Navigation
Topics
Log In
Log Out
:
Special Search
New Today
New This Week
Advanced Search
Tree View
Your Account
Edit Profile
Register
Forgot Password
Tools
Help/Instructions
Policies
CLICK STATE TO SEE:
"WATCH LIST"
Marked with: 
"OPEN & HONEST"
Marked with: 
...
|
| 2-17-06: BREAKING: Calif. Sec. State ... |
|
| Author |
Message |
    
Jim March
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 119
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 18 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 17, 2006 - 5:40 pm: | 
|
This is a very important news post, with national implications because -- with YOUR help: you must send five specific e-mails -- today's miscarriage of democracy will give you the first good shot at subpoena-induced sworn testimony from voting machine makers and testing labs. Vendors and voting machine examiners: Enjoy the reprieve that McPherson just handed you, because the American citizenry -- with the help of some California senators -- is about to make sure it stops right now.
Citizens: Instructions are provided in this article.
Contact list: Email, Fax, Call -- Senate rules committee to issue subpoenas:
Senator Don Perata (Chair) - may want to call him as well as email. California citizens, use the form at his site to send messages also.
(916) 651-4009 mailto:Senator.Perata@sen.ca.gov
(510) 286-1333
Senator Jim Battin (Vice-Chair)
(916) 651-4037
mailto:Jim.Battin@sen.ca.gov
Senator Roy Ashburn
(916) 651-4018
mailto:senator.ashburn@sen.ca.gov
Senator Debra Bowen
(916) 651-4028 (Prefers email: mailto:Debra@debrabowen.comYes, call her too so she can log the support calls, it's important since it allows her to back her position from the grassroots.)
Senator Gilbert Cedillo
(916) 651-4022
Call and, California citizens - use the form at his site to send your message as well.
Red flag: Meet bull
THE RED FLAG: Today California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson certified Diebold's entire product line, including the TSx touchscreen machine with its "toilet paper roll" paper trail -- you know, the design that removes the privacy of your vote. He also approved the Diebold optical scan system, knowing it can be hacked, and he approved the Diebold GEMS system, knowing it can be hacked, and all accessories and accompaniments.
The system was approved despite 100 percent public opposition and despite not having the ITA report back. (Welcome to Black Box America.)
YOU'RE THE BULL: It's time for you and everyone you know to send emails for subpoenas!
We are seeing a pattern of obfuscation and cover-up. YOUR help will be needed to get to the bottom of it all.
The Feb. 16 California Senate Elections Committee hearing on certification was hit with no-shows by ALL FOUR major vendors (Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia and Hart Intercivic).
Representatives from Wyle and Ciber testing labs declined to appear. Both the technical staff and the PR flaks for the California Secretary of State's office blew off the Senate Elections Committee.
The Secretary of State's office is now "legally late" on a series of public records requests made by California Elections Committee Chairperson Debra Bowen.
This lack of response to a California Senate hearing is a potential disaster in the making. With no election insiders willing to answer questions, the vendors as a whole (and Diebold in particular) along with the now-infamously inadequate test labs start looking like they're coated with non-stick Teflon.
It's not nice to blow off democracy, and we are asking you, the taxpayer, to refuse to allow testers and vendors to thumb their noses at the California Senate. It's your tax dollars that are paying for this equipment, which you have asked NOT to be purchased at all.
That Senate hearing on 16th could end up doing more harm than good, because if subpoenas don't happen, it tells American citizens that they are impotent and that laws, federal regulations and standards don't matter. That is, unless you and your friends send five very important emails to gouge that Teflon.
This is your best shot to drag the right people to the questioning table, kicking and screaming if necessary.
Complicating things: the head of the Senate Elections Committee (Debra Bowen) has to get permission from the California Senate Rules Committee to have subpoenas issued.
Fortunately there are good people at Rules. Of their five members, the chair (Sen. Don Perata-D) has a good record in electronic voting issues and Sen. Cedillo-D also has a decent grasp of these issues. Sen. Bowen is the 3rd Democrat on Rules and we know where she stands. The two Republicans (Sen. Jim Battin (Vice-Chair) and Sen. Roy Ashburn) are approachable on this issue too. Only three of these Senators are needed to invoke port subpoenas (or letters containing promises of subpoenas upon failure to appear).
