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| 2-1-06: Voting system examiners block... |
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| Author |
Message |
    
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3475
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 5 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 8:10 am: | 
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Voting system examiners in several states have reportedly been prohibited from revealing voting system flaws to the public due to nondisclosure agreements they signed with the vendors.
With the future of democracy is at stake, just what agreements were signed by examiners like Steve Freeman (CA), Brit Williams (GA, MD, VA), Paul Craft (FL), Doug Jones (IA), and David Jefferson (CA)?
Black Box Voting has learned that vendors have been requiring nondisclosures to block release of information of critical importance to the public. Secretaries of state have failed to protect their voting system examiners, reportedly requiring administrative rules that prevent proper analysis and evaluation of voting systems by state examiners.
Black Box Voting has filed public records requests to obtain all nondisclosure agreements signed by Paul Craft, David Drury, David Jefferson, Steve Freeman, Doug Jones, Brit Williams, Merle King, and Michael Shamos.
We have already obtained one of the Diebold nondisclosure requirements. Diebold attempts to block everything that should be revealed -- even if the contractor is served with a subpoena or court order!
Black Box Voting is investigating the following issues:
1) Whether voting system examiners have been provided with indemnification. Failure to provide indemnification allows the vendor to sue the examiner for damages if the examiner happens to discover or expose something harmful to the vendor.
2) Whether voting system examiners were protected by their secretaries of state. It appears that secretaries of state have left it to the scientists who examine voting software to negotiate their own terms of engagement with vendors. Some scientists, who understandably are not experts in intellectual property law, have signed the agreements provided by vendor attorneys. These agreements can later prove to be unduly restrictive, preventing the examiner from revealing what he knows even to the secretary of state.
3) Whether state voting system examiners were prohibited from examining the testing reports provided by Ciber and Wyle, the federal testing labs. Documents provided to Black Box Voting by Joan Quinn, a citizen in Sacramento, Calif., indicate that California examiner Steve Freeman may not have had access to key portions of the federal testing reports when examining voting systems for the state of California.
4) Whether examiners were prohibited from examining the source code and/or testing the equipment themselves.
5) Whether examiners were prohibited from asking the vendors follow up questions by rules or administrative procedures .
6) Whether examiners were ever prohibited by rules or administrative procedures from communicating with others on voting system panels or certification boards during deliberations over certification recommendations, or during/after voting system examinations.
7) Whether examiners are ever allowed to examine escrowed information -- source code and/or "penetration analysis"?
Black Box Voting has requested copies of the rules, escrow procedures, and any indemnifications, nondisclosures or administrative procedures that apply to the certification, examination and deliberation process in Florida, Pennsylvania, Georgia, California, and Iowa.
Please do not limit these important inquiries to Black Box Voting efforts
- Citizens are urged to gather evidence independently of Black Box Voting, through Freedom of Information and public records requests, to determine exactly what procedures, nondisclosures, restrictions, rules and guidelines are in place for each state's voting system examiners and certifiers.
- State senators and legislators, especially in the above-named states, are urged to launch formal hearings, with subpoena power and witnesses under oath, to investigate exactly what restrictions were placed on voting machine examiners by vendors and secretaries of state.
Another breakdown in voter protection
Bruce Sims of San Diego, Calif. caught this problem:
According to 1990 FEC standards section 5.3, "Access Control", voting machine manufacturers are required to provide federal testing labs with a "penetration analysis" (hacking analysis). Did Diebold, Sequoia and ES&S provide this to testing labs?
If so, why didn't the labs identify the massive Diebold holes exploited by a Finnish security expert in the 2005 Black Box Voting "Harri Hursti" projects, and by Dr. Herbert Thompson and Black Box Voting with the Diebold GEMS central tabulator, and by Jeremiah Akin with the Sequoia WinEDS central tabulator?
