: 179
Registered: 07-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 12:54 am: |
|
Awesome analysis! Great work, Nancy!
Nancy, would you mind emailing me or posting your professional bio? Since nobody will be able to refute your analysis, I expect that a full-fledged Rovian-style smear campaign directed against you personally will begin at any moment (ask Bev if you're not familiar with how those smear tactics work), and I'd appreciate any ammunition that I can use in your defense.
I'm forwarding your analysis to California Secretary of State Debra Bowen and hope everyone active in California will do the same.
It would also be helpful if everyone forwards your work to Senator Diane Feinstein and to all the Holt proponents in Congress.
Congratulations on a magnificent breakthrough! 
--Mark |
Nancy Tobi
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ntobi
Post Number: 98
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 4:39 am: |
|
Thanks for the props Mark. I hope you are wrong about what you imply because my husband is ready with his shotgun to ward off any evil spirits.
And furthermore I am blessed to have prayers said for me by someone close to G-d.
Between the two I should be OK.
:-)
My professional bio has little to do with the work I do in this arena, however. Here is what is posted at OpEdNews in my writer's bio:
Nancy Tobi is the author of numerous articles on election integrity, including "The Gifts of HAVA: Time to Ask for a Refund," "What's Wrong with the Holt Bill,"and the newly released "We're Counting the Votes: An Election Preparedness Kit." She is co-founder and Chair of Democracy for New Hampshire and Chair of the Democracy for New Hampshire Fair Elections Committee. Her writings may be found at www.democracyfornewhampshire.com |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 5890
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 7:23 am: |
|
Here is a PDF version of this story that you can email to your elections officials, members of congress, and the media:
 The voting machine certification Ponzi scheme
ponzi.pdf (75.4 k) |
Government is the servant of the people, and not the master of them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. We insist on remaining informed so that we may retain control over the instruments of government we have created.
|
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 785
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 8:43 am: |
|
Nancy,
You have absolutely nailed this so dead on!
And every present (and former  ) election official in the nation knows your analysis is dead on.
We need, as a nation, to stop deluding ourselves about how quickly these things can be done. We need to be seriously thinking RIGHT NOW about what we want to be voting on in 2016, not 2008.
Why don't Rush Holt and Diane Feinstein, et al, get this? It's just obvious to me. Anything shorter horizon than 2012 at the earliest is merely chasing our tails, the very thing you so completely described.
Our only options for 2008, 2010, and likely beyond are two:
1) Suck it up and suffer through essentially what we have, with minor tweaks, or
2) Go retro completely. Eliminate the technology and go to paper. (Of course, that will never satisfy the "accessibility" lobby.) |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 5891
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 9:30 am: |
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Kurt,
I find the "pass Holt now even if it's damaged goods, or we won't have anything in 2008!" arguments to be not just dangerous to our system of government, not just an invitation to waste collossal sums of money, not just exploitive and coercive, but partisan.
Such arguments imply that "if we don't pass something, anything" Republicans will cheat. While they don't come right out and say "We are Democrats and we think Republicans steal elections", when you peel off the layers you find that assumption among many who are pushing Holt.
Well, I've said it before and I'll say it again: I live in King County, Washington, the home of the deleted three hours in the GEMS audit log, the home of the now-you-see-em-now-you-don't ballots, which appeared like rabbits out of a hat every few weeks during the 2004 gubernatorial recount (usually when the Republican candidate pulled ahead; the "found" ballots -- lo and behold -- ended up in the Democrat "winning").
I've said it before and I'll say it again: Election integrity is not a partisan issue and it is not an issue that should be "solved" by dealing only with the federal races, as if the presidential race was the key to election integrity.
The most common frauds are at the county level, in the breadbasket positions that oversee development projects, guns, and contraband. Those positions in turn hold great sway over the elections official chosen, and that election official -- or any civil servant working for that election official -- can hold the keys to the kingdom for the federal races.
Meaningul election reforms must get at the foundation of the problem, which is secrecy and withholding information from the public.
It's more important to get it Right than to get it Rushed.
No pun intended.
However, that's not to say I'm not in a rush. I am. I just believe that the citizens, and prompt open acces to information, provides the real, longest-lasting keys to election integrity -- and the bonus is, this doesn't require new techno-toys, or new certifications, and it tackles both local and federal election integrity simultaneously.
...
Government is the servant of the people, and not the master of them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. We insist on remaining informed so that we may retain control over the instruments of government we have created.
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V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 788
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 1:46 pm: |
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Bev,
"The most common frauds are at the county level, in the breadbasket positions that oversee development projects, guns, and contraband. Those positions in turn hold great sway over the elections official chosen, and that election official -- or any civil servant working for that election official -- can hold the keys to the kingdom for the federal races."
Wow! Well said. And I remind everyone here that the present Election Director here in my county is the first person listed as having bailed out of the AVS sinking ship by Bradley Spencer on his thread involving the AVS WinVote matter in Northampton County, Pennsylvania. She is the person who sold the WinVotes to Fairfax County, VA. And her spouse is a convicted felon on federal job-selling charges in this county while he was the Coroner. He had his deputies kicking back to him inflated fees for transporting bodies that never existed. Ethics is nearly non-existent here today. It's why there is an ongoing federal investigation of political corruption here. |
Bev Harris
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Site_admin
Post Number: 678
Registered: 10-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 10:50 pm: |
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Please disregard the smear attack post by "nyjazz" alias "cleo". I have removed the post and banned the IP.
Lately there have been a larger than normal number of Internet trolls spewing disinformation and tabloid-style distortions to smear individuals who have expressed opinions unfavorable to the Holt Bill.
In many of these attacks, the trolls are posting hints that they have researched the individual they are attacking, as if they feel that it is appropriate to compile a personal dossier on people who aren't on the Holt Bill bandwagon.
The individual who just smeared V. Kurt Bellman posted from a hotel room somewhere.
Kurt, congratulations. You join me, Brad Friedman, Paul Lehto on the receiving end of personal "investigations" and off-topic personal attacks designed to distract and spread propaganda.
Lately, these smears have begun to appear as responses to articles discussing issues with the proposed Holt Bill. Especially with the "dossiers" these trolls appear to be storing like chipmunks, this development is a disturbing commentary on the process someone seems to feel is necessary to quell debate.
Appendix F
Psychological Operations Techniques
Manufacturing Disapproval
This technique is used to get the audience to disapprove of an action or idea by suggesting that the idea is popular with groups hated, feared, or held in contempt by the target audience. If a group that supports a policy is led to believe that undesirable, subversive, or contemptible people also support it, then the members of the group might decide to change their position.
Other propaganda tactics I've noticed in the past two weeks:
Appeal to Authority ["Top experts support the Holt Bill so you should, too']
Appeals to authority cite prominent figures that support a position, idea, argument, or course of action.
Least of Evils
This technique acknowledges that the course of action being taken is perhaps undesirable, however, any alternative course of action would result in a worse outcome.
* * *
Apparently it's time for all of us to learn to recognize these tactics for what they are: Propaganda techniques.
If someone refuses to engage in rational debate of issues, but instead changes the subject to engage in personal attacks and smears, consider it a red flag that something may be seriously amiss in the election reform arena. |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 789
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 11:05 pm: |
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Wow Bev,
You got it taken down before I got to see it.
I guess it must have been something! |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 794
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 21, 2007 - 9:25 am: |
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Bev,
Thanks for the "heads up" by email. Yes, folks, I once was a harsh critic of the election reform movement. I still am of a goodly sized portion of it - the "scare the crap out of people" portion of it.
These machines have problems. We have problem people in the industry, vendors, election admins, (especially) ITA's, and even (gasp!) the reform movement itself. For some, it's just a partisan tool, like any other tactic.
These are serious problems. Where I draw the line is when people start "Chicken Littling" this issue and getting people all worked up to the point they don't feel like voting is worth doing. THAT is my definition of "electoral terrorism". When you do or say things that make people question whether going to vote makes sense, you deserve the label "terrorist" in my book.
To me, the franchise, AND the conscious decision to NOT exercise it, if that is your wish, is nearly sacred. And when people do or say things that discourage people from voting, that is reprehensible to me. Always has been, always will be.
And there are those who, especially in the early years of this movement, were doing EXACTLY that in my opinion.
My mantra is, "Find the problems, fix the problems, but stop scaring people, and tell everyone that it's okay to go vote, because to do otherwise is to surrender to evil." |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 2
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 7:35 am: |
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As a first time poster, I am fascinated with this site and the wealth of information that exists on the various topics and issues dealing with voting protocol. In fact, it is somewhat overwhelming in terms of its volume.
With elections coming up in my town on March 10th, is there a prescribed set of procedure(s) that I or my campaign workers could/should go through (as a candidate for re-election) to ensure that the Accuvote opscan equipment has been calibrated properly, memory chip cleared, totals zeroed, etc.
What should we be doing and when - i.e., before, during and after the vote.