YOUR EMAILS ARE NEEDED to Rules Committee members
Urge support for subpoenas of election industry and certification insiders who didn't testify on the 16th.
Black Box Voting Inc. seldom puts out calls for grassroots pressure, as we feel this powerful tool can be diluted with over-use. But now is the time.
How to deliver your message
Be quick, be polite, be professional. Here's your message: ask for "Rules Committee support for subpoenas of election industry and certification insiders who won't otherwise inform the Elections Committee as to what's going on".
This is about volume of emails logged.
Therefore, not only should YOU send emails, but this needs to go out to your list.
Why this certification is a red flag
California does NOT have the Wyle Labs ITA report back on the memory card and interpreted code. McPherson sent the code back to the labs after issues were triggered by Black Box Voting in a June 20, 2005 "19202 request".
To recap, Wyle should never have approved the use of interpreted code OR "electronic ballot box" memory cards that can be pre-stuffed with negative and positive votes, especially when you can use Diebold's funky private "AccuBasic" code to fake the zero report that's supposed to catch such manipulations.
Black Box Voting asked the Secretary of State's office to review this issue, per California Election Code 19202. Shortly before Thanksgiving, the Calif. Sec. State's office formally requested Black Box Voting to do a review but under contrived and ridiculous test conditions written by Diebold.
This turkey shoot led to a bit of squabble. The Secretary of State's office buck-passed the situation to Wyle, and Wyle still hasn't responded.
Not surprising: If Wyle says interpreted code is OK, they've violated the FEC 2002 published standards yet again. If Wyle says it's a problem, any reasonable person will ask "how did you approve it in the first place!?"
This is a classic Catch-22 which Wyle appears to be unable to resolve.
Members of the Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board (VSTAAB) two UC Berkeley researchers tested the code for Secretary of State McPherson and blasted the system. It is stunning that McPherson is still certifying the system, which is clearly out of compliance with FEC standards.
Because Black Box Voting made the 19202 request we believe we have every right to that data, especially since Election Code 19202 requires the Secretary of State's office to "report on it's accuracy and efficiency."
The public commentary in California on this system is running 100 percent against certification. The federal testing authority appears to be dumbstruck. With your help, Black Box Voting WILL get to the bottom of this if it takes a backhoe and bulldozer to do it.
California Sec. State staff reports late AGAIN
A hearing on 3/1/06 at the Secretary of State's office will take public commentary on a slew of new or revised voting machines from ES&S, Sequoia, Hart and Populex. The agenda and other information has been posted here:
http://ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/agenda_20060301.pdf
What's significant by its absence is the legally required staff reports on these machines to allow the public to give informed testimony. The California SecState's office has consistently promised to make these available a month ahead of time (again, as required) but as of today they're a no-show:
http://ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vs.htm
This agency doesn't appear to care much about informed commentary.
Item three: What? No regulations YET!?
This one is important, folks. Almost a year ago the activist community in California discovered something important in California Election Code 19205:
19205. The Secretary of State shall establish the specifications for and the regulations governing voting machines, voting devices, vote tabulating devices, and any software used for each, including the programs and procedures for vote tabulating and testing. The criteria for establishing the specifications and regulations shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) The machine or device and its software shall be suitable for the purpose for which it is intended.
(b) The system shall preserve the secrecy of the ballot.
(c) The system shall be safe from fraud or manipulation.
"Regulations" has very specific meaning in California: it means the agency in question has to write a set of rules, submit them for public comment and hold meetings with public input on them.
Without regulations the agency can make up the rules as they go along, which in times past (admittedly prior to the McPherson administration) we’ve seen as they play favorites in fairly obvious fashion, with the treatment of Avante voting systems as opposed to major vendors with more political clout being classic across 2003 and 2004.
Worse, at present the Secretary of State's office blocks all questions from the public during the "public commentary" meetings. We can't question their certification staff or the vendors. This is a travesty which we could fight in a proper regulatory wrangling process but the McPherson administration has ignored this vital reform for the nearly a year they’ve known about the legal requirement.
They've ignored the law on this for nearly a year, folks. ALL future certifications appear to be illegal on their face until this is fixed.
Conclusions: We’re seeing a horrifying pattern of obfuscation and illegality wrapped together and supporting each other. We have reason to think that the California Rules and Elections committees acting together can shed light on this series of backroom dealings and we're asking YOUR help in making it happen.
Any one of these items viewed individually would be bad news.