"All software (including firmware) for all voting systems SHALL incorporate measures to prevent ... unauthorized operations by ANY PERSON. Unauthorized operations include, but are not limited to: MODIFICATION OF COMPILED OR INTERPRETED CODE..."
This is exactly the "unauthorized operation" that Hursti performed in Leon County on May 26 and Dec 13 2005 in the Black Box Voting projects. Thompson's Visual Basic GEMS hack was also an "unauthorized operation" of the code, and the alterations in the Sequoia WinEDS code demonstrated by Jeremiah Akin are also "unauthorized operations."
When public officials and vendors explain to you that these hacks are not relevant because they require inside access, note that this FEC requirement applies to both outsiders and INSIDERS.
And did the vendor ever supply adequate "penetration analyses"?
"The vendor shall provide a penetration analysis," the standards say. Setting aside for the moment the sheer stupidity of relying only on a profit-seeking vendors assessment of their own product weaknesses, the Diebold memos show that Diebold knew that its customized AccuBasic code could be altered to "do just about anything." Therefore, unless Diebold identified this in the "penetration analysis" it was supposed to provide to the labs, it was out of compliance with FEC guidelines.
From: Guy Lancaster
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 1999
"The 1.94w firmware does not keep a checksum on the Accu-Basic report program stored on the memory card. It sounds like that area has been corrupted on these but without a checksum, the Accu-Vote doesn't recognize the fact and report the error..."
From: On Behalf Of Steve Knecht
Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2002 9:54 AM
Subject: AccuVote Tapes Results Report
> could we get an AccuBasic Report Option that just printed out the label and the ballots cast by precinct only for the zero and election night
report...
Reply: "We can do just about anything."
So, Diebold knew that the AccuVote results reports could be programmed to "do just about anything" and Diebold also knew that "firmware does not keep a checksum on the Accu-Basic report program stored on the memory card."
Did Diebold include this KNOWN information in its "penetration analysis"?
If so, why are the testing labs (Ciber and Wyle) still in the business of examining elections software?
If not, why is Diebold still in the elections business?
Not only is the memory card exploit findable and documented in the public record (at least since 2003 when the Diebold memos were released), but another "unauthorized operation," the use of a Visual Basic script to hack the GEMS central tabulator, has been widely known for years. The use of the MS Access database to perform unauthorized functions was publicly revealed by Black Box Voting in July 2003, but was documented by Diebold programmers back in Oct. 2001.
Aside from the memory card problems, were the GEMS penetration points documented in the penetration test sent by Diebold to testing labs?
Regardless, why didn't state and independent evaluators identify the problems and speak up?
Public records obtained by Joan Quinn reveal that California voting system examiner Steve Freeman did a five-hour "security examination" of GEMS after the exploit holes were documented publicly by Black Box Voting -- yet he recommended certification of the system, even after a critical protective measure for GEMS hacking was stripped out of the Diebold central counting system.
What is in his report on this? Black Box Voting has requested a copy, but due to the bizzaro-world nondisclosures, we believe we may be turned down for "security" reasons (even though it was Black Box Voting that first publicly identified the GEMS defects, on July 8, 2003!).
FEC standards:
"Such penetration analysis will be subject to strict confidentiality and non-disclosure by the test authority. For security reasons, the penetration analysis shall not be routinely distributed to the jurisdictions that program elections. The penetration analysis, however, will be part of the escrow deposit."
How many secretaries of state have violated their own election laws?
Many states have election laws that state something similar to this: "systems be safe from 'fraud or manipulation'."
Let us examine for a moment the responsibility of secretaries of state under their own legal responsibility to ensure that their voting system is "safe from fraud or manipulation."
- If the FEC standards requires that the ITA-examined and vendor-supplied "penetration analysis" be submitted into escrow, does the secretary of state have a duty to examine the penetration analysis?
- If a secretary of state authorizes a state examiner to look at the system, does the secretary of state have a duty to enable said examiner to conduct an unfettered examination, review federal testing lab reports, including vendor's "penetration analysis" and any testing lab comments on it?
