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| 9-10-2005: Here's your chance to 'Loo... |
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| Author |
Message |
    
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 1847
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 13 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, September 8, 2005 - 6:55 pm: | 
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UPDATED SAT. Sep. 10:
Imagine this: A ballot scanner that captures and keeps a precise picture of every ballot. Guess what? These are already in use in elections.
Add this to the mix: Freedom of Information Act laws mandate that citizens can obtain records produced by the government -- which includes these ballot image files.
And now imagine this: Your personal program to examine digital ballot copies from real elections. Review close-up details for each ballot, do forensics or extract data for stats. Examine ballots one by one or automate examination of batches, 8,000 ballots per hour. Can also be used with multiple computers to process batches simultaneously, for greater speed.
And this: Open source software, designed for public scrutiny, available shortly (estimated for early October), FREE OF CHARGE, to anyone -- reporters, citizens, candidates.
More: You can use the program right away, for the Nov. 8 elections. No new laws need to be passed, and the feature you need is ALREADY in many voting machines. The ballot image files, which are public records, are already in the machines, we just never knew to ask for them.
Is this for real? Yes. Conceived of and designed by Harri Hursti, to be made available soon by Black Box Voting.
Note: Not all ballot scanners create digital images. At a minimum, though, the Diebold high speed central count (version 2.0.xx series) and all Hart Intercivic optical scan systems provide this feature.
This is, of course, not a complete solution. There are many other corrective actions that need to be taken to return citizen ability to watchdog our own elections.
This wonderful idea by Harri Hursti, to give American citizens a tool to watchdog elections quickly, and in time for the next election, does represent a breakthrough approach to citizen empowerment.
Ballot images are public records. Therefore, in jurisdictions that use digital image ballot scanners, you can get them -- right now! You can use your home computer to view photocopy-quality images of the real ballots used in recent elections.
Digital images of ballots contain no proprietary computer code, and are clearly a public record, and are not difficult to extract from ballot scanners to comply with public records requests.
Non-digital image scanners, older "infra-red" ballot scanning issues
In the mean time, comments on Sept. 7 story revolved around things that can be done to manipulate scanners that use infra-red technology.
The most important problem with infra-red ballot scanners is that certain organic materials are photoactive to infra-red frequencies. What this means is that, when there is organic material in an ink, it will give unpredictable results when scanned in one of these machines.
Particularly for mail-in and absentee ballots, this is a bad idea -- there is little control of what kind of ink people have in their various pens, and simply putting an instruction in the packet to use a number 2 pencil (the best option) is not sufficient.
It's also a bad idea for polling places, where an absurdly simple attack vector presents itself: Place pens with the wrong ink into polling booths, where some voters will use them. It isn't just the color of the ink that matters -- its chemical composition is also important to election integrity.
The new digital image scanners are less vulnerable to problems with infra-red-affected inks.
Correction on Sept. 7 article: The ballot scanners that do not produce and store a digital image are called many things, but no term is both precise and widely understood. That article has been edited accordingly. Basically, a ballot scanner either produces (and retains) a digital image or it doesn't. |
Paula Bushkoff
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Plumb
Post Number: 103
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, September 10, 2005 - 8:35 am: |
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In my district in Massachusetts we have absentee ballots that are sent with a small pencil to be used to fill out the ballot. (Probably a no. 2 pencil.) It comes taped to the instruction sheet. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 862
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, September 10, 2005 - 4:42 pm: |
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This is an intriguing and creative development. It seems promising. Could this finally be an appropriate use of technology in elections, providing both convenience, speed and openness? I like the fact that it could be used even in more complex voting systems such as PR or Condorcet.
Four questions come to mind--
1) What if there's a snag in the FOIA about allowing people to have the ballot images? Especially since officials often don't play by the rules. This should be copper-fastened before implementing. Would the images also be allowed for ballots deemed to be not void (e.g., if they writing or other marks on them that could potentially identify the voter even if not containing the voter's name)? There should be separate groups of ballots according to how/when they were cast (at polling station, early, absentee, provisional etc.)
2) Having recently been without electricity for one day, and seeing the Katrina experience, it's crucial to develop and maintain procedures for carrying out paper-only elections (including establishing standards for custody of ballots). Preparedness. Never assume that electricity will always be available.
(Idea--maybe we should promote laws that if the chain of custody of the ballots has been compromised, or if anyone has had access not supervised by at least 2 reps of different candidates, then the election is thrown out. If this happened once or twice it might make people take chain of custody seriously.)