Any assistance would be greatly appreciated. |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 241
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 7:52 am: |
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Attend the functional testing (aka Logic an Accuracy (L&A) testing). That will likely shatter all confidence you may have had in how likely the machines total votes accurately.
I have not seen Kurt's L&A testing, but my experience has been that I have only witnessed one clerk do L&A testing well and dozens who do not.
My opinion is nearly all officials want to do the testing well, but have been given no guidence on how to do it well.
After that observe (observe = videotape) the canvass and tabulation. The video tape seems especially important to me if you are a candidate doing the observation. The camera limits somewhat the claim that you are a sore loser just making stuff up.
Video lies less often than people. 
Kurt can speak to this, but the canvass and tabulation is at the end of a very, very long day. People are at their shortest temper. Be polite and persistent, but not rude. I found when I am carrying the camera I tend to be more polite and less rash than I might otherwise be, because I am conscious the camera is recording me as well.
(Message edited by johnwashburn on February 23, 2007) |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 797
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 8:16 am: |
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John,
"My opinion is nearly all officials want to do the testing well, but have been given no guidence on how to do it well."
AMEN, John!
We were/are all flying blind on this. None of my former colleagues understands this very well at all!
If you want to reach E.D's on this, I would suggest contacting the state level authorities and ask to give a talk or seminar at the meeting of county E.D.'s that nearly all states have. |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 798
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 8:30 am: |
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John,
Videotaping, where it is legal, can be a great tool. But you are right. It is a much less threatening thing to do if one sets up a camera where oneself is also being recorded if possible. That makes the whole experience far less adversarial for the election workers.
When you put yourself also in a potentially embarrassing situation, you come across far more sympathetically.
Now as it pertains specifically to L&A testing, I don't know what to say. While I was there, the requirements for notification were very meager. I understand they're somewhat more robust now in Pennsylvania. I believe there is now a requirement for a "Legal Notices" ad.
What would happen if anyone showed up? I don't really know. In the eight elections I did, no one ever showed up to witness L&A, or tabulation, for that matter. They only seemed to want to come in to watch the tab screens up until I got web reporting working.
Actually, in 2004, the newspaper DID send a still photographer to L&A, who took a shot of me with a wide angle lens standing among several hundred Danaher 1242's waiting for L&A tests. The shot was eerily reminiscent of something out of an old movie. like "Coma" with the rows of comatose bodies waiting for organ harvesting. The machine warehouse always did creep me out a little. |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 3
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 8:32 am: |
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Thanks very much John and Kurt. I've just requested of our town clerk to be present for the L&A of the Accuvote opscan equipment. The reason for my initial inquiry is because I happened to notice what appeared to be cpu's sitting on a bunch of heating units in our town hall. When I asked someone what they were, they told me they were the voting machines. It appeared as though they were being charged up. Having run as a candidate before, I never really thought to question the voting machines or how they were supposed to be calibrated, etc.
But after reading some things on this site, it sure got me wondering. My problem is this. If I get to attend the L&A, I'm not even sure what to look for let alone the canvass and tabulation phase at the end. Thus, are there key aspects that I should be attuned to and just simply, flat out ask the election offficial (town clerk) why this and why that?
Again, many thanks for your assistance.
Dmauch |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3689
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 8:53 am: |
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Donald
They had taken the CPUs out of the scanners?
Is it just me--or does this seem unusual? Shouldn't all voting machine equipment be kept under lock and key?
This raises lots of red flags for me.
If they took CPUs out, is there anything that could be done with them that could affect the integrity of the election, the reliability of the machines, or their certification status? |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3690
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 8:54 am: |
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Donald,
Thanks for mentioning your observations. What we need are lots more people keeping their eyes open.
By the way, have you checked out the Citizens Tool Kit yet? Some of the modules there may be particularly useful to you as a candidate. |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 799
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 9:11 am: |
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Catherine,
We need to be very careful about how we describe things and how we interpret the decriptions of untrained observers.
And I don't know Accuvote opscans very well.
But it is possible, and I'd venture to say LIKELY, that what Donald saw was the recharging of the internal battery backup devices. |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 800
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 9:22 am: |
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Catherine,
Just an example from my experience. The weirdest thing I ever saw in elections was the first time I saw the Danaher cartridges being erased so they could be regrogrammed for the next election.
One of my staff was physically breaking open the cartridges, taking the inner circuit boards out, loading them up in an oversized suitcase with some holes in it, turning a rotary dial, and walking away. The suitcase had an eerie-looking glow coming out of it.
She was erasing the EPROMs with shortwave UV light. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3691
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 10:27 am: |
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Kurt,
Agreed. And sometimes, innocent-seeming observations turn out to be indications of major problems.
We shouldn't assume anything either way, and the more observations the better. |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 4
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 11:07 am: |
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To All of you,
Thank you for bringing these issues to my attention. Ironically, at 11:33 am as I was posting on this site, I received an email from our town clerk (in response to my email to her thanks to you folks) that the testing of the Accuvote machines was to take place in our town hall at 12 noon TODAY!!! (see the following)
"Don, I am a little confused with your question. Do you mean when is the test that we do on each Accuvote machine which we procured from LHS, and which is then sent to the Secretary of State's office for their records.?? If so, it is today at Noon and has been posted on the Board for more than 48 hours. It will be done in the Osborn Room if we don't freeze to death. I will answer your other questions as soon as I get all the info together. If you wish to come today, please knock on the door if it is past noon."
I recorded each and every step of the testing procedure and with each machine a total of 50 test ballots comprised of 7 overvotes, 4 blanks, 10 write-ins, and 29 votes were fed in. All three machines with their corresponding memory chips appeared, according to the printed tapes, to have counted 49 votes instead of 50.
I am told however by the town clerk, that the tape totals reflect actual votes only - i.e., the 29 votes and the 10 write-ins. Therefore the total tape figure shows 39 actual votes of which 10 were write-ins. Thus it appeared from the tape that the 10 was in addition to the 39 not a part thereof.
Apparently the Accuvote machines do not have the ability to count the overvotes or the blanks at all.
Nevertheless I have asked for a formal explanation from LHS, the firm who programs the memory chips.
In addition, the first machine recorded 3 votes when only two had been fed in but that was attributed to failure to reset the machine after the backup memory chip was removed and the actual inserted. When the machine was reset by powering off and then on, the ballots were counted.
Finally the second machine when the ballot holding bin was opened, a stack of 100 or more ballots from a prior election were still in the machine but I was told that - they did in fact get counted.
Upon conclusion of the test I asked for the boots to be placed over the memory chip slots and I recorded the serial numbers on all three. The units are usually kept locked in the town hall vault but nearing the election, after their tested, are kept locked in the town clerk's office in their cases.
Thanks to you guys, my "field trip" was most intriguing and informative.
I do intend to stay on top of all this and make sure the the explanation for the tape totals is a legit one.
Dmauch |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 5892
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 11:15 am: |
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woh woh woh --
Accuvotes can count the undervotes and overvotes.
It's called "The long report." It's an option they can choose, to print the long report. We have received many copies of "the long report" and indeed it does count unders and overs and blanks.
Government is the servant of the people, and not the master of them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. We insist on remaining informed so that we may retain control over the instruments of government we have created.
|
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 5
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 11:33 am: |
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Thanks Bev,
Now that you mention it...
When the test was over and they went through the reset protocol, the town clerk read from the instructions as the assistant pressed the corrseponding numbers below the digital screen. I do recall that one of questions on the screen was whether or not to print a "long report," and the town clerk replied to the assistant, "No."
My goodness, in any case, I would have assumed that both of them would have easily provided me with this explanation rather all of us just scratching our heads and having them tell me that they would get one from LHS. (It wasn't until after I got home that the assist clerk called me to tell me that she and the clerk had come up with an explanation)
John's earlier statement, "My opinion is nearly all officials want to do the testing well, but have been given no guidence on how to do it well," couldn't have been more on the mark!
Dmauch |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 6
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 11:43 am: |
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Kurt,
I was able to confirm that what appeared to be cpu's were the actual voting machines that were in fact being recharged. I've learned a lot today! - again, many thanks to you guys.
DMauch |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3692
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 12:17 pm: |
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Donald,
I find those tape results weird. Did they say 39 or 49 on them?
If it's not clear what the tape results mean at an L&A test, how do we know if a real election result will be any clearer?
And why didn't the people running the test have an immediate 1) expectation of what the results should look like and 2) answer to your question on the spot.
Elsewhere posters have said running the "Long" tape result actually doesn't take long at all, yet the vendor had warned them not to choose this option, implying it would take forever. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3693
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 12:19 pm: |
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Donald,
Does your area have strict written procedures regarding secure storage and handling of the voting machines? Is it ok for any 1 staff person to have access to them without any other observer present? |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 242
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 12:30 pm: |
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There is nothing like stepping into action for educating experiences.
I'll bet you were the first person to ever attend the testing who was not required by law to be there. I have heard that exact phrase at least 3 times.
