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| 11-22-05: California invites Black Bo... |
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BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2800
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 10 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 22, 2005 - 7:20 pm: | 
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The California Secretary of State has invited Black Box Voting to hack away at some Diebold voting systems. The testing is set for Nov. 30, 2005.
Diebold Election Systems has been trying to re-certify its “TSx” touch-screen machines in California. Diebold has added stronger passwords and encryption, but even the consultant hired by California to evaluate the system reported that the voting system remains vulnerable to alteration of vote results.
(More on consultant report and vulnerabilities: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/14296.html)
This week, officials at the California Secretary of State's office invited Black Box Voting, a nonprofit, nonpartisan watchdog group for elections, to try hacking into the Diebold system. A specific testing protocol was provided by Diebold and the California Secretary of State’s office.
Though the opportunity was welcomed by Black Box Voting, negotiations remain on the procedures. Black Box Voting contends that the proposed testing violates California Election Code §19202, which governs the request for voting machine testing formally submitted to the state of California by Black Box Voting on June 16, 2005. Also, Black Box Voting identified areas of bias in the proposed procedures, which would violate normal scientific protocol and cause voters to lack confidence in the results.
At issue is Diebold’s insistence on being involved in setting up the testing procedures, and Diebold’s provision of hand-picked machines, using new voting systems not currently in use in California.
Let’s look at what’s at stake for Diebold:
Black Box Voting had formally requested replication of the work by experts Harri Hursti and Dr. Herbert Thompson. If Diebold does not survive the tests, the firm may face a nationwide product recall, rivaled in notoriety only by the exploding gas tank fiasco that afflicted the Ford Pinto. Diebold is dependent on a particular outcome. Failing this test might cost them their elections business altogether.
Diebold’s stake in the outcome is compounded by financial problems in the Diebold ATM division, which produced a restatement of corporate profits and caused a significant collapse in stock prices.
Though the formal request for replication of Black Box Voting security tests was made in June 2005, Diebold delayed the test required by §19202 for more than five months. Diebold is now “permitting” the testing only under conditions Diebold controls, using machines only Diebold provides.
The proposed procedure contaminates the results.
Black Box Voting has offered to resolve procedural defects in such a way as to “enhance public confidence” as required by §104 (c) in the California certification procedures. Instead of voting machines hand-picked by the vendor which have never been used in elections, Black Box Voting wants to test a randomly selected voting system used in the last election -- the machines that elected the California governor and the president.
Black Box Voting also proposes selecting machines from county elections offices which have not shown a bias for Diebold, recommending Alameda County for the evaluation of the touch-screens and Placer, Modoc, Trinity or Santa Barbara County for evaluation of the optical scan system. Within these counties, Black Box Voting proposed random selection of the machine. The five counties suggested by Black Box Voting are the Diebold customers who did not take part in a pro-Diebold advertisement copied on back of the official flyer containing the agenda for the certification hearing. Sec. State’s office’s Bruce McDannold disavowed the flyer, saying his office had nothing to do with its distribution.
The scientific method attempts to minimize bias by removing the influence of any party who profits from one outcome or another. In testing, those who design the system are not supposed to be the same as those who test the system.
Therefore, Black Box Voting is confident that the California Secretary of State will comply with these reasonable adjustments. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2801
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 22, 2005 - 7:22 pm: |
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Letter to Bruce McDannold:
Mr. McDannold,
We have reviewed your proposed test protocol. Thank you for your intriguing proposition, although it is nonresponsive to the 19202 request we filed on June 16, 2005.
Since you’ve so very kindly sought our expertise in this matter, we certainly want to oblige. Because you have requested our guidance, we feel it incumbent upon us to begin with the appropriate protocol, one which will be accepted by the scientific community and which will ensure an unbiased outcome. Let’s start by looking at your agency’s certification procedure §104 (c), which states:
“Certification tests shall enhance public confidence…”
Based on your own procedures, we know you’ll agree that choosing test protocols that meet normal accepted practice will be imperative.
It would, of course, be a highly unusual procedure for a vendor whose existence depends on a particular outcome of the test to be involved in designing the evaluation. For this reason, Consumer Reports buys their test products off the shelf, choosing them randomly from the same inventory that customers use. (If Consumer Reports allowed manufacturers to ship them their test products, they know they would receive especially robust versions, and their constituency would not have as much confidence in their results.)