- If so, does the secretary of state have an obligation to obtain the report of his own state examiner?
Why would a secretary of state have his contractor negotiate/sign the NDA with the vendor, rather than the Sec. State's office?
If a nondisclosure is used at all, would not the correct party for the nondisclosure agreement (NDA) be the secretary of state, with the sec. state then invoking his own NDA on the state examiner?
In other words, it seems that a strange breach of duty may have occurred in locations where state examiners were forced into NDAs directly with vendors. Because the Secretary of State has a fiduciary duty to the taxpayers to ensure that voting systems are safe from manipulation, the examiner must be given free rein to disclose any and all findings with the secretary of state.
Thus, any NDA should be between the secretary of state and the vendor, with an employment or consultant's agreement executed between the secretary of state and the examiner. It is the secretary of state's duty to protect his own examiner from retaliation from the vendor.
Instead, it appears, the secretaries of state have stepped aside, have failed to provide examiners with the materials and access to the voting system reasonably required to perform an examination, have apparently failed to provide examiners with access to the penetration analysis, have failed to protect examiners from legal retaliation by the vendor, and therefore have failed to obtain the necessary information to "ensure that the system is safe from manipulation."
# # # # #
Permission granted to copy, distribute, reprint, or cite only if any
further dissemination includes the link http://www.blackboxvoting.org
and credit given for the source of the information. |
Joseph Hall
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Joehall
Post Number: 46
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 12:07 pm: |
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Please let us know if you will be able to post NDAs that you receive. We've been very interested in IP issues in e-voting and this is obviously a big part. best, Joe |
Rady Ananda
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Recordrat
Post Number: 1
Registered: 01-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 1:12 pm: |
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I just received a two-page letter from Diebold to Ohio County BOEs, detailing exactly what they cannot release in response to any FOIA or public records requests. I'm posting it on BBV for everyone's benefit. I've scanned both pages onto one document, hence the line across the page bottom. |
Joseph Hall
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Joehall
Post Number: 47
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 2:46 pm: |
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would love to see that Rady... I don't see any attachment icon or anything in your post. You can email me a copy at joehall@berkeley.edu. best, Joe |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3476
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 2:56 pm: |
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Joe and Rady,
Here's what we've got so far, first NDA we've received and we have reason to believe this is one of the LESS restrictive ones!
=============
I understand and agree that "Confidential Information" as used in this Agreement means any and all non-public information concerning the business and affairs with Diebold Election Systems Inc., its affiliates, subsidiaries, and its customers. This includes, by way of example and not as an exhaustive list: computer software and programs (including object code and source code), the computer software and database technologies, systems, structures, and architectures (and related formulae, compositions, processes, improvements, devices, know-how, inventions, discoveries, concepts, ideas, designs, methods and information), testing procedures, financial projections and budgest, historical and projected sales, capital spending budgets and plans, bid proposals, the work experience of key DESI personnal, personnel training techniques and materials, product specifications, data, know-how, formulae, compositions, processes, designs, samples, inventions and ideas, research and development, current and planned design, manufacturing or distribution methods and processes, customer lists including prospects, the identity of customer decision-makers and key contacts, current and anticipated customer requirements, price lists, market studies, business plans, supplier information, personnel files, and any other information, however documented, that is either a trade secret within the meaning of Tex. Penal Code #31.05 (or any other applicable state trade secrets law), or which is not generally known to the public, and which was developed or collected by or at the expense of Diebold Election Systems Inc. Confidential information includes information in any format designed to record, store, or convey information. Confidential Information does not include information which has generally been made public without the violation of an obligation by the disclosing party to maintain confidentiality. The improper action of any person in disclosing Confidential Information to the public in violation of a duty to maintain its confidentiality will not render such Confidential Information no longer subject to protection by me.