3) Transparency would depend heavily on ongoing citizen interest & participation in checking the election results. It could be a good civics class exercise. (Who can spot the most mistakes?)
4) What happens if citizens get a different result? This would also have to be established prior to implementation. (E.g., In event of any difference, there would be an official recount of all the votes using a committee of humans including candidates' representatives, using only the original paper ballots.) |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 867
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, September 11, 2005 - 4:08 am: |
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I take the liberty of posting Marian Beddill's comments on the ICTE public e-group:
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"We discussed digital images at a recent forum in my city, at which Bev Harris (of BBV) was one of the panelists.
In our state (Washington {Seattle}) somebody wrote into law many years ago that a computer "record" has the value of a "cast ballot". I was astounded when I saw that, obviously the work of someone setting the stage for internet and DRE voting.
Thus such a digital image, being by any standard a "computer record", could be considered "the ballot". We just barely escaped in recent years language which would have made that able to trump even the presence of a voter-verifiable paper ballot, but it still MAY BE used, and that permission is what allows paperless DRE's to be used.
That leads me to the review of the ability to tamper with such a digital image file. Simple software may edit an image, such as the common TIFF or JPEG files, thus such a record could easily have the voter intent subverted by changing the file after the voter cast their ballot. Such a subversion could happen at any place in the chain-of-custody of the image, and I believe that it would be very difficult to prevent or even detect such edits.
It is true that files may have "signatures" or tags like the older CRC number either internally or externally to the image file. But that itself only constitutes yet another "computer record" which itself could be subverted. And the additional security management to verify such coding would be a burden on the election staff - subject to human failure allowing the images to be changed."
(Message edited by catherine_a on September 11, 2005) |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 1868
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, September 11, 2005 - 8:27 am: |
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Detailed feedback on possible problems with this method
Most of the above are entirely valid points. This solution does nothing to negate the fact that all electronic systems have abundantly more attack points than hand counted paper ballots, and are far less transparent.
This solution plays a limited role
I also agree with your assessment that this is a creative and appropriate use of technology to provide an immediate aid to election integrity, but on a limited basis (only available some places) and it helps with only one part of a multi-part problem.
Public records obstructiveness
The image file is clearly a public record. Therefore, attempts to block production of the image file must be viewed as obstructive and should be considered consistent with the possibility of elections fraud. It will be interesting to see who perceives this invention to be hostile. Quite diagnostic, really. Light should be shined on such obstruction.
Manipulation of the image files:
such a record could easily have the voter intent subverted by changing the file after the voter cast their ballot.
This comment applies very much to the "image" inside touch-screens, which isn't a digital photocopy at all, but an interpretation of data which was never an image in the first place. This kind of data could be affected at the time it is created by any number of factors.
To manipulate source code so that scanner will misinterpret the image at creation
It also is true that a somewhat elaborate manipulation of the source code might affect the image creation, but that is equally true of the older style of optical scan machines, those that don't produce an image.
In fact, a source code manipulation is harder to carry off with ballot scanners that produce digital images, because you have one more layer you must subvert. Also, that kind of subversion may leave tracks like an elephant with digital image forensics.
Chain of custody issues
Such a subversion could happen at any place in the chain-of-custody of the image, and I believe that it would be very difficult to prevent or even detect such edits.
The "chain of custody" of the image files is important. However, an easier attack point in the chain of custody is the actual ballots themselves. If you swap in fake ballots during the scanning procedure, obviously the images will provide swapped ballots. And, as in the above example, that is an equal risk with ordinary optical scan ballots.
To access image files from ballot scanners
It is a simple matter to edit a TIFF file, but it remains that you have to get either inside access or remote access to do so on these particular image files.
Tracing manipulations in the images
As for it being very "difficult to prevent or even trace" the manipulations, neither of those statements is true. Leaving aside the issue of prevention for the moment -- because we are looking at using this immediately, without time to mandate any procedural or software adjustments at all -- there are a number of forensics that can be done that will trace manipulations, and none of them depend on the election official, nor do they provide any extra work for officials.
Do we let everyone know what forensics are possible now, or later?
When I used to write about embezzlement, there was always an interesting question: Do you reveal what you know about methods to embezzle and how you catch them, thereby educating new would-be embezzlers and teaching embezzlers to cover their tracks more effectively?