Together? Well folks, WE better hang together on this. If democracy as a transparent and lawful concept cannot be restored in California, the rest of the nation will go with it and our Republic is doomed.
This ain’t a drill folks. Grab a phone, start dialing. Polite, professional, short clear message, FIRM is what works.
----------------
BREAKING UPDATE:
The Secretary of State's office has released the Berkeley report on the Diebold product line:
This document borders on the bizarre. We find the following quotes of particular interest:
Harri Hursti's attack does work: Mr. Hursti's attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server.
...and:
Interpreted code is contrary to standards: Interpreted code in general is prohibited by the 2002 FEC Voluntary Voting System Standards, and also by the successor standard, the EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines due to take effect in two years. In order for the Diebold software architecture to be in compliance, it would appear that either the AccuBasic language and interpreter have to be removed, or the standard will have to be changed.
California can only run software certified by the Federal ITA process, by state law. The "Berkeley team" is saying flat-out that such certification was NOT done correctly, therefore the entire Diebold product line is illegal under state law.
IF YOU BELIEVE CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF ELECTIONS IS IMPORTANT, PLEASE JOIN THE 2006 ELECTION CLEANUP CREW. WORK STARTS NOW. WE WILL PROVIDE ONE ON ONE CONSULTING TO HELP YOU UNCOVER WHAT'S GOING ON IN ELECTIONS NEAR YOU. E-MAIL crew@blackboxvoting.org. (Allow a few days for a response, due to our heavy travel schedules.)
PERMISSION TO REPRINT GRANTED, WITH LINK TO http://www.blackboxvoting.org
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3695
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 17, 2006 - 9:04 pm: |
|
Geez Louise. McPherson certifies it despite this -- in the report that HE assigned:
• Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots.
• Interpreter bugs lead to another, more dangerous family of vulnerabilities: However, there is another category of more serious vulnerabilities we discovered that go well beyond what Mr. Hursti demonstrated, and yet require no more access to the voting system than he had. These vulnerabilities are consequences of bugs - 16 in all - in the implementation of the AccuBasic interpreter for the AV-OS. These bugs would have no effect at all in the absence of deliberate tampering, and would not be discovered by any amount of functionality testing; but they could allow an attacker to completely control the behavior of the AV-OS. An attacker could change vote totals, modify reports, change the names of candidates, change the races being voted on, or insert his own code into the running firmware of the machine.
• Successful attacks can only be detected by examining the paper ballots: There would be no way to know that any of these attacks occurred; the canvass procedure would not detect any anomalies, and would just produce incorrect results. The only way to detect and correct the problem would be by recount of the original paper ballots, e.g. during the 1 percent manual recount.
• The bugs are classic, and can only be found by source code review: Finding these bugs was only possible through close study of the source code. All of them are classic security flaws, including buffer overruns, array bounds violations, double-free errors, format string vulnerabilities, and several others. There may, of course, be additional bugs, or kinds of bugs, that we did not find.
• AV-TSx has potential cryptographic protection against memory card attacks: ... if the cryptographic keys are managed properly (see next bullet), any tampering would be quickly detected and the attack would
be unsuccessful.
• But the implementation of cryptographic protection is flawed: There is a serious flaw in the key management of the crypto code that otherwise should protect the AV-TSx from memory card attacks. Unless election offcials avail themselves of the option to create new cryptographic keys, the AV-TSx uses a default key. This key is hard-coded into the source code for the AV-TSx, which is poor security practice because, among other things, it means the same key is used in every such machine in the U.S. Worse, the particular default key in question was openly published two and a half years ago in a famous research paper, and is now known by anyone who follows election security, and can be found through Google.
Good golly. They're still using "1111"????
They say the bugs are easy to fix, but they do not say the ARCHITECTURE problems are easy to fix. |
Jim March
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 120
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 2:58 am: |
|
A tidbit:
I was told late on 2/14 (Tuesday) by Susan Lapsley that her boss is Bruce McDannold who in turn is in charge of the entire state certification department reporting ONLY to Bruce McPherson.
If true this is a serious promotion for McDannold, as it creates a new high-level department outside of the management of the elections division (run by Caren Daniels-Mead and Brad Clark).