I will not, either during the time I work at the premises of Diebold Election Systems Inc. or any time thereafter, disclose to any person or use any Confidential Information except as may be necessary in the course of the activities I am requested to perform for Diebold Election Systems Inc.
I understand that Diebold Election Systems Inc. will own all inventions, patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and other intellectual property rights arising or resulting from my assignment to Diebold Election Systems or from the use of Diebold Election Systems's facilities, equipment, resources or proprietary information and Confidential Information. I agree to cooperate fully with Diebold Election Systems Inc. to secure title in Diebold Election Systems Inc. to any such inventions, patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets or other intellectual property rights. If requested, I will execute any assignment documents needed by Diebold Election Systems Inc. to secure and protect its rights. It is agreed that all works of authorship authored by me as a result of activities pursuant to my assignment are works that have been specially ordered and commissioned by Diebold Election Systems Ind., that all such works of authorwhip will be deemed "works made for hire" under United States Copyright Law, and that all the copyrights in such works shall belong exclusively to Diebold Election Systems Inc. If any original works of authorship create in whole or in part by me in the course of performance of this Agreement do not qualify as "works made for hire" or at any time upon Diebold Election Systems Inc or its nominee to protect and secure its exclusive rights in such works, including but not limited to teh executiion of written assignments.
I agree and understand that I shall not misappropriate, disclose, or use for my own benefit, any trade secrets or confidential information belonging to a third party, including any former employer of mine, in performing activities for Diebold Election Systems Ind. I further agree that if I am the owner of any intellectual property rights, and I use or incorporate such rights in any design, work of authorship or item that I create, produce or deliver to Diebold Election Systems Inc. hereunder, then Diebold Election Systems Inc. shall have an unlimited, perpetual, royalty free, nonexclusive license to such intellectual property rights.
I agree that I will not remove Confidential Information from Diebold Election Systems Inc's premises except to the extent such removal is authorized for purposes of the performance of the assignment and as otherwise specifically authorized by Diebold Election Systems Inc. I understand that transmission of Confidential Information to electronic mail addresses other than those of Diebold Election System Inc. are prohibited, unless necessary for Diebold Election Systems Inc. business purposes to transmit to customers or authorized contractors at their regular business electronic addresses. I will take care not to store or intermingle Confidential Information with my personally owned files or devices. Upon termination of my assignment for any reason, or upon the request of Diebold Election Systems Inc. during the assignment, I will return to Diebold Election Systems Inc. all Confidential Information in my possession or subject to my control. I will not retain any copies, abstracts, sketches, or other physical or electronic embodiment of of any of the Confidential Information.
If I receive a valid subpoena or court order or court paper (collectively, "subpoena") seeking or requiring the disclosure of Confidential Information at any time, I will immediately notify Diebold Election Systems Inc. and I will cooperate with Diebold Election Systems Inc. to take steps to prevent the disclosure of the Confidential Information. I will not voluntarily turn over Confidential Information in response to such subpeona but rather will first assert confidentiality, unless otherwise authorized by Diebold Election Systems Inc.
I acknowledge that the injury to Diebold Election Systems Inc. or its affiliates, subsidiaries or customers as a result of a breach of the provisions of this Agreement would be irreparable and that an award of monetary damages for such a breach would be an inadequate remedy. Diebold Election Systems Inc. will have the right, in addition to any other rights it may have, to obtain injunctive relief to restrain any breach or threatened breach and to specifically enforce any provision of this Agreement. Diebold Election Systems Inc. will not be obligated to post bond or other security in seeking such relief.
In the event Diebold Election Systems Inc. must take legal action to enforce this Agreement, and prevails, I agree that I will be responsible for DESI's reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees.
...
Any typos in the above are mine. Note that this contains no provision to reveal the information to the secretary of state or to members of a voting systems panel, or anyone except Diebold itself.
It contains no indemnification for the contractor, and gives the contractor responsibilities to Diebold, but not to any governmental entity.