I think we should reveal how you can do forensics on these ballots, but my instincts tell me to wait until we have the Nov. 8 ballot images (in the mean time, because there are elections between now and November, working privately with reporters, citizens, and candidates who are trying this software to advise them on forensics, out of public view). This way, we can identify clumsy attempts to manipulate, if they occur, before telling perpetrators how to cover their tracks.
You'd need to do your traceless manipulation on many ballots, not just one
Manipulating a ballot image without leaving ANY forensic trace would be challenging even for a computer professional, and remember, it wouldn't do much good to manipulate just one ballot. If one perfected a scheme to do entirely invisible manipulations, you'd also have to find a way to batch that invisible manipulation process, or make it very quick indeed, because (except in very close elections, under 200 votes difference, which can go to hand counts anyway) you'd have to manipulate a whole lot of ballot images. A lot of identical manipulations would leave even more suspicious tracks.
Does this put an extra burden on election officials to track things?
None of the forensics that Hursti has described to me require any cooperation from either the election official or the vendor.
Other identifiers
It is true that files may have "signatures" or tags like the older CRC number either internally or externally to the image file.
There are many identifications built into images automatically. The above comment indicates that the author is not aware of the other kinds of identifiers, which are already be there for anyone to examine, with or without cooperation from officials.
Synopsis
It is easy to manipulate the images AFTER they have been created, using a program like PhotoShop, but it is not easy manipulate the images during creation (and that manipulation would apply to all optical scan machines anyway). It is extremely difficult to manipulate images after they are created without leaving a number of different kinds of telltale signs.
I think the bigger concern will be obstructiveness and delay with the public records. This is why we are so delighted that this tool is being received with enthusiasm by NEWS REPORTERS and CANDIDATES, as well as ordinary citizens, adding to the pressure to cooperate, and shining light (and litigation) on such obstructiveness.
I do realize that some individuals invested a lot of time persuading their local officials not to buy the digital image ballot scanner systems. We did not know about this solution then, and they are not to be faulted for that. Now we do know, and it is the opinion of the BBV staff (for a number of reasons), that if you are going to buy electronic voting machines:
1) Ballot scanners are superior to DREs.
2) Digital image ballot scanners are superior to those that cannot produce a digital image.
3) More steps, including rethinking our electoral processes themselves, are needed. This invention by Hursti is a stopgap measure, but may also evolve into additional useful measures. |
Brant Lamb
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 57
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, September 12, 2005 - 4:50 am: |
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Weren't optical scanners where most of the flim-flam was accomplished in Ohio? And wasn't it the tactic to delay the recount as much as possible, then force where the recounts to areas they could get to gibe with 'official' counts? How will you get this information in time to make a difference?
It has to be legislated that you have the legally binding copy of your vote in your hand when you leave the polling place, that you can check to make sure it's right, get it corrected if it isn't, before they get to set it in stone, and that you can review the totals at your precinct, county and state levels, both at the precinct for precinct levels and on the internet for precinct, county and state levels. Otherwise, finding fraud or hacking will again be a moot point. |
John Washburn
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 94
Registered: 04-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, September 12, 2005 - 2:39 pm: |
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RE: It is true that files may have "signatures" or tags like the older CRC number either internally or externally to the image file.
A CRC is not a "signature" in the coumputer security sense of the word. MD5 and SHA-1 are true "digital signatures". MD5 has flaws as does SHA-1, but either are still much better than a CRC32 value.
When you make your FOIA (or Open Records) requests for ballot images, you should immediately generate both an MD5 and SHA1 fingerprints for the image data given to you. For added work and extra security generate each of the 4, SHA-2 fingerprints for the image data as well. Capturing the file size in bytes and the CRC32 can only help.
Record these 8 numbers and give the clerk a "receipt" CD-ROM of all 8 numbers, the hash calculating program you used and a copy of the data the clerk just gave you. The design of different document which collides on all 8 hashes but has the same file size and CRC32 checksum is vanisingly small.
Thus, at a future time when the clerk accuses you of "tampering" with the image file you can prove the file you are using is a faithful copy of the original. The receipt given back to the clerk is a contemporaneous record. As such it would have great weight in supporting your claim of authenticity and data integrity. And the best part is the CD you gave the clerk as a "Receipt" is a public record you can request at a later time.