RE: My opinion is nearly all officials want to do the testing well, but have been given no guidance on how to do it well. My own efforts on this front are found here. The main problem I have found is if an election official has received any guidance at all on testing, then that guidance has come from the vendor.
Conscious or not the vendor (salesman, developer and to some extent the election official) has a testing bias against discovering problems. This bias manifests itself as an avoidance (conscious or not) of "problem" areas.
I want to be clear. The bias is present absent of any malice or any effort to deceive. The discovery of defects is seen as a failure which threatens the sale, threatens the election schedule or threatens the reputation of the salesman, the election official, the vendor, or some combination of the three. |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 243
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 12:37 pm: |
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Kurt,
I had not seriously considered the idea of road show until now. But, would love to pursue this even if my time doing so is largely uncompensated. (For the record I opt for compensation ) Good functional testing is a limited tool, but is a tool available RIGHT NOW and is better than the poor testing going on now.
Who do you think it best to approach: The state-level person (e.g. Secretary Cortez in PA) or the chair of the Association of the Election Officials (e.g. Association of Municipal Clerks in WI)? |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 244
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 12:53 pm: |
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Don,
I have got to ask: Were the 5 Basic Rules for Testing Your Voting Machinery followed?
1. Create your own test deck.
Always create the test plan and test ballots yourself. Do not accept test materials from the vendor or programmer.
2. Always test an election system in “Election Mode.”
Many elections systems offer “test mode,” “automatic testing,” “self-testing,” or other such features. Never test an election system in these test modes. Since the election official performing the testing is signing paperwork stating the election system will work during an election, the testing MUST be done in the same mode used during the election. Otherwise, the election official has no knowledge of how it will perform in an election.
3. Create a comprehensive deck of test ballots.
The goal of L&A testing is to determine if the software is or is not working as expected. Thus, the deck of test ballots for L&A testing must be designed to actively look for programming defects. A haphazard collection of test ballots will not do. A comprehensive deck of test ballots must be thoughtfully constructed. For voting machines there are 5 general steps to creating a deck of good test ballots for L&A testing
a. Create 2 ballots with zero marks (no screen touches). This tests that only designated areas are read.
b. Create every possible ballot which has exactly 1 mark (one screen touch). This tests the calibration.
c. Create every possible ballot which has exactly 2 marks (two screen touches). This tests for overvotes.
d. If there is a race where the elector votes for N of M candidates, then, for only the multi-vote race(s), create every possible ballot which has exactly 3 marks (screen touches), 4 marks (screen touches), 5 marks (screen touches) etc., up to a limit of ballots with exactly N+1 marks (screen touches).
e. Create tally distinction ballots such that every ballot line on the ballot will have a distinct expected vote total. This tests ballot rotation and that candidate totals are not swapped.
For complete instructions, see Guidelines to Create Deck of Test Ballots.
4. Perform the Planned Tests.
Often software tests are planned but never executed. There are many reasons, but the simplest is the lack of time. Even if time becomes short, perform the tests you have planned. The test plan was a good idea when time permitted. It is even better when the schedule crush begins. The worst time to decide which corners to cut and which tests to skip is under the pressure of looming deadlines.
5. Go wherever the evidence leads.
The software testing may well discover defects. There may be tremendous pressure to ignore the troublesome results or pressure to allow an illegal software patch to “fix” the discovered problem. Resist this pressure. The uncomfortable answers from the software testing results may mean the election system under test is unfit or illegal to use in the upcoming election, or the system can only be used if new procedures or protocols are followed. |
Bob Fleischer
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rjf7r
Post Number: 109
Registered: 09-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 1:44 pm: |
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I'm a professional software tester and programmer. I am profoundly unmoved to test voting machines or even watch the tests. I know that if one were to tamper with the programming of a machine, it would be in a way that would not fail at the time of testing or on such simple cases. I don't see the value of this other than to show that these systems perform so poorly that they should never be considered for any important task such as elections. (I admit, this may be a very important thing to accomplish!)
(Of course machines must be tested before elections to detect ones that need maintenance. But this is not really testing “logic and accuracy” – just weeding out failed machines that need servicing.) |
Pat Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 462
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 2:27 pm: |
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John, Aside from the '5 Basic Rules' that you outline above, wouldn't it also be important to make sure that the time and date be set to that of the actual election, and that the number of votes cast be within the range anticipated that each machine will actually handle? Otherwise, how would you know for sure that there aren't any hidden triggers in the software?
Just wondering.
Pat A. Vesely ;-)
Paper ballots are the 'Currency of Democracy'. They've been helping to curb election fraud since 139 BCE!
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Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 7
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 2:55 pm: |
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Catherine/ John
The bottom of the tape show:
Vote: 39
Write Ins: 10
So being the newbie that I am, I knew that 50 ballots had been sent through and 11 were rejected as blanks or overvotes.
Thus 39 + 11 = 50 but I (along with the election officials) couldn't figure put why the tape was showing 39 + 10 = 49 or 1 short. AFTER I got back to my office the asst. clerk called twice - the first time to tell me they thought they had an explanation but the didn't and a second time to tell me that the 10 write-ins on the tape were INCLUDED in the 39 figure.
As to why they didn't have an immediate response - I don't know.
But you must understand that I am in a rather sensitive position because as John opined, I was probably the first outsider to observe the L&A but also an incumbent elected official running for re-election and thus on the very ballots they were testing.
I also think John is very correct when he points out that, "The bias is present absent of any malice or any effort to deceive. The discovery of defects is seen as a failure which threatens the sale, threatens the election schedule or threatens the reputation of the salesman, the election official, the vendor, or some combination of the three."
I believe our town clerk and asst. do an excellent job given their limited resources and it was very obvious that there was a sense of annoyance/discomfort over my presence as one of the chief fiduciaries of the town.
As to secured storage, policies and rules, I'm not sure but I certainly plan to review whatever does exist and assess remedial measures if necessary regardless if I'm re-elected on March 10th.
I don't think the town clerk had ever used the boots on the cover of the memory slots before so that was significant given that the machines are stored in her locked office rather than the town hall vault. Howvere, as a selectman, I can gain access to the office as easily as the town administrator or the chairman of the board of selectmen who happens to support my opponent!
I don't mean to belabor the point, but you folks have provided me with some invaluable information that I would not have otherwise come across and I extend my sincere thanks and appreciation.
In a small town like ours (pop. 10,000) we all have to be very careful to avoid the appearance of having our inquiries taken as accusations by those in the public. Hence, it's a very thin line we walk with a lot of this stuff.
Dmauch |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3694
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 6:41 pm: |
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It's not a question of accusing anyone of malfeasance. But clear procedures and complete transparency are a must so that everyone can experience and confirm the lack of loopholes in the systems that are used.
This also would provide election officials with protection. It's in their own best interest to work closely with citizens of all political backgrounds to develop systems that are models of transparency and meaningful citizen participation. |
Jason Aaron Osgood
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Zappini
Post Number: 24
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 8:22 pm: |
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Hi V. Kurt Bellman-
Election integrity activists are terrorists?
Really.
Do you have any reason to believe that the extensive media coverage of the problems with computer voting and counting machines during the run-up to November 2006 election decreased voter turnout?
Hardly.
If you haven't already, watch the excellent movie American Blackout to see how voters respond when their right to vote is under attack.
Frankly, I find your characterization of people such as myself, my friends, and my colleagues as very offensive. I suppose we should all just sit down, shut up, and let the adults sort everything out. That'll solve everything.
Cheers, Jason Osgood
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zappini.blogspot.com
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Jason Aaron Osgood
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Zappini
Post Number: 25
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 23, 2007 - 8:30 pm: |
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Hi Donald Mauch-
Welcome to the neighborhood!
My advice is to take the first step, which is to show up. Ask questions. Be polite.
And then keep showing up.
It'll take you a while to learn about all the events that the public can attend. Pre and post testing of the machines, canvassing board meetings, public demonstrations, etc. You just have to keep asking until you find the right person and ask in just the right way.
Some possible good ways to start are to call your county's elections department to find how how to be a poll worker, work the central count, or be an observer. Your local parties may also have their own observer training.
Black Box Voting has an excellent Citizen's Toolkit. It's a great place to start for getting acquainted with all the issues. Absorb as much as you can.
Through repetition, it'll start making sense.
Good luck.
Cheers, Jason Osgood
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zappini.blogspot.com
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Charles Christopher
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ilikeinfo
Post Number: 47
Registered: 11-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 4:29 pm: |
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When I read the initial post I got very depressed and thought "I hope the selling of the US government to corporate America has not gone so far as to be irreversable" ...
Then I read Bev's post:
>Lately there have been a larger than normal
>number of Internet trolls spewing disinformation
>and tabloid-style distortions to smear
>individuals who have expressed opinions
>unfavorable to the Holt Bill.