McDannold is the California SecState staffer that very deliberately provoked a "PR war" with Black Box Voting by proposing that we at BBV test the Diebold memory card and interpreted code structure but using test protocols that were written by Diebold and blatantly biased; McDannold forwarded an MS-Word document on the proposed test procedures that was literally written by Diebold according to the document properties on the file:
http://www.bbvdocs.org/records/proposedhurstidemo.pdf
(In this link it is watermarked and converted to PDF but we have the original in MS-Word with the Diebold properties intact.)
The file is unsigned and contains no information on who wrote it; the authors at Diebold and McDannold were apparantly trying to make it look like a product of the SecState's office but they didn't know Microsoft tracks licenced users against documents and that this can be traced.
McDannold has also shut down all attempts by the public to ask questions of California certification staff and industry at public meetings, changed the rules on the certification meeting procedures at the last minute and prevented people from giving time to other speakers to get a higher quality of public input versus "everybody needs to come to the mike".
It should also be noted that certification staff within the California Secretary of State's office have frequently been hired by industry after leaving government "service": Alfie Charles was hired by Sequoia, Lou Deider was hired by ES&S and Deborah Seiler was hired by Diebold (she recently quit and went to work for Solano County's elections department). This revolving door pattern opens the possibility that pro-industry actions while on the state's payroll is being rewarded once they leave "public service"...this pattern has frequently been noted in the military-industrial sector.
This history and McDannold's well-documented "pro-Diebold" actions give us reason to hope that the California Senate Elections Committee one day soon asks McDannold under oath whether he's NOW working more on behalf of industry than the California public he allegedly serves.
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Joseph Hall
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Joehall
Post Number: 53
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 10:14 am: |
|
Actually, it's not the default poll worker PIN that was unchanged (1111)... I don't believe they were checking that part of the code. It's a default cryptographic key that was left unchanged from the hopkins-rice report. |
Michael W Mather
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Gypsy
Post Number: 9
Registered: 07-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 10:50 am: |
|
Jim, your post seems to have left out part of the story. The CA SoS certification in question is conditional (http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/local/states/california/northern _california/13900909.htm).
Diebold will still be required to "resubmit the machines for independent testing."
Although the Berkeley report confirms and expands on the security flaws, McPherson is able to use the same report to justify the conditional certification of Diebold machines because it also states that "the risks can be mitigated through appropriate use procedures." and "the problems as a whole are manageable."
Of course, the report is self-contradictory, since it confirms that the Diebold systems use illegal interpreted code. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3698
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 11:05 am: |
|
Michael,
You are exactly right of course.
However, there is no such thing as a "conditional certification" in California. So McPherson's decision is bullshit.
And Joe,
Thanks for pointing out that it's not the 1111 password. It is, apparently, the second time Diebold has hard-coded a password into the source code so the same thing works nationwide. The first mistake lasted a decade. How long would this one have lasted, had the California team not exposed it?
The federal ITAs passed the hard-coded password through, and they need to be subpoenad and put under oath and compelled to answer questions about this. |
Jim March
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 121
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 2:16 pm: |
|
John Gideon forwarded the following to me in private:
----
>>Jim,
Here is what was found by the Johns-Hopkins Rice group and that was never changed by Diebold. It's at http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf on Pg. 14:<<
4.4 Key management and other cryptographic issues with the vote and audit records
Unlike the other data stored on the voting terminal, both the vote records and the audit logs are encrypted
and checksummed before being written to the storage device. Unfortunately, neither the encrypting nor
the checksumming is done with established, secure techniques. This section summarizes the issues with
Diebold’s use of cryptography in protecting the vote records and audit logs, and then return to consequences
of Diebold’s poor choices in subsequent subsections. (Recall that we have already discussed the lack of
cryptography in other potions of the system.)
KEY MANAGEMENT. All of the data on a storage device is encrypted using a single, hardcoded DES [22]
key:
#define DESKEY ((des_key*)"F2654hD4")
Note that this value is not a hex representation of a key, nor does it appear to be randomly generated. Instead,
the bytes in the string “F2654hD4 ” are fed directly into the DES key scheduler. It is well-known that hardcoding
keys into a program’s source code is a bad idea: if the same compiled program image is used on every
voting terminal, an attacker with access to the source code, or even to a single program image, could learn
the key and thus read and modify voting and auditing records. The case with the Diebold system is even
worse: from the CVS logs, we see this particular key has been used without change since December 1998,
when the CVS tree for AccuVote-TS version 3 began, and we assume that the key was in use much before
that. Although Jones reports that the vendor may have been aware of the key management problems in their
code since at least 1997 [16, 17], our findings show that the design flaw was never addressed. The SAIC
analysis of Diebold’s system [27] agrees that Diebold needs to redesign their cryptography architecture. The
most appropriate solution will likely involve the use of hardware cryptographic coprocessors.