Perhaps Hari can incorporate this overly-secure fingerprinting mechanism into his "product" or as a separate utility. Given the name of a file of ballot images, copy the ballot images, a text files of fingerprints, and the hash calculator into a ZIP file archive. Burn the Zip File to a CD-ROM or DVD-ROM and "viola" instant "receipt"
In Liberty,
John Washburn
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Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 1875
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, September 13, 2005 - 7:41 am: |
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John - yes, with you on that. Thanks for the information. What you brought up is one method, an important one.
There are also other telltale signs if a file has been tampered with.
I'm in Oakland today and tomorrow involved in citizen workshops and will not be able to participate in discussions here.
Thanks,
Bev |
James Zukowski
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimz
Post Number: 134
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 14, 2005 - 12:15 am: |
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Bev Harris wrote: "I think we should reveal how you can do forensics on these ballots, but my instincts tell me to wait until we have the Nov. 8 ballot images (in the mean time, because there are elections between now and November, working privately with reporters, citizens, and candidates who are trying this software to advise them on forensics, out of public view). This way, we can identify clumsy attempts to manipulate, if they occur, before telling perpetrators how to cover their tracks."
We can still discuss actions, tactics, and strategies without the general potential trouble-makers learning about such things. There is an area already set up on BBV: the "Special Area". By redefining who has access to this area (which has already happened), BBV can control who gets involved in the procedures.
Something to consider...
Peace!
James Zukowski
The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything.
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Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 1876
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 14, 2005 - 7:35 am: |
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Well duh.
Perfect solution, James. We can definitely use that area.
I'll work on that late this week.
Bev |
Linda Franz
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Linda_franz
Post Number: 171
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 14, 2005 - 8:47 am: |
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"It also is true that a somewhat elaborate manipulation of the source code might affect the image creation, but that is equally true of the older style of optical scan machines, those that don't produce an image.
In fact, a source code manipulation is harder to carry off with ballot scanners that produce digital images, because you have one more layer you must subvert. Also, that kind of subversion may leave tracks like an elephant with digital image forensics."
This is a good audit tool.
But the heart of the matter is whether the ballot was "Imaged" correctly or not. Even if that is more complex to do, the potential exists. As with DRE's, the ultimate question is if the ballot was imaged correctly.
While forensics may tell you if someone messed with the information after it was recorded, it cannot tell, as far as I know, if the information was recorded correctly.
Also, is there a way to tell if the information you're getting is the same as recorded on election day?
I'm all for this as a tool in the audit tool kit.
I would be wary of vendors and officials deciding that it's better than a hand audit of results. We'll have to insure that hand audits are implemented across the country- and that any difference in results calls for a complete hand audit. This tool though, could help make more of those audits happen.
Given the speed and ability to move information these days, I'd also worry that the medium used to store the images could be swapped out- especially with early and absentee ballots.
For example, I believe the Hart Intercivic op scan stores that information on flash memory. Swap one unit for another, both "original creation," and who would know without a hand audit?
Where some states (Like Washington) allow "processing" of mailed in ballots ahead of time with the information stored on flash memory (In the case of Hart) and then the flash unit is what is "counted" on election day- opportunity exists to swap the memory. (State law is fuzzy on what processing is. Used to be- and still is for units without digital imaging- they'd prep the paper ballots ahead of time, file them in trays, lock them up, and count them on election day. The law would have to specify that ballots cannot be RUN through the scanners until election day, to eliminate this loophole)
State laws will have to be tightened to make this less vulnerable. And as experienced, it can take up to three years or more to get that done.
"In fact, a source code manipulation is harder to carry off with ballot scanners that produce digital images, because you have one more layer you must subvert. Also, that kind of subversion may leave tracks like an elephant with digital image forensics."
Again, the source code issue. It may be harder but the incentive to accomplish that kind of subversion is high- winning elections is power.
What kind of tracks would be left in source code, or in the "images" produced, if the code was written to accomodate the potential in the first place?
I have concerns. However, this is a valuable audit tool and should certainly be used across the country in upcoming elections. Congrats to Harri and all who are making this possible.
MULTIPLE ways, IMPLEMENTED, to audit election information, is more likely to catch errors and makes the potential of tampering harder.
It's going to be interesting to see responses in upcoming elections. Do we have open records, which are OUR records, after all, or not? |
James Zukowski
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Jimz
Post Number: 135
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 14, 2005 - 11:28 am: |
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Has anybody "seen" an imaged ballot yet? Do infrared marks show up differently in the image than visible marks? Is it gray-scale or color imaging? Anybody?