As that would not be happening if this site where not holding the system accountable. So I'm actually pleased to here this is going on and it's on the increase. My momentary depression is no gone. |
Charles Christopher
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ilikeinfo
Post Number: 48
Registered: 11-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 4:45 pm: |
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>Bob Fleischer said:
>
>I know that if one were to tamper with the
>programming of a machine, it would be in a way
>that would not fail at the time of testing or on
>such simple cases.
I beleive you've brought up a key issue but you probably should have taken it even further than you did.
Forget tampering, and lets assume the current machines are in fact "perfect" (cough), once a testing standard become instaintiated it will become *IMPOSSIBLE* to change to any significant degree.
What that translates into is simple, devices will then be designed to guarentee they pass the test however there will be *ZERO* motivation on the part of the manufactures to guarentee their devices perform accurately under realworld conditions since the test *IS* their certification rather than a realworld audit which these devices conviently make *IMPOSSIBLE*. In effect the existance of an "approved test" *CAN* become a license to kill.
This is just another reason for removing high tech form the equation entirely and return to the time test approach of Keep It Simple Stupid.
Technology has no place here, unless the intent is to be empowered to manipulate an election ... |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 245
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 5:10 pm: |
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Dear Bob Fleischer:
RE I'm a professional software tester and programmer. I am profoundly unmoved to test voting machines or even watch the tests
I had a coach whose admonition was: "Half of winning is showing" still ring true. Now he was applying this maxim to instill in us superb aerobice fitness so that we (his wrestlers) could "show up" in the third period and not have to "fish out" the last 2 minutes.
Pre-Election functional testing is a legal requirement in most if not all states. Because of this there are 2 reasons to do this testing well as possible.
1) In general professionals strive for excellence in every task. We should expect the same of our election officials.
2) Election officials, at the end of the functional testing, often sign paper work that the testing was done and the machine is fit for use in the upcoming election.
As software test professionals we should help these newbies do the testing well because most want to do it well and are open to suggestions if we explain why. Some aren't. My suggestion in that case is provide no more suggestions on process improvement. |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 246
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 5:20 pm: |
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Dear Pat Vesely:
Re:John, Aside from the '5 Basic Rules' that you outline above, wouldn't it also be important to...
Yes. But functional black box testing (aka L&A testing), is a limited tool and only designed to find programming mistakes. Finding malice is a much harder problem and very different threat model.
It was with this simplistic threat model, the time constraints of the election official, and the legal requirements, that the the 5 basic rules were designed.
If the 5 rules are followed the test deck is better. The function testing is better (both better coverage and an active search for defects). Most importantly, the testing can be done in the time frame allotted to most election officials without exceeding the statutory requirements. |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 247
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 5:43 pm: |
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RE:
My advice is to take the first step, which is to show up. Ask questions. Be polite. And then keep showing up.
Amen to that.
Mr. Mauch you may well have taken a life changing action by just showing up. Keep asking these questions. They are reasonable and there should be answers to them.
Maybe this will help.
IF there was a test plan prior to the L&A testing, then there should be a document which documents the configuration of the test ballots AND the vote tallies these test ballots are expected to produce.
The plan is unlikely to exist, but ask for this test plan.
I don't think such a plan exists, because if it did exist, the election officials would have noticed this discrepancy sooner and already been investigating the root cause of the variance.
My speculation is LHS provided the test deck with no accompaning documentation of the expected results.
Boris Beizer |
Charles Christopher
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ilikeinfo
Post Number: 50
Registered: 11-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 7:30 pm: |
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>John Washburn
>
>As software test professionals we should help
>these newbies do the testing well because most
>want to do it well and are open to suggestions if
>we explain why. Some aren't. My suggestion in
>that case is provide no more suggestions on
>process improvement.
There's a certain element of "I was only following orders, Sir!" to that.
Quality Control (aka "Software Test") is not the act of testing right or wrong, quality control is the act of proving stated the specification has been met. In other words you have to know the spec before you can test *ANYTHING*.
Testing electronic voting systems in effect states these system "meet the spec" to begin with and thus the act of testing serves to further legitimize that view point and take us all futher away from disputing the foundation of the decision and spec.
Solutions are not found by being on autopilot, they are found by allways being willing to go back to the very begining of the decision chain and ask a formidable question ... What was the scientific evidence, and scienticific studies, that clearly *PROVED* electronic voting system "better" and *HOW* exactly is "better" defined? Without that it's impossible to formulate a test as the test, to be valid, *MUST* embody and validate the answer to those questions for each and every electronic voting system produced ...
Of course that assumes the goal is improving the voting process where "improve" is defined as sginificantly increasing the likelyhood that the final outcome accurately reflects the voters stated desires *AND* anyone at any time can go back and confirm the process did just that with minimal uncertainty. If the goal is something else then please ignore all my comments as they would obviously be "out of line" ....
So to place it into context a software test professional is at the mercy of those in control, great care must be taken to avoid being used to legitimize damaging policies, procedures, and finally, technology as potentially embodied by an electronic voting system.
The software test engineer should be asking "Ok previous baseline was chads (for examaple), so how does the test verify the improvement over that previous system?". To which the employer will likely move that software test engineer to another project until a person is found who asks fewer questions - Sorry for my cynicism.
(Message edited by ilikeinfo on February 24, 2007) |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 248
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 8:49 pm: |
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But the legal definiton of pre-election testing (and that is all my guidelines address) ARE reasonably well defined specifications. The expected results of the test should provide evidence the machine is programmed to interpret the marks on the opscan ballot (or touches on the screen) into tallied votes in accordance with statute and case law.
I agree with your definition of improvement of election administration and I have asked many of those more fundamental questions.
But, there are thousands of election officials who have to do this testing by law and want to do it well but don't know how to do it well.
Improving L&A testing is something that, as Mr. Mauch demonstrates, can be done today. I will take my improvements were I can get them. Improved L&A testing should also gather better base line data on programming and ballot definiton mistakes.
As for being shunted aside for testing "too hard", yes, that has happen to me. In both cases the ironic result is my reputation was improved because my concerns were vindication in public-facing production systems.
Thankfully neither system invovled something as vital as election administration. |
Charles Christopher
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ilikeinfo
Post Number: 51
Registered: 11-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 1:48 am: |
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>John Washburn
>But, there are thousands of election officials
>who have to do this testing by law and want to
>do it well but don't know how to do it well.
I'm with you and completely understand what you are saying.
I'm just making the point that we've been maneuvered into "damn if you do, damned if you don't" position.  But time is the biggest killer, I've allready seen people say on TV news "There is no verifiable error in counts obtained from electonic voting machines, they work" or words to that effect. I'm not saying those comments were right or wrong, just saying the more people hear that and hear "how well" the devices are tested the harder it is to get people to switch back. This sites job gets harder and harder with time as people get use to the electronic systems.
So everything's just moving to justify and entrench a system that eleminates intrinsic accountablity.
I'm please to hear support of "testing to hard" but what was the baseline and did it trace back to the system that the electronic voting machines replaced? ... In fact is it even possible to traceback given there seem to be no real scientific (aka "measured") basis for the change in the first place, people just go on assuming the change was right.
John also keep in mind I'm as biased as it gets since I believe it's impossible to truely secure these systems. The "people" issue can't be eliminated, but for a peice of paper the voter can look at the paper and it can be assumed they can serve the QC role of their own votes and the paper retains that vote (and refusal to QC is their *CHOICE*) and I beleive, like checks and currency, can be design to make tempering evident. The more someone like you is needed the more fundametally the system is flawed by way of too much complexity. So that's where I'm comming from, FWIW. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3697
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 3:54 am: |
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Charles:
quote:did it trace back to the system that the electronic voting machines replaced? ... In fact is it even possible to traceback given there seem to be no real scientific (aka "measured") basis for the change in the first place, people just go on assuming the change was right.
This is one of the many basic problems about how electronic voting has been introduced. Those questions were never asked and never studied.
There are grounds to question why electronic voting was ever introduced. Perhaps as a revenue stream for vendor suppliers, and possibly as a way to manipulate elections (just look at the results from some of the first elections held on these machines).
While reasons were given for why electronic would be better with electronic machines, these were just selling points--the claims were not based on thorough study or comparisons between various systems. And they never asked voters their opinion. Decisions were made behind closed doors. |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 249
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 10:13 am: |
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I should have been more clear. Neither of the 2 cases where I have been shunted aside for "testing too hard" involved voting systems.
As for any kind of requirements document or traceability matrix for electronic voting systems, Catherine is dead on.
Voting is a complex social, legal, and political environment where technology choices should be the last decision made.
What virtues are to be preserved during the administration of an election; Transparency, security, fraud detection, fraud prevention, disability access, ease of administration for the election official, ease of administration for the sovereign citizens?