The scientific method attempts to minimize bias by removing the influence of any party who profits from one outcome or another. In testing, those who design the system are not supposed to be the same as those who test the system.
Therefore, we believe you will agree that the protocol submitted earlier should be adjusted in order to avoid procedures which introduce bias.
Let’s look at what’s at stake for Diebold:
If the findings by Harri Hursti and Dr. Herbert Thompson are replicated, Diebold may face a nationwide product recall, rivaled in notoriety only by the exploding gas tank fiasco that afflicted the Ford Pinto. Diebold is dependent on a particular outcome.
Failing this test might cost them their elections business altogether.
In addition, Diebold’s stake in the outcome is compounded by recent financial problems in the Diebold ATM division, which produced a restatement of corporate profits and caused a significant collapse in stock prices. There are already rumblings of a stockholder lawsuit.
It is therefore not surprising that Diebold delayed this test for more than five months, and that Diebold is now “permitting” it only under conditions they control, using machines only Diebold provides.
The proposed procedure contaminates the results.
Therefore, let’s resolve the current procedural defect in such a way as to “enhance public confidence” as required by your certification procedures. We can move ahead with assisting you simply by testing the voting systems used in the last election. After all, these are the machines that elected the California governor and voted for the president.
We suggest selecting machines from those county elections offices which have not shown a bias for Diebold.
We therefore suggest Alameda County for the evaluation of the TS/TSx memory card systems and for the optical scan system, we suggest Placer, Modoc, Trinity or Santa Barbara County.
These five counties are the Diebold customers who did not take part in the “we support Diebold” advertisement copied on back of the official flyer containing the agenda for the certification hearing. To refresh your memory, this relates to the letter you felt compelled to specifically disavow in your capacity as chair of the Nov. 21 certification hearing. Of course, it was inappropriate for certain county elections officials to piggyback an advertisement onto an official Secretary of State agenda, and you recognized this, disavowing the attempt to avoid the impression of impropriety.
Instead of having Diebold provide specially selected equipment from their own offices, we propose a more objective approach: The voting equipment shall be randomly selected by Black Box Voting from actual county elections offices that have shown the least bias.
We have full trust that your agency will see the wisdom of testing voting systems from an unbiased source. We are, of course, most interested in testing systems actually purchased and in use in California, rather than hypothetical or possible future systems, such as versions 1.96.6 and 4.6.4, which were initially proposed – systems that have never been certified in California. We are sure that you did not intend for Black Box Voting to take the place of the national testing labs or your consultant in testing new systems.
Therefore, consistent with our request under California Election Code §19202, let’s examine the firmware most meaningful to California voters: Optical scan version 1.96.4 and the TS/TSx system as used in Alameda County.
Jim March
Bev Harris
Black Box Voting, Inc. |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 162
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 10:29 am: |
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Nicely put. You may, in the future wish to (at least)appear to be giving them the benefit of the doubt by not saying "The proposed procedure contaminates the results.", and saying something along the lines of "Using these prodedures will leave the results integrity under suspicion.", it yeilds the same message while appearing more magnanimous. (Sneak up on them!) |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2805
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 1:39 pm: |
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Brant, thanks for the suggestions. You're probably right. By the way, here are California's (Diebold's) proposed procedures:
http://www.bbvdocs.org/records/proposedhurstidemo.pdf
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Proposal for special demonstration of alleged security vulnerabilities in the Diebold AccuVote-OS system claimed by Black Box Voting
In recent months, Black Box Voting has made many public allegations regarding security vulnerabilities of the Diebold AccuVote-OS (AV-OS) equipment. Several of these have centered around the AccuVote-OS system, in particular around the memory cards used to store the election definition and results. (blend w/
original)
In May 2005, election officials in the Leon County, Florida, provided Mr. Hari [sic] Hursti access to Diebold equipment in order to demonstrate potential vectors of attack on the AV-OS system. The exploits from Mr. Hursti’s testing were detailed in the document entitled Black Box Report: Critical Security Issues with Diebold Optical Scan Design, dated July 4, 2005.
It is recognized that the memory cards used by the voting system contain sensitive