Peace!
James Zukowski
The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything.
|
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 1881
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 14, 2005 - 8:51 pm: |
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Yes, we have about 50 files of them. Many are L&A test image files, some are election image files.
It should be gray scale imaging, but Diebold, I believe, chose to take a short cut in the interest of speed, and made it scan black and white.
These are not infra-red scanners. The infra-red ink issue applies to those. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 1882
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 14, 2005 - 9:15 pm: |
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But the heart of the matter is whether the ballot was "Imaged" correctly or not.
Yes. However, it is more complex than you'd think. When I get the special section ready, we can discuss this in that more private setting.
Even if that is more complex to do, the potential exists.
Yes. The potential for that exists with both the old scanners and the new digital image scanners, but with the new ones you have to clear additional obstacles. In no case should this replace the hand count audit.
As with DRE's, the ultimate question is if the ballot was imaged correctly.
Comparing this image with a DRE image is apples and oranges. The DRE "image" is not an image at all, but a concocted graphics creation. The digital image scan is a digital photograph of an actual ballot, rather than a concoction out of thin air. DRE "images" are a somewhat pointless exercise.
While forensics may tell you if someone messed with the information after it was recorded, it cannot tell, as far as I know, if the information was recorded correctly.
Forensics may provide very good footprints if the information was not recorded correctly. That will be discussed in the private section. Sorry, won't be able to get that up for a few days, but it will happen. Thanks immensely to James Zukowski for suggesting that solution.
Also, is there a way to tell if the information you're getting is the same as recorded on election day?
Yes, but for best results that will need to be a slightly later stage. For excellent results a procedural change will add to data security immensely (after the later stage is implemented). It would require no new laws, just a later stage software and a simple procedure change. Concept planning for the later stage software is done. And did I mention that Harri Hursti is a genius and a national treasure?
We want to get the early stage program beta tested immediately, while we are in election season. It will be a natural progression to incorporate additional features.
I would be wary of vendors and officials deciding that it's better than a hand audit of results.
It will not be likely to replace a hand audit of results. That will be discussed in the private section.
Given the speed and ability to move information these days, I'd also worry that the medium used to store the images could be swapped out- especially with early and absentee ballots.
There would be likely telltale signs if that happens. To be discussed in private section shortly.
For example, I believe the Hart Intercivic op scan stores that information on flash memory. Swap one unit for another, both "original creation," and who would know without a hand audit?
Hand audit is best, but there are methods to detect most likely methods of swaps. Swapping can be significantly reduced, or eliminated altogether, at a later stage, with some upgrades and a simple procedural change.
The law would have to specify that ballots cannot be RUN through the scanners until election day, to eliminate this loophole
Not necessarily. There are a couple short-term forensic examinations that could detect certain swapping methodology, and there is a longer term technique/procedure that could pretty much eliminate them without anyone seeing the count ahead of time.
State laws will have to be tightened to make this less vulnerable.
State laws have to be tightened anyway, but the premise here is seems to be a little off.
Right now, we have no checks and balances at all. This adds a significant method of checking up on these votes. Something is better than nothing.
There are enhancements that can make this very, very significantly better than the current situation, while making the attack vectors you suggest very risky.
What kind of tracks would be left in source code, or in the "images" produced, if the code was written to accomodate the potential in the first place?
The likelihood of tracks in the images if the source code was manipulated is quite high. However, I'm glad these tracks aren't obvious -- and I encourage our membership not to guess at what the tracks are until we get this onto a private forum.
It's going to be interesting to see responses in upcoming elections. Do we have open records, which are OUR records, after all, or not?
One of the most interesting things to watch will be who considers this to be a hostile act. Which vendors resist it, which elections officials resist, which legislators resist.
We will certainly prevail in some locations very quickly. We will certainly litigate for the records if we are obstructed.
Yes, this is only ONE method and should not be used to the exclusion of anything else. However, it does something we see very little of today: It provides a measurable increase in scrutiny without the need to change laws, recertify anything, or get different equipment.
Think of this solution as sticking a few fingers in to plug a handful of holes in a very leaky dike. Any dike with as many leaks as we have right now is a hazard to the republic. |
Richard Holliday
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rholliday
Post Number: 1
Registered: 09-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, September 19, 2005 - 3:37 pm: |
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I'm new here, so forgive me if I address an already broached topic, but I looked in recent articles about this topic and saw nothing.