None of these question were asked by anyone (except by a literal handful of people) between 1975 and 2000 when these systems were being introduced. It seems to me the de-facto virtue preserved was ease of administration for the election official. This is because election officials were the only people buying, specifying or using these systems. This technology introduction was compounded by the fact that most election officials are non-technical and only administers elections intermittently. Any technology which seemed to get them through election night without reported
incident was deemed good enough and an "improvement".
In many instances it seems to me it was less a case of deals behind closed doors, but of no one from the public attending the publicized, open meetings.
Open meeting laws imply there at least some citizens interested in observing and influencing the policy under discussion. For the first 25 years of voting machinery (1975-2000) the interest by us in the general public has been scant at best.
(Message edited by johnwashburn on February 25, 2007) |
Jason Aaron Osgood
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Zappini
Post Number: 26
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 11:26 am: |
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Hi Charles Christopher-
Technology has no place here, unless the intent is to be empowered to manipulate an election ...
Not to be argumentative, but I have a different view.
All human artifacts and beliefs are technologies. Language, math, writing systems, laws, hammers, wheels, procedures, recipes, methodologies, etc., are all technologies.
I used to write software for print manufacturing (imposition for books, newspapers, etc). Generally, people regard paper and printing as low tech. I know first hand that they're very high tech. When I see paper ballots, I marvel at how high tech they truly are.
For me, posing the issues as "computers vs no computers" isn't helpful. Rather, the rub is always about the appropriateness of the technologies used.
We generally don't think of it as such, but the Australian Ballot system, meaning a secret ballot and a public vote count, is the enabling technology for our democracy. It's the balanced combination of real world stuff (uniform paper ballots, ballot boxes, privacy booths) and head space stuff (rules, procedures) that best ensures election integrity.
When the computerized voting machines were introduced, it was the choice of one technology over another. Those kinds of choices are the result of the value systems in operation at the time. Right now, the emphasis is on timely results, easy administration, and smooth elections. At the expense of election integrity, of course.
The deep irony is that the promises of computerized voting were never realized, leading to prolonged counting, exceedingly expensive administration, and troubled elections. From my experience and observation, this kind of trouble was experienced by every industry as they adopted cybernetics (computers, robots, communications).
Cheers, Jason Osgood / Seattle WA
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zappini.blogspot.com
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Jason Aaron Osgood
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Zappini
Post Number: 27
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 11:28 am: |
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Hi John Washburn-
Voting is a complex social, legal, and political environment where technology choices should be the last decision made.
You're one of my personal heroes because of statements like this.
Cheers, Jason Osgood / Seattle WA
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zappini.blogspot.com
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Charles Christopher
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ilikeinfo
Post Number: 52
Registered: 11-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 12:09 pm: |
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>Jason Aaron Osgood said
>
>When the computerized voting machines were
>introduced, it was the choice of one technology
>over another.
Choice?
Who's "choice" was it and how was the decision made? ;)
That's my point and that is the decision the decision makers want to wrap in legitimacy via such things as untracable testing (for one).
I/We *NEVER* had a choice that I am aware of. One election I was punching chads, next election I had an electonic voting machine in front of me.
>For me, posing the issues as "computers vs no
>computers" isn't helpful. Rather, the rub is
>always about the appropriateness of the
>technologies used.
I agree with you comments about how hi tech paper really is. However my background is in "Silicon" hightech.
I do find it interesting that we both are rejecting the "technology" we are most familiar with and are suggesting the other technolgy be used. The fact that we do not have any evidence either way is the core of the problem of switching from 1000's of year old technolgy to one only ~30 years old ...
And now we're now trying to use "tests" to attempt to prove the correctness of the decision in the continuing absense of on any real evidence ....
(Message edited by ilikeinfo on February 25, 2007) |
Jason Aaron Osgood
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Zappini
Post Number: 28
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 12:42 pm: |
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I/We *NEVER* had a choice that I am aware of.
Well. I don't know about the past. I only got involved in 2005. Best as I can tell, this trainwreck was a long time coming.
Of course, things would run a lot smoother if I'm consulted about any decisions related to computers beforehand. It'd save everyone a lot of time, heartache, and money. Haha. But now that I'm activated, I'm being pretty vocal about my choice.
Being right and $2.00 will get you a cup of coffee. Being ego-centric as I am, I bashfully admit to enjoy the privilege of saying "told ya so!", which may be reward enough.
Serious again for a moment, moving forward, the best we can do is prepare the inevitable failure of the prior bad decisions, have viable alternatives in place, and be ready to act when opportunities arise.
Of course, I'm not above pointing how the emperor has no clothes in the mean time.
I do find it interesting that we both are rejecting the "technology" we are most familiar with and are suggesting the other technolgy be used.
Confessions of a former technophile. Maybe this is my penance.
Similiarly, who knows the evils of smoking better than an ex-smoker? Who's more strident than an ex-smoker?
The fact that we do not have any evidence either way is the core of the problem of switching from 1000's of year old technolgy to one only ~30 years old ...
I don't follow you here.
Nothing is foolproof, but I think the secret ballot and public vote count worked pretty well for quite a while.
The secret ingredient is relying on the mutual suspicion of adversaries to ensure the integrity. (Hat tip to Paul Lehto for that phrasing.) Trust was never a factor. Paradoxically, mistrust is what ensures the integrity.
That's why, in my thesis, a fully computerized voting system can never work. There's no opportunity for mutual suspicion. Because it's not a public vote count. Also, that's why VVPAT is moot. Just like boss rims don't make a muscle car go faster. VVPAT is just a decoration.
Are we talking about the same thing? Or did I just run off on another tangent?
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zappini.blogspot.com
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Charles Christopher
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ilikeinfo
Post Number: 53
Registered: 11-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 5:29 pm: |
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>Serious again for a moment, moving forward, the
>best we can do is prepare the inevitable failure
>of the prior bad decisions, have viable
>alternatives in place, and be ready to act when
>opportunities arise.
*THAT* is the trap.
The switch to electronic voting machines should *NEVER* have happened without clear proof on the benefits and that improvements in the paper system could now long be made.
Thus I believe we screw ourselves over a second time by rolling over, playing dead, and say we have to make due with these new devices. Supporting testing without tracability to the systems they replace does just that IMHO.
>The fact that we do not have any evidence either
>way is the core of the problem of switching from
>1000's of year old technolgy to one only ~30
>years old ...
In other words I beleive paper is far better understood than "silicon" so to are the improvements is needs over time to retain it's security.
Technology seducation is easy, and sadly it's sometimes seems hard to trust that "the old time tested mouse trap", does what's it's suppose to and does not require radical change / throw the baby out with the bath water in effect.
Bottom line is I've read time and again on the site of how various paper based recounts unintentionally proved that previous "secret" recounts had occured as well as some forms of tampering. That's the benefit of 1000+ year "old technology" of paper recordings that even a child can understand ...
The more a college educated person is *REQUIRED* in order to validate the system, the more the system is fundmentally flawed. We're not talking launching the Space Shuttle, we're talking, adding numbers and ensuring proof of the original intent of each voter, no PhD's required .... |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 8
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 6:10 am: |
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John/Catherine,
Thought you would be interested in the email I received a short time ago from our town's election official in response to my prior exchange with her:
__________________
"The machines are programmed not to count overvotes or blanks. When a ballot is rejected and the screen says it is "Blank" or there is an "over-vote" in whichever office, the Warden/Clerk are to ask the voter if they would like another ballot. Most say yes they would. Otherwise, Blanks Ballots and Overvotes are put in the auxilliary section of the ballot box and they are hand counted after the polls close. Every office but the overvote office would be counted on write-in paper and added to the total tally. Jan L"
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald Mauch [mailto:dmauch@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, February 26, 2007 4:26 PM
To: Janice Lawson
Subject: Re: LHS - Optical Scanner - Possible Maintenance
Thank you Jan.
While I believe that you and Pat eventually came to a correct explanation following Friday's tests, that the 10 write-in votes were included in the 39 votes, am I to assume that the machine does not then, record over votes and blanks?
I will be in attendance tomorrow and thank you for the heads up.
I also appreciate your understanding as well as to have arranged for LHS Associates to take a look at the machines.
Kind regards,
Don
On Feb 26, 2007, at 3:29 PM, Janice Lawson wrote:
Hi Don, A representative from LHS Associates, Inc., the company where were purchased our three Accuvote optical scanners, is supposed to be coming on Tuesday, 2/27/2007, at 10:30 am in the Osborn Room to check over our machines at my request. Jan L
________________________
I plan on attending the vendor's meeting this morning and will let you both know how I make out.
DMauch |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3698
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 8:09 am: |
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Does this mean the machine only records the no. of correct votes and the no. of voters who actually pressed the "cast ballot" button at the end?
I.e., it doesn't record how many voters began the voting proceess, but then didn't complete it for some reason? |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 801
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 8:43 am: |
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Catherine,
"Apples and oranges". There is no "cast ballot" button on an opscan, to my knowledge. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3699
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 8:54 am: |
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Thanks, Kurt. I'm getting lost in voting machine land--can't keep track of which machine is being used by which person posting. Through the looking glass and down a rabbit hole. . . |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 802
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 8:55 am: |
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Catherine,
I am unaware of, not to say it doesn't exist, any DRE or opscan machine that counts the number of voters that "began the voting proceess, but then didn't complete it for some reason".