(In a similar fashion, Diebold’s voter, administrator, and ender cards use a hardcoded 8-byte password
ED 0A ED 0A ED 0A ED 0A (hexadecimal) to authenticate the voting terminals to the smartcards, transmitted
in cleartext. The smartcards are discussed in Section 3.)
John Gideon
----
Jim again
It's not exactly a "password" Diebold has hard-coded, it's an encryption key, but the effect might as well be similar. It's a security hole from hell and indicative of a really poor grasp of computer security or worse, an attempt to leave a back door in.
Lemme digress a second here: in the history of PC software, several companies have gone out of business when their initial programs were good stuff functionally but poorly written and documented. If the initial programmers go away for any reason, ongoing updates or even basic maintenance becomes borderline impossible.
MicroPro's "WordStar" remains THE poster child for this sort of thing, going from total market dominance in it's niche (word processing) to absolute abandonment in the space of just a few years.
Is this happening at Diebold? We don't know, but my personal opinion is that a lot of the signs are there:
* They're running code dating back 10+ years which isn't being updated frequently.
* There are internal memos on poor source code quality (lack of internal documentation, statements by the coders as to what's going on written right in).
* If you're a programmer of low moral character, one way to maintain job security is to write code nobody else can comprehend. Geeks joke about this trend with contests for who can write the most deliberately obfuscated code:
http://www0.us.ioccc.org/main.html
Then if you look at their programmers, we get Jeff Dean (known crook) and a gaggle of programmers hired by the crooks we know of in management.
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
TRIPLE PROTECTION FOR ELECTION 2006 - STARTING NOW:
(1) Use Freedom of Information, public records requests ("All American Paper Chase")
(2) Try Dumpster Diving for Democracy
(3) Candid America Project - Don't leave home without your camcorder
HOW TO DO IT: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/6/6.html
|
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3704
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 2:37 pm: |
|
Well Jim, I'd say the proof is in the pudding -- Jeff Dean was BROUGHT BACK by Diebold in May-June 2002 because they were having problems and needed his expertise.
That would indicate that they couldn't write the code without him, i.e., it wasn't properly documented.
The source for that is the transcripts of the depositions of Jeff Dean and his wife, which are published here:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/2197/17789.html |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3708
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 5:16 pm: |
|
We had an anonymous user post this. I deleted the post -- real names only required -- but the link was of value. It shows guidelines for issuing alerts.
http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/alerts.html
I would like for anonymous ("squeege") to edit profile so that real name will appear in subsequent posts.
Thanks,
Bev |
Anne Smith
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Squeege
Post Number: 2
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 36 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 6:46 pm: |
|
Okay, that was me. This urgent action alert doesn't have clearly-defined actions for participants to take. It's too confused with excess and redundant information when the idea is to rally people to take action.
Phone calls to state senators take some initiative. You have to give people clear, concise talking points. A script, even.
"I'm calling to express my concern about no-shows at the Feb. 16 California Senate Elections Committee hearing on certification . . . I urge you to subpoena Diebold, etc..."
Keep it short and polite. No tangents.
Look at other Internet-based advocacy groups that send out action alerts - Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Planned Parenthood - to see how they do it.
Here's an e-mail action from Amnesty:
I am writing to encourage committee passage of HR 3127, the Darfur Peace and Accountability act.
Unfortunately, the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, which began in 2003, has worsened over the past six months in several ways. Darfur remains generally insecure. Additionally, its most vulnerable inhabitants (including over one 2 million displaced persons), remain in danger, as do aid workers attempting to relieve widespread humanitarian crisis, and understaffed and underequipped African Union peacekeeping forces.
The Government of Sudan continues to be implicated in what both the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress have identified as genocide by flouting UN Security Council resolutions, allowing continued acts of violence against women and children perpetrated by pro-government militias, obstructing humanitarian aid, human rights workers and the press, and impeding international investigations.
The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act will address these critical concerns, and I strongly urge you to support its timely passage. I look forward to future communications with your office on this matter.