By the way, the state of California appears to have misplaced or lost track of at least one of its contracts for voting systems examiners. Either that or there was never a contract or letter of agreement at all -- something we find implausible.
Bev |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1615
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 3:35 pm: |
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If CA has misplaced the contract, could they ask the contractor to provide them with a copy for you?  |
Joseph Hall
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Joehall
Post Number: 48
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 4:44 pm: |
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Wow... this is great stuff. We're working on IP issues and e-voting and this is just great. For the record, here is the memo that Randy mentioned:
<http://josephhall.org/tmp/diebold_to_oh_boe_1-13-06.pdf>
Feel free to add it to the archive! |
Joseph Hall
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Joehall
Post Number: 49
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 4:45 pm: |
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oops... that last link doesn't work as the software got rid of the capitals!
http://josephhall.org/tmp/Diebold_to_OH_BOE_1-13-06.pdf |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3486
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 10:31 pm: |
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Thanks for the link/document, Joe! We have a ton of documents to upload now, between the wonderful documents provided by Joan Quinn (hour by hour job records for Steve Freeman, some by David Jefferson and R&G consulting); And, of course, on another front we have an absolute trove coming in on Jeffrey Dean. See latest lead story for his testimony about remote access into California counties for the 2000 election. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1616
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 11:40 pm: |
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This stuff is absolutely amazing. I can't believe that NDA.
It's appalling that private contractors were put in the position of having to sign a vendor-produced NDA in order to do work for a separate employer. Did the election officials even see these NDAs ahead of time? Did they realize what the contractors were being asked to sign?
Someone not used to dealing with NDAs--whether an election official or their contractor--might not have realized how unusual and restrictive these particular NDAs were. Also, it can be daunting to negotiate the terms of an NDA with a legal professional, particularly if you're not used to it.
It would be so easy to hand someone a piece of paper and say, "This is our standard form that we ask everyone to sign." And if you've been told you've been hired to do certain work requiring collaboration with the person who handed you the paper to sign, on what basis could you say no? If you refuse to sign, then you can't do the job you were hired to do by the person who hired you.
It's a catch-22 situation.
Is it legal to do this kind of thing? (Legal for Diebold? Legal for election officials?)
Can an NDA be used to cover up evidence of a crime? Or a potential crime? I would expect not, but perhaps someone with legal expertise can comment. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3493
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 8:11 am: |
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I have received word that a court decision about a decade ago made it legal to violate an NDA if you are exposing evidence of lawbreaking.
If anyone can find that citation it would be helpful.
For example, does it apply only to evidence of a crime or also to evidence of regulatory noncompliance? Note that the FEC standards are "voluntary" so, technically, failure to follow them is not illegal. However, making false claims in a sales presentation is a crime: fraud.
Do note, however, that some situations -- e.g. where people have signed an NDA upon leaving a job, and accepted a "termination payment" dependent on signing that release, the actual legal minefield is somewhat more complex.
For example, while you may not be prosecuted for violating the nondisclosure, you can still be forced to pay the money back. So people who took, say, a $10,000 termination payment and signed an NDA in that context can be compelled to testify if subpoenad, but such testimony can result in their being compelled to repay the $10,000 (sometimes with additional punitive kickers). |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1622
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 8:51 am: |
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What if it might be evidence of a crime, but you can't know for sure till you have more access? |
Byron Hale
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Clearbox
Post Number: 1
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 8:09 am: |
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It is a sure sign of criminality if a vendor does not provide a copy of a contract or does not provide a copy of a receipt.
On the other hand, failure to retain proper records is a sign of dereliction of duty in public office. In short, it calls for impeachment or other removal from office. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3505
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 8:17 am: |
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Just received California Sec. State's office reply to our NDA request. They say they do not have the records.