No one in the vendor world (or the election admin. one) has ever thought that it was something valuable to count. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3700
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 12:02 pm: |
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Kurt: "No one in the vendor world (or the election admin. one) has ever thought that it was something valuable to count."
I guess I thought it was a no-brainer. It's the equivalent of counting the number of people signed into the poll book, and comparing to the number of ballot papers that are in the box. Plus also comparing that to the number of votes recorded for each individual race. And also recording the number of spoiled ballots.
Seems like any electronic system should be able to keep count of all these situations. Otherwise it makes it hard to troubleshoot (or to realize that there's a problem requiring troubleshooting). |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3701
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 12:03 pm: |
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And because optical scanners have their own idiosyncratic subset of unique problems, more accurate records are needed to diagnose and treat the problems (or to know that a problem exists). |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 803
Registered: 04-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 2:11 pm: |
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Catherine,
Perhaps your perception is because you and I (at least now) look at elections as something to be audited and accounted for. And believe me, in places where old-fashioned paper ballots or even punchcards were used, there used to be a rigorous accounting for each ballot, a complete end-of-day audit of a sort, at least in my state.
But there is a perception, primarily in long-standing DRE places, but I'll bet in others too, that a "non-vote" (a 'spoiled' DRE ballot, or an undervote, or a blank, or whatever) is just something to be ignored and not thought about much at all. It's a mindset that infects all election officials. It really boils down to "I f they can't follow the simple instructions, it;s the voter's problem, not mine." I know the sentiment well. I had it.... in spades. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3702
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 4:51 pm: |
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I always like to know the "why" of things--did the voter not want to vote for anyone in one or more races? (Then give them a "none of the above" option and/or a "no opinion" opinion option or a "please spoil this ballot" option and we'd be more likely to know the voter's intention.) |
Jason Aaron Osgood
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Zappini
Post Number: 32
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 5:15 pm: |
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Catherine Ansbro wrote:
Then give them a "none of the above" option and/or a "no opinion" opinion option or a "please spoil this ballot" option and we'd be more likely to know the voter's intention.
That idea is one of the more important election integrity improvements available. It's cheap, easy, and increases confidence in the results.
---
zappini.blogspot.com
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Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 1213
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 28, 2007 - 5:01 am: |
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quote:But there is a perception, primarily in long-standing DRE places, but I'll bet in others too, that a "non-vote" (a 'spoiled' DRE ballot, or an undervote, or a blank, or whatever) is just something to be ignored and not thought about much at all. It's a mindset that infects all election officials. It really boils down to "I f they can't follow the simple instructions, it;s the voter's problem, not mine." I know the sentiment well. I had it.... in spades.
This is a major problem in elections, we have people using assumptions that were made when paper ballots were the norm and reasoning that things that happen now are representative of the same circumstances when the results look similar. With a paper ballot, if the voter didn't fill out a choice in a particular place, you would think that they overlooked/missed it, with a DRE or an optical scan, that may well be an invalid assumption. Every undervoted opscan ballot should be hand checked.
The 'no choice' spot does make good sense. It should be there. I wouldn't expect it to cure all of this though, you will get people too mentally/physically lazy to realize what it's for and use it conscientiously. But, any little bit helps. |
Michael W Mather
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Gypsy
Post Number: 155
Registered: 07-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 28, 2007 - 10:50 am: |
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The 'no vote' and 'none-of-the-above' ballot lines have been discussed in more detail previously. Nevada uses a non-binding none-of-the-above now. After the FL-13 congressional race fiasco, a FL state senator introduced a bill that proposes Florida do the same. John Washburn pointed out that there are several different flavors of no, ranging from 'no opinion/I don't care who wins' to 'none of the candidates are suitable, we need to hold a new election with new candidates (Binding NOTA)'. Apparently, both 'No Preference (Abstention)'
and 'None of the Above (New Election)' appear on the ballots at Beloit College. There is a group working to get NOTA added to ballots in all the states.
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Nancy Tobi
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ntobi
Post Number: 100
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, March 4, 2007 - 1:23 pm: |
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Here are two brief papers you can use to share with your elected officials on the problems with the Holt Bill and the EAC Certification Program. They are interconnected problems, it is worth passing both sources of information on to your elected reps. |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 9
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 8, 2007 - 4:50 pm: |
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Since my last post on 2/23, I have been preoccupied with my campaign. As a DIRECT result of John Washburn's response to me on 2/23/07 (see above) on this sight, the Accu-Vote machines had to be serviced because of problems that occurred during the L&A testing. With only a day to go now, I am very pleased to report that I have retained Counsel for my campaign who, after consulting with the chief counsel of the Elections Division of our MA Secretary of State's Office, will be coordinating a team of observers to carefully monitor and watch for any anomalies with respect to the Accu-Vote opscan machines. In addition, they will have all received a primer on the legal rules of the road, from our Counsel, AND, unlike in prior elections, will all be present for a test deck run IMMEDIATELY PRIOR to the opening of the polls rather than a few weeks before. We have asserted all of our rights by statute citations to our chief elections official, have an emergency number to the state at the ready, and are prepared to take any action necessary to challenge any procedure in order to preserve the credibility of the vote.
I have thanked many of you who have posted before and after me here and once again, your contribution to my campaign in terms of overall awareness has been invaluable. I should probably include the value of your information and advice on my campaign finance report as an "in-kind" contribution - if I could assign it a value!
Thank you all again!
Dmauch |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 10
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 8, 2007 - 5:00 pm: |
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One point that I neglected to mention in my previous post, is the fact that when the L&A testing was being performed two weeks ago, when the election's official opened the holding bin for our precinct two machine, approximately 150 COMPLETED ballots from the prior election had been left in the bin.
I was assured that they had been counted!
Dmauch |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3725
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 8, 2007 - 5:16 pm: |
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Donald,
It's great that you and your observers are paying attention!
Re: L&A, I'm sure this has been mentioned--but even though it's important to carefully observe the L&A (for exactly the reasons that you discovered), it's important that everyone understand that having a perfect L&A guarantees nothing. (An L&A can reveal problems that would otherwise have gone unnoticed--but it's useless in terms of guaranteeing accuracy, reliability, security, lack of tampering, etc.) As has been discussed here at length, the L&A mode and conditions are completely different from the real election.
That said, you are a champion for showing how even this inadequate test can sometimes bring something important to light--even if it doesn't mean that every problem was brought to light or that the machine deserves a clean bill of health.
I am harping away on this because all too often, election officials and vendors mention the L&A testing to reassure voters that all is well and they should trust the machines. |
Marian Beddill
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Uu7thprinciple
Post Number: 62
Registered: 08-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, March 8, 2007 - 5:36 pm: |
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Catherine is absolutely right. Just remembering that the computer has a date-and-time clock, which a program could look at to tell itself, in sequence...:
"Today is not the election, so I will behave."
...then...
"AHA! Today IS the election, so NOW I can do my tricks!"
Marian
http://NoLeakyBuckets.org
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Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 11
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 9, 2007 - 3:32 am: |
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Marian,
It is ironic that you mention the date and time clock. When the technician came in to service the Accu-Vote machines, he asked the election official if she realized that the dates and times on all three machines were incorrect. He reset them.
Dmauch |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3726
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 9, 2007 - 7:17 am: |
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Hmmmmmmm.
Probably just low batteries, yes? Or. . . |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 251
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 9, 2007 - 8:01 am: |
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Dear Mr. Mauch
Diebold AccuVote OS (optical scanners) are used here in my home polling place, District #1 of Germantown, Wisconsin. I am familiar with some of its fault modes.
The fault I would watch for during the post-election observations it the fact that the AccuVote OS sometimes under-counts the number of ballots scanned. This happened in GTown District #1 on November 2, 2004 and April 5, 2005.
On the left front of the AccuVote OS is a small LCD display panel. This is the number of ballots scanned by the AccuVote OS. The definition of "scanned" here is sucked into the machine and deposited in one of the 2 locked bins beneath. This count does not include ballots rejected as over-voted, rejected as blank, and (if so programmed) rejected as under-voted. The number on the LCD display should match the number printed at the head of the end of day report. I.e. the machine should internally agree on the number of ballots cast into the ballot box below the scanner. Verify these numbers match BEFORE the plug is pulled on the scanner. The number on the LCD is a very ephemeral datum. Video tape this display. Once the plug is pulled this information is gone. More on why to capture this information is found below.