Thank you for your attention in this matter.
See? It states the action advocated, the reason for advocating the action (briefly!), then restates the action advocated. Simple, short, clear.} |
Anne Smith
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Squeege
Post Number: 3
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 6:53 pm: |
|
Ah! Here's one especially for the phone:
If you have a few extra minutes, consider calling your Representative to deliver the message in person. To get your Representative’s phone number, call the Congressional switchboard at 202-224-3121. Once you are transferred to your representative’s office, ask to speak with his/her foreign policy advisor and urge them to sign on to Congressmen Farr and McGovern’s letter because:
1. The Colombian Army’s 17th Brigade is implicated in numerous human rights violations including involvement in the killing of several civilians from the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó. Eight members of the Peace Community were murdered in February 2005, and there are eye witness accounts tying the Brigade to these murders.
2. Unfortunately, this kind of violence by the Colombian army and its paramilitary allies is not limited to the 17th Brigade. Other Brigades have been accused of killing Afro-Colombians, labor leaders, and internally displaced peoples.
3. While the Department of State has suspended further assistance to the 17th Brigade until “all significant human rights allegations involving the unit have been credibly addressed,” the U.S. continues to provide assistance to the Colombian armed forces.
4. I urge you to sign-on to Rep. Sam Farr and Jim McGovern’s “Dear Colleague” letter to Secretary of State Rice asking her to refrain from certifying Colombia on human rights grounds, and discontinuing the disbursement of U.S. security assistance.} |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3710
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 7:03 pm: |
|
Thanks very much, Anne. Yes, we know this is too cumbersome. Have been testing out the message all weekend on various blogs, to see how to make it resonate.
Timeline for hitting this is not 'till Monday, with calls not needed until Tues-Wed-Thurs.
Thank you very much for your constructive advice and link. This is exactly why I like these forums so much -- everyone here has their sleeves rolled up for constructive action. The strategies I'm seeing here every day are those that create change.
We really, really appreciate your feedback Anne! (And welcome to Black Box Voting.) |
Bruce Sims
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ubetchaiam
Post Number: 682
Registered: 06-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 7:05 pm: |
|
Regarding 'conditional certification'; it could be -I'd certainly argue against it except for the part of the election code that allows 'experimental systems' to be considerd as 'valid' for an election-argued that this provides 'historical' 'cover':
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ks_dre_papers/decert1.pdf
BUT the fact remains that McPherson has certified for use the Diebold systems despite the fact they violate FEC and EAC standards.
And Bev said that the calling was more about 'volume' not 'substance'; AND the Berkeley report issues the caveat about their restricted 'viewing' of 'security issues' with the machines.
Hi,HO, it's off to court we go.....
 |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3713
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 7:31 pm: |
|
I don't think the "experimental" certification thing works. Thought of that, too.
Hey, Bruce, I am still working on your stuff -- and I have some documents you guys might find informative if you are planning to go to court.
The calling is to provide the political backbone to issue subpoenas. Court's nice, but Senate Election Committee subpoenas will get us testimony under oath much faster than a case can get to discovery.
Neither rules the other out. |
Pat Vesely
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 19
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 8:30 pm: |
|
How to contact the California Elections Division directly to voice your opinion or file a complaint.
Voter Complaint Form
This complaint form should be used if you have information that a violation of the California Elections Code has occurred. Include dates, times and specific occurrences of any alleged violations which you have personal knowledge of. Mail this form to the address provided.
Voter Complaint Form PDF
Voter Complaint Form - Espanol PDF
Voter Complaint Form - Tagalog PDF
Voter Complaint Form - Chinese PDF
Voter Complaint Form - Japanese PDF
Voter Complaint Form - Korean PDF
Voter Complaint Form - Vietnamese PDF
If you use this form please check the "Other Federal Law violation" box and be sure to have it notarized before mailing it back!