What about voter privacy? How much of the image is scanned? Is there a ballot number noted? Does that number correspond to a zone/time/coordinator/voter? Could it be if it's not? Oversight is an excellent idea, but my vote should not be associated with me unless I mention it myself.
Also, tampering with pictures might be hard. Generating modified duplicates might not be. By this I mean if you know what one looks like, you could create a program to recreate them, and then possibly delete and swap if you gained access. Just a thought. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 1946
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, September 20, 2005 - 8:19 am: |
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Richard,
Welcome to Black Box Voting!
Here are some responses to the excellent points you brought up -- and by the way, we welcome such input. Our logs indicate that for every one who posts, there are a thousand who read but don't post. You are no doubt asking questions that others were thinking, but were too shy to ask.
What about voter privacy?
The ballots contain no information about the voter. The information which identifies the voter is removed when the envelope containing the absentee ballot is removed, and the polling place ballots never have voter identification attached.
How much of the image is scanned?
The entire ballot is scanned.
Is there a ballot number noted?
Most ballots are serial numbered (all should be, but unfortunately that is a sound accounting procedure that is lately being ignored in some areas)
Does that number correspond to a zone/time/coordinator/voter? Could it be if it's not?
Serial numbered ballots are supposed to be assigned to precincts with the serial number range noted. Thus, if a hand recount is done, not only the votes should be matched, but the serial numbers should be matched to reduce the potential for ballot-swapping during spot check recounts.
The serial number is not associated with a time, a voter, or a poll worker.
Oversight is an excellent idea, but my vote should not be associated with me unless I mention it myself.
Agreed. By law, your ballot cannot be constructed in such a way as to enable it to be connected to you, and therefore, the scan shows only what precinct the ballot is from, not what time or who voted it.
However, it should be noted that the new Sequoia touch-screens with the "voter verified paper audit trail" violate this principle. They spew out consecutive ballots that are attached to one another, allowing identification of who voted which ballot when compared with poll book. A bad thing, and it's amazing it is allowed to be used.
Also, tampering with pictures might be hard. Generating modified duplicates might not be.
I'll enable you for the private section where we discuss how insertin modified duplicates could be spotted.
Thanks for the excellent points, Richard. |
Andrew Riley
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Riles
Post Number: 1
Registered: 09-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 21, 2005 - 9:31 am: |
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It struck me immediately on reading your posts, it still comes down to open source code in the machines. Why go through the process of creating forgeries when you can simply delete a certain number or percentage of votes and the images that go with them. The only way that I can think of to prove deletion is to check immages against paper ballots. Which brings you back to counting paper ballots.
(Message edited by riles on September 21, 2005) |
Richard Holliday
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rholliday
Post Number: 2
Registered: 09-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, September 21, 2005 - 10:02 am: |
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Thanks for your quick response Bev. You resolved most of my fears. I look forward to having the rest of them disapated by the other discussion you mentioned. |
alex baxter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ragtop_red
Post Number: 1
Registered: 10-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, October 31, 2005 - 8:18 am: |
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Interesting discussion.
I see no reason why any of the election officials with whom I have contact would have an issue in providing copies of these image files.
Quote from message above:
"It has to be legislated that you have the legally binding copy of your vote in your hand when you leave the polling place, that you can check to make sure it's right,..."
With respect to the above poster, there is a valid reason why this will probably not see the legislative light of day. Our present standard of a secret ballot exists to prevent persons from being were coerced and/or rewarded (vote buying) on the basis of voting for a person and/or group. To issue any copy of the ballot to the voter as a receipt only assists those who would seek to engage in this practice. To make such a receipt legally binding violates chain of custody.
(Message edited by ragtop_red on November 01, 2005) |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2547
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, October 31, 2005 - 4:00 pm: |
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Hi, Alex, and welcome to Black Box Voting. Did you mean "there is a valid reason why this will [NOT] see the light of day? That's what it sounds like from the context of the points you made.
You can edit your posts for several hours after you post them, by clicking the icon on the top right of your post that looks like a piece of paper and a pencil. You click it, then scroll down and a text window appears below the post.
Bev Harris |
alex baxter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ragtop_red
Post Number: 2
Registered: 10-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 1, 2005 - 4:23 am: |
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Yep, that is what I meant. Good Catch. |
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