What happened in both elections in Germantown is that the number printed at the top of the end of day report for the number of ballots cast was less than the number indicated by the poll books; i.e. the machine reported fewer ballots in the ballot box than poll workers handed to electors. To their credit, in both election the poll workers scoured the polling location looking for the "missing" ballots. Each time they found none. At that point (again showing rare initiative and diligence), the poll workers called the village clerk and the locked bin beneath the scanner was opened. The number of ballots with at least on write-in vote were segregated and counted. The number of machine-resolved ballots (no write-in votes recorded) were segregated and counted. In both elections (November and April) the poll workers determined, by hand counting, that the number of ballots physically transferred to the locked boxes beneath the scanner EXACTLY matched the poll book records. They aslo proved the number of ballots cast as reported by the AccuVote OS scanner was incorrect and was less than the number of ballots actually transferred by the scanner to locked boxes below. I had the privilege to see the April version of these events from begininnig to end. This was from 8:00 pm t about 10:30 pm on April 5, 2005.
In both elections, what happened next is where I, my village clerk, and the staff of the State Elections Board part company. The poll workers, after having PROVED, the first and simplest number on the report was absolutely, positively incorrect, accepted every other machine-generated number on the report as if those numbers (e.g. candidate vote totals) were true and accurate.
WI Statute 7.51(2)(h), states:
... the written record [produced by a voting machine] shall be presumed correct ..., unless an error in the record is clearly apparent ...
It is my on-going struggle with the election powers in my village and state that such an error on the simplest statistic produced by the voting machine (number of ballots transferred to the locked boxes) voids the presumption of correctness of all the more complicated statistics (e.g. candidate vote totals) further down on the report. With the presumption of correctness gone, I argue the machine-generated numbers should be ignored.
Mr. Mauch, I do not know where you are located, but your state election statutes or your state election regulations may have similar presumption of correctness which outlines when or if the machine-generated numbers are to be ignored or at least doubted.
Now why capture the LCD number? On September 12, 2006 I captured on video tape (now DVD) an OpTech IIIP Eagle faulting. The number of ballots scanned as displayed on the big red LED display on the front of the scanner did not match the number of ballots scanned as reported on the machine-generated end of day report. Of course once the power is turned off the only record of ballots scanned is the printed end of day report. This is important because the machine is interanlly inconsistant. This is not a poll worker or a voter error. This is a clear machine fault. The internal state of the machine is demonstrably inconsistent. Under such a condition, why should any number produced by the machine be trusted?
Since I have recently seen an OpTech fault in this way, I now wonder if the Diebold, ES&S, and Hart interCivic scanners fault in a similar manner. After all, until now who has been watching for this?
So for as many precints as possible capture three pieces of data at a minimum:
1) the number of ballots scanned as reported by the LCD display on the left front of the AccuVote OS scanner.
2) the number of ballots scanned as reported by the scanner on the end of day report.
3) the number of ballots handed to electors as reported by the voter sign-in pages of the poll book.
The three numbers should be exactly the same. If not, then question then is why aren't the numbers equal? |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 253
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 9, 2007 - 1:57 pm: |
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Dear Mr. Mauch:
Massachusetts election law Chapter 54 Section 105a seems to require the number of ballots found in the locked box beneath the scanner be counted by hand.
Section 105A. states in part:
At any precinct using an approved electronic voting method, the clerk shall, as soon as the polls are closed, record the total number of ballots received, the number registered on the ballot box, and the total number of spoiled ballots. The election officers shall then, publicly and in the presence of the other election officers, audibly and distinctly count and announce the number of names checked on each voting list used, and the clerk shall record the same. The ballot box shall be opened by the presiding officer, and the ballots taken therefrom and counted, and the whole number of ballots cast shall be publicly announced by him.
It seems to me the election officers need to do 3 things before sealing up the ballots for transport.
1) Record the number of ballots cast as registered on the scanner (LCD, printed report, or both is unclear to me)
2) Examine and publicly and audibly announce the number of ballots expected as determined by the poll lists.
3) Open up the lock box beneath the scanner and count how many ballots are actually are in the lock boxes beneath the scanner.
I have never seen such provisions in a state statute. Is this three step procedure carried out in all polling location in the state of Massachusetts? What happens if the numbers do not agree as has happened here in the Village of Germantown (on AccuVote OS) and in the City of Milwaukee (OpTech IIIP Eagles)? The statutes seem silent on how to resolve a discrepancy should one be discovered. |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 12
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 16, 2007 - 12:41 pm: |
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Well following my unsuccessful bid for re-election last Saturday, I would like to share the results, as reported in our local newspaper, from the classic risk elected officials must take to ensure a fair and honest election. Even then, my election was wrought with election violations that are also described below. I apologize for the length of my posting, but I thought that some of you would find it interesting.
Regardless of the election outcome, I am a smarter and better person for having been guided by this site. Thank you all.
The first two articles below can also be accessed by going to the following links:
http://www.townonline.com/norwell/homepage/x132111791
http://www.townonline.com/norwell/opinion/x431157191
Vote counting machines questioned on Election Day
By Matt Dunning
Wednesday, March 14, 2007 - Updated: 07:01 PM EDT
With last weekend’s general election now in the history books, some town officials are looking into the reasons one of the selectmen candidates felt it necessary to have an attorney at the polls on Saturday to watch over the ballot machines.
According to Norwell Town Clerk Janice Lawson, the town received notice prior to the election that selectman candidate Donald Mauch’s campaign had retained an attorney to be present in the Norwell Middle School gymnasium prior to the beginning of the election. The intention was “to observe the set-up procedures, the examination and recording of the ballot boxes before any Accu-vote ballots are cast, the zeroing and signing of the printer tape and the locking of the ballot boxes, and conveyance of the keys to the police officer assigned to the polls,” the notice stated.
Additionally, Lawson was informed that the attorney — Norwell resident Marlon Hawthorne — would be present along with several other observers, during the election to watch over the voting process.
“I was kind of upset and nervous,” Lawson said. “[Hawthorne’s] an awfully nice guy, but it was kind of a pain in the neck to have them hanging around all day.”
Though Lawson said some of the town’s election workers, who receive a small stipend for their work on Election Day, expressed concern about having someone watching over them throughout the day, she and the workers have since been made aware it was the machines themselves, which electronically tally the ballots, that had been the object of Mauch and Hawthorne’s concern.
“It felt like they didn’t trust us at first,” Lawson said, “but now it seems that it was the machines that they don’t trust. I think they just wanted to make sure it was fair and that it come out right.”
Mauch, who lost Saturday’s election to Tom Bigger, did not offer comment regarding the machines or Hawthorne’s presence during the election.
After the election was over, Hawthorne insisted he was in no way interested in observing the actions of the election workers, but rather the DieBold Accuvote machines that were tallying the ballots. According to Hawthorne, Accuvote Optical Scanners have a marked history of malfunction.
“There was never a question about the election workers,” Hawthorne said. “This had nothing to do with this election, but it has everything to do with future elections. This was about the machines, and only the machines, which have a history of malfunctions.”
On Saturday, Hawthorne said his fears were substantiated, when one of the Accuvote Optical Scanners did temporarily break down, causing a brief stoppage in vote counting in Precinct 2, in which candidate Mauch lives. During the election, one of the machines counting votes in Precinct 2 became jammed, and had to be reset. According to Lawson, Accuvote machines do have a tendency to jam, though the problem is usually caused by the voters themselves.
“The only problems we’ve ever had with those machines is that occasionally they do get jammed up,” Lawson said. “That doesn’t happen very often, and it only happens when someone doesn’t put their ballot in straight. If you put a ballot in one of those machines at even a slight angle, it can’t process the ballot and a technician has to come out and reset the entire machine.”
Though the breakdown of one of the machines was troubling, Hawthorne said he does not believe it had any effect on the results of this year’s election. Still, Hawthorne said it is cause for concern, citing news reports of Accuvote malfuntions in other parts of the country. According to report in the San Jose Mercury News in 2004, Accuvote machines were responsible for awarding votes to the wrong candidate.
“I know it wasn’t significant to this election,” Hawthorne said, “but it does raise the issue of future elections.”
mdunning@cnc.com
_____________________
LETTER: Appalled by Election Day monitoring
Thursday, March 15, 2007 - Updated: 01:06 PM EDT
To the editor:
There was a situation surrounding Saturday’s town election that I think everyone should be made aware of.
Prior to Election Day, Norwell Town Clerk Janice Lawson was advised by an attorney representing The Committee to Elect Donald Mauch, that he and other supporters would be monitoring the election throughout the day. When the polls opened, they commenced to place people along the wall of the gym to stare at the election workers. I find it appalling they would even think that such an intimidating tactic was necessary.
In the 33 years I have lived here there has never been a suggestion that anything was amiss with our election process. This is not Chicago or Philadelphia or somewhere else where election fraud is a tradition. The people working at the polls, including myself, are your friends and neighbors who volunteer to spend 12 hours at the middle school for a small stipend so the town can conduct our elections.
We are not professional politicians or political operatives committed to any candidate.