Elections and Voter Information
Elections Division Contacts
General Information - Elections Division
Secretary of State's Office
1500 11th Street, 5th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: (916) 657-2166
Fax: (916) 653-3214
E-Mail: elections@ss.ca.gov
TDD Only - No Charge To Calling Party: (800) 833-8683
# Voter Fraud Hotline: (800) 345-8683 / (800) 345-VOTE Telephone and Address Information
On-Line Contact Form http://www.ss.ca.gov/cgi-bin/print_form.cgi
The names of our key professional staff follow:
Chief
* Assistant Secretary of State, Elections - Brad Clark
* Division Chief - Caren Daniels-Meade
Candidates and Elections
* Associate Elections Analyst - Catherine Ingram-Kelly
* Associate Elections Analyst - Evelyn Mendez
Calvoter
* Elections Analyst - Brad Mello
* Elections Analyst - Richard Cuny
Election Information
* Program Manager - Jana Lean
* Elections Specialist - Irene Capps
Fraud and Investigations
* To contact the Fraud and Investigations Unit, please call (916) 657-2166 or you can lodge a recorded complaint by calling 1-800-345-VOTE.
Front Office/800#
* Supervising Program Technician, Front Office/800# - Edlynn Cardenas
* Program Technician, Front Office/800# - Darlene Guthrie
* Program Technician, Front Office/800# - Michelle Brown
* Program Technician, Front Office/800# - Carla Shulz
Initiative and Ballot Pamphlet
* Program Manager - Joanna Southard
* Elections Analyst - Katherine Montgomery
Legal
* Staff Counsel - Michael Kanotz
* Staff Counsel - Judith Carlson
Voter Education
* Program Manager - John Mott-Smith
* Election Specialist - Ed Cuellar
* Elections Analyst - Susete Machado
Web Design and Development
* Associate Elections Analyst - Evelyn Mendez
Voter Services/Registration
* Program Manager, Voter Services - Deirdre Avent
Office of Voting Systems Testing Assessment
* Program Manager, Voting Systems - Bruce McDannold
Pat A. Vesely ;-)
Paper ballots are the 'Currency of Democracy'. They've been helping to curb election fraud since 139 BCE!
|
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3715
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 8:45 am: |
|
From Senator Bowen:
Hi CCN community--
Please email me in support of issuing subpoenas rather than calling -- you will save my staff a great deal of time logging calls, and you know what kind work we have to do right now.
use this address:
Debra@debrabowen.com
This will be greatly appreciated.
This is a critical time in this fight - thank you so much for blogging this and for CARING about our democracy.
...Email is great because it is easy for us to log and report -- and we can actually prove how many emails we've received!
We are going to need an enormous amount of people power in the next couple of weeks. Together we can change this whole pathetic mess. Let's stand |
Bruce Sims
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ubetchaiam
Post Number: 683
Registered: 06-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 8:48 am: |
|
This is an action I strongly feel should be pursued and suggest that any Californian reading this contact the voting rights organization of their choice to provide support for this idea, which is recalling SOS McPherson:
Election Code 11006. Proceedings may be commenced for the recall of ANY elective officer, including ANY officer APPOINTED in lieu of election or to
fill a vacancy, by the service, filing and publication or posting of a notice of intention to circulate a recall petition pursuant to this
chapter.
Election Code 11100. (a) This chapter applies only to the recall of state officers.
(b) In addition to this chapter, Sections 13 to 18, inclusive, of Article 11 of the California Constitution and the applicable provisions of Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 11000) and Chapter 4(commencing with Section 11300) shall govern the recall of state officers.
((What's tragicomic about this section is that Article 11 of the California Constitution does NOT contain anything higher than Section 15)
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_11
Some of the pertinent Election Code sections:
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate?WAISdocID=3659462052+4+0+0&WAISaction =retrieve
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate?WAISdocID=3659462052+1+0+0&WAISaction =retrieve
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate?WAISdocID=3659462052+2+0+0&WAISaction =retrieve
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate?WAISdocID=3659462052+3+0+0&WAISaction =retrieve
|
Robert Sawdey
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rsawdey
Post Number: 36
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 2:39 pm: |
|
Jim Marsh, thanks for the IEEE article (originally from Johns-Hopkins)... excellent piece with the best of pedigrees...
This piece of code >>>#define DESKEY((des_key*)"F2654hD4")
Note that this value is not a hex representation of a key, nor does it appear to be randomly generated. Instead, the bytes in the string “F2654hD4” are fed directly into the DES key scheduler.<<< is just HORRIBLE! As noted, it's malformed to be a hex representation (the 'h' needs to be on the END)... and the string may well be a Unicode string of integers rather than bytes... plus all the other bad coding mentioned in the article. And this is the style of the programmer Diebold can't do without? OMG, their ineptitude seems even worse than their honesty! Bad design, built with an inappropriate language, by incompetants... no wonder they crash & glitch on a regular basis!