This supports the contention that the SoS office left the examiners hanging, that they had to sign the NDA directly with the vendors. Now the question is: If the examiner is paid by the state, is the examiner subject to public records laws? |
Byron Hale
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Clearbox
Post Number: 2
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 8:21 am: |
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Bev Harris post of an NDA (Posted on Wednesday, February 01, 2006 - 03:35 pm) appears to be an NDA for employees of Diebold. Perhaps it seems a bit over broad, but technology development NDAs tend in that direction.
As I mentioned in an email, no contract in violation of law is supposed to be enforcable.
For another thing, a simple subpoena is not actually binding, in and of itself. To be binding, it must be enforced.
Failure to enforce the law is a dereliction of duty of the executive branch. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3508
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 8:26 am: |
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Byron -- That NDA was received from a contractor for Diebold who was not and never has been an employee of Diebold.
There are buffering layers in at least some of the work. For example, David Jefferson at one point shows up as an hourly invoice item on a bill to the SoS from the vendor that did the certification audit -- R&G? Don't have the doc. in front of me.
This has the smell of protecting information from the public by putting an insulating layer, a third party contractor, in between the vendor (voting machine company) and the SoS.
SoS contracts with vendor 1 (examiner or firm that contracts with another person).
Vendor 1 contracts with vendor 2 (voting machine mfr).
Therefore they may try to claim that none of Vendor 2's agreements are subject to public records requirements.
|
Byron Hale
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Clearbox
Post Number: 3
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 8:34 am: |
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What reason could there be for voting examiners to sign an NDA with a vendor, other than that they or their superiors were paid by the vendor.
If paid by the vendor, conflict of interest. It is my belief that in California, not to mention other states, that the employer (here the state or county) is responsible for the actions of its employees.
Of course, if a mail truck runs over you, you are out of luck. The government cannot be held liable for it. However, in principle, some official could lose his/her job. |
Byron Hale
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Clearbox
Post Number: 4
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 8:39 am: |
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Bev, I have been an independent technology contractor for years. Independent contractors are given the same NDA, or nearly so, as employees. What many people don't know is that one can negotiate to modify the contract, if one has any bargaining power. Thus, proposed agreements can be modified on the fly, if one has the moxie. |
Byron Hale
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Clearbox
Post Number: 5
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 8:46 am: |
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Bev, as far as insulation goes, that never works in medical malpractice suits. So, if there is electoral malfeasance, a medical malpractice model seems appropriate.
Proper elections are the foundation of removing bad officials from office. Improper elections and lack of proper oversight have been a weak link in our system of government. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3511
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 3, 2006 - 1:17 pm: |
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Excellent advice re: medical malpractice, but what I'm wondering is -- that's a court action. We're looking, at the moment, at public records access so we can even determine what the problem is with precision.
Perhaps some of the arguments used to remove the insulation in medical malpractice might apply to arguing for the public records, should that become necessary. Do you have any suggested source material where we might take a look at those kinds of arguments? |
Byron Hale
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Clearbox
Post Number: 6
Registered: 02-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, February 6, 2006 - 3:16 am: |
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Bev, medical malpractice revolves around lawsuits. Lawsuits have the potential of discovery motions. So maybe the right lawyer could get you the information you need based on a lawsuit.
I'm not a lawyer, but I understanding that the following comments hold (or once held) in California. Anyone may sue anyone for any reason. However, some suits will be thrown out as frivilous. One doesn't want to be the plaintiff in a frivilous lawsuit. Moreocver, unincorporated associations can be sued member-by-member. So, it's wise to have a good lawyer, as suits automatically enable counter-suits. Who should be the plaineiff(s) and respondent(s)?
I don't really mean that go-for-the-juglar suits, such as medical malpractice, just that real maliciousness should be liable. I doubt that juries would get quite as worked up over electoral malfeasance as over medical malpractice. In addition, the hottest juries for medical malpractice seem to be in Texas. Perhaps another state would be needed for the electoral arena. |
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