I am insulted that former Selectman Mauch would think it necessary to bring in legal counsel and a squad of supporters to look over our shoulder as we went about our duties. I am absolutely outraged by what his tactic implies about his view of our Town Clerk. Janice Lawson has served this community well for many, many years. She runs her office and meets her responsibilities efficiently and effectively. Her integrity has never been questioned nor should it ever be.
Former Selectman Mauch owes me and my associates on the election team and, especially Mrs. Lawson, an apology.
Mary Ellen Wetzel
Stetson Road
____________________
My (as yet unpublished) Response:
In what began three weeks ago as nothing more than a totally benign inquiry regarding the operation and testing of Norwell’s AccuVote voting machines, ended up as a sad commentary at how desperate certain individuals were at the last minute to create an embarrassment and controversy.
Nevertheless, it is worth looking at the facts. During the testing of the three voting machines three weeks ago, one machine malfunctioned, all three machines had incorrect time and dates, and, astoundingly, one was discovered to have had approximately 150 completed ballots left in the machine from the last election. Though the machine that contained the completed ballots from the last election had previously jammed several times, no attempt had been made since then to have the machine serviced.
A second machine after rejecting a ballot advanced the counter anyway. It was later “assumed” that the town clerk had forgotten to turn the machine off before installing another memory card. All three machines required adjustments and one needed a new optical scanning head. Even with the adjustments, the same machine that had jammed in the last election, jammed once again in Saturday's election.
Of further concern was the fact that neither the town clerk nor the assistant town clerk, who had supervised the operation of these machines since they were purchased several years ago, knew how to interpret the test tapes. They literally made a manual count of the 50 test deck ballots four times and asked me to count them as well since they could not initially explain why the total counts for each machine only added to 49. After I left, it took two additional calls from the town clerk’s office to provide an explanation.
After testing the machines, a tamper-resistant seal was applied over the memory card slot of the first machine but not fastened until it was brought to the town clerk’s attention. Subsequently, they were then applied to the other two machines. All of the seals were broken a week later when the machines were serviced but new seals could not be applied since the town clerk had run out of them. The memory cards therefore sat unsecured in the town clerk’s office until new seals could be obtained. While no one ever suggested that the clerk’s locked office was not sufficient to ensure adequate security, simply stated, the prescribed security rules were not followed.
While state law requires that the AccuVote machines be tested with a deck of 50 test ballots immediately prior to the opening of the polls, this was never performed on the day of the election but rather three weeks earlier. The primary purpose of testing the machines immediately prior to the polls opening, according to the AccuVote technician, is to ensure that they are working properly after being subjected to possible bumping or jarring during their transport to the polls. As the town clerk pointed out, “We’ve never done it that way.”
My campaign never questioned the integrity of any of the election personnel involved despite their troubling unfamiliarity with the equipment. However, there was more than enough concern over the reliability of the AccuVote optical scanning machines to justify their close observation. (Refer to http://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/Reports.html) Hence, I asked Mr. Hawthorne, a supporter who happens to be an attorney as well, to observe that the machines operated properly. Thus it was felt that the courtesy of a letter notifying the town clerk under what legal conditions the machines would be observed, would be delivered to the town clerk’s office so that there would be no confusion or upset.
It is regrettable that some chose to exploit my motives by suggesting otherwise after receiving only partial information from the town clerk’s office. Not only was a copy of Mr. Hawthorne’s letter provided by the town clerk to others, but also copies were made and widely distributed to supporters of my opponent on the eve of the election AND AT THE ELECTION further distorting my campaign’s motives. How did it happen that anyone knew to ask the town clerk for the letter in the first place?
It is also unfortunate that the town clerk chose not to reassure her election workers of the facts surrounding our concerns with the machines before Saturday’s election leaving them to feel threatened or intimidated. It is further odd that she should have felt “kind of upset and nervous,” in view of the following email exchange between the two of us two days before the election and after Mr. Hawthorne had met with her.
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald Mauch [mailto:dmauch@verizon.net]
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2007 10:35 AM
To: Janice Lawson
Subject: Thank you!
Hi Jan,
I thought about your comment the other day while the voting machines were being serviced when you mentioned that all too often we hear about what we don't do right from others rather than being appreciated for our services. I just wanted to thank you and Pat for helping me to better understand the voting process and the machines. I appreciate it and also thank you for the time you spent with Marlin Hawthorne yesterday who will be one of our observers on Saturday.
Thank you again to both you and Pat.
Kind regards,
Don
From: jlawson@townofnorwell.net
Subject: RE: Thank you!
Date: March 8, 2007 11:35:45 AM EST
To: dmauch@verizon.net
Its always nice to hear something good especially when we are preparing for elections and they are so much work and so stressful. See you on Saturday. Jan L
It is difficult to explain the town clerk’s refusal to enforce the legal protocols at the polls which allowed my opponent to repeatedly enter the polls and converse with his supporters throughout the day, repeatedly engage voters in discussion within the 150’ no electioneering perimeter, allow his supporters to engage in discussions with others inside the polls even after being repeatedly warned not to do so, and allowing his supporters to repeatedly make telephone calls and approach would-be voters in the parking lot.
Furthermore, it is inexplicable why the Norwell Mariner would even print Ms. Wetzel’s request for an apology as to our motives when they were fully versed as to all of the above facts prior to the publication of last week’s issue.
Finally, after hearing the rhetorical spin, “This isn’t Philadelphia or Chicago or somewhere where election fraud is a tradition,” I can assure the voters and taxpayers of Norwell, that in the 18 months of serving as your selectman, corruption and self-dealing in Norwell town government is alive and well. It just hasn’t surfaced yet.
Yes, I would agree with Ms. Wetzel. Apologies are due to her and all of the election workers particularly those who felt uncomfortable in any way. But the apologies will have to come from the town clerk herself and the Norwell Mariner who chose to exploit our motives before, during and even after the election was over, because they certainly won’t be coming from me. |
Donald Mauch
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dmauch
Post Number: 13
Registered: 02-2007
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 16, 2007 - 12:53 pm: |
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One more important item I neglected to mention. On the eve of the election, I received a call from John Washburn (BBV activist immediate above last post). I spoke with him on election day and he was kind enough to walk me through some of the things we needed to look for once the polls closed.
A special thanks is in order to John for his thoughful assistance and guidance.
Thank you John!
Dmauch |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 257
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 16, 2007 - 1:48 pm: |
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I can only tell you what has happened with the AccuVote OS scanners here in District #1 of the Village of Germantown, WI. I figured since the same equipment is used, the same issues may arise for you.
As for the issue of "we don't need no stinkin' election integrity here in Norwell". Feel free to plagerize all or any part of the following:
All Election Integrity is Local
I wrote this in response to a commenter on my blog. He said why don't I leave poor, little Germantown alone and move "down the road" to where the real fraud is: the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
There is good reason to focus on Norwell, MA before moving on to Boston, Philedelphia, or Chicago. It is where you live. I love my Village of Germantown too much to ignore her.
I was honored to be of some small help and I hope this post is helpful as well.
(Message edited by johnwashburn on March 16, 2007) |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 3743
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 16, 2007 - 2:44 pm: |
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Don,
Congratulations on standing as a candidate and congratulations on your service to your community by getting informed and then observing your local election system.
This is the way things improve--one small step at a time. |
Jason Aaron Osgood
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Zappini
Post Number: 33
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 16, 2007 - 3:38 pm: |
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Donald Mauch-
You've been added to the small but growing pantheon of Heroes of Democracy. Thank you for your efforts.
Elections officials have to get over themselves. Do accountants get cranky when auditor review everything? Do structural engineers get cranky when they have to submit their designs for review? Of course not. The same is true for election integrity. Trust isn't a factor.
I wrote about the trust issue last year. It's a bit long.
What About Trust?
http://www.washblog.com/story/2006/4/26/142826/385
Cheers, Jason
---
zappini.blogspot.com
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Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 5969
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, March 16, 2007 - 3:48 pm: |
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There are a lot of elections officials who actually do cooperate. I'm thinking of Shirley up in Whatcom County, Washington, and there are quite a few more.
I agree that Donald Mauch has demonstrated both brains and fortitude in his actions. I found myself enmeshed in a rather lengthy debate in the forums here today with a particular technician who does not believe citizens can really be trusted to oversee elections competently. http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/72/46278.html
quote:Ultimately, we trust or mistrust people like ourselves. I trust people who build and review software. You distrust those people. This is not likely for either of us to change.
You trust the "common man" to review the elections. I distrust that same group. This too, is unlikely to change.
Instead of being so long-winded with him, I should have simply pointed him here to you, Jason -- an unsung hero who is slogging through King County on a regular basis, along with Tom Courbat, John Washburn, Kathleen Wynne, Melisa Urda, Adele Eisner, Jim Soper, Paul Lehto, Susan Pynchon, Ellen Brodsky, Nancy Tobi...and now the wonderful Donald Mauch.
You folks are proof that the founders of this nation got it right when they put the citizens in charge. |
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