I note this is yet another authoritative exposee of how unsuitable these machines are which came out BEFORE the 2004 elections, and yet they are still being used and purchased two years later. At this point, I can't believe anyone who supports their use isn't complicit in election fraud... it's definately time to start getting these people charged, convicted, and jailed... if the people can find unbiased non-partisan judges. |
Russell Novkov
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rnovkov
Post Number: 1
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 4:08 pm: |
|
We need reliable software.
Russell J. Novkov
|
Robert Sawdey
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rsawdey
Post Number: 41
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 5:27 pm: |
|
Reliable is only a piece of the problem... what is required is TRUSTABLE software & hardware, and there's no such thing.
You want reliable, what's more reliable than a pencil & piece of paper? |
Richard H. Roth
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Richardhroth
Post Number: 1
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, February 20, 2006 - 12:18 pm: |
|
After trying for about 45 minutes to figure out what it is that I should do with this "urgent action" I come to this box.
All I know is that it seems important and I would like to do something. Hope you guys figure out what that is soon. Please let me know. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1778
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, February 20, 2006 - 12:56 pm: |
|
Hi Richard,
Those instructions are a little confusing, aren't they!
Here's the email I sent to the 5 Senators (with name/title changed as appropriate):
20 Feb. 2006
Dear Sen. Cedillo,
As a member of the Rules Committee I urge you to subpoena the voting machine manufacturers, the ITA testers, and other relevant insiders. (For example: Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia, and Hart Intercivic; Ciber labs, Wyle labs, and the voting system examiners)
These folks are disregarding regulations with impunity and must be required to testify under oath in response to questions put by the Senate Elections Committee. There are a lot of unanswered questions about voting machine programming, examination and certification, and these people need to be held to account to citizens and voters for their actions and decisions.
Thanks for your help.
Catherine Ansbro
[address redacted]
Ireland
(currently living in Ireland but I vote absentee in the US)
For Cedillo I faxed it, since there's no email address.
Here's the list of the 5 Senators for you to contact:
Senator Don Perata (Chair) - may want to call him as well as email. California citizens, use the form at his site to send messages also.
(916) 651-4009 mailto:Senator.Perata@sen.ca.gov
(510) 286-1333
Senator Jim Battin (Vice-Chair)
(916) 651-4037
mailto:Jim.Battin@sen.ca.gov
Senator Roy Ashburn
(916) 651-4018
mailto:senator.ashburn@sen.ca.gov
Senator Debra Bowen
(916) 651-4028
Prefers email: mailto:Debra@debrabowen.com
Senator Gilbert Cedillo
(916) 651-4022
Fax (916) 327-8817 (no email address)
Call and, California citizens - use the form at his site to send your message as well. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1779
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, February 20, 2006 - 1:13 pm: |
|
And to clarify what the purpose of this is,
1) These 5 Senators sit on the Senate Rules Committee. They will decide whether or not witnesses will be required to testify (be subpoenaed). The emails or phone calls are to lobby these 5 Senators so they'll decide in favor of allowing these people to be subpoenaed. Among other things, if they're subpoenaed they must show up.
2) Sen. Debra Bowen, who's on the Rules Committee and is also Chair of the Senate Elections Committee, wants to ask certain people from the voting machine companies, certification authorities, and other system testors to appear before the Election Committee to answer questions. Why? Because they all certified lousy voting machines with huge security flaws and inadequate testing as to performance. The Election Committee wants to ask these folks how/why they designed and certified this poor equipment, and why it was certified even though it doesn't meet certain CA or federal regulations.
When there was a meeting last week to ask these questions, none of these folks turned up. Since they hadn't been subpoenaed, there was no way to force them to attend. The only way to get them to turn up is by issuing subpoenas, and this will only happen with the approval of the Rules Committee.
After your 5 emails/phone calls are sent, Richard, there will hopefully be enough public pressure that the Rules Committee will approve that witnesses be subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Elections Committee.
For years these people have been doing anything they can to avoid having to testify, and this is a golden opportunity to hold these people accountable for their actions in public view. It is also an opportunity to get more information out of them, which could be of crucial importance in understsanding more about the voting systems that have been certified and who knew what, when.
Hope this clarifies what needs to be done, and why your emails and phone ca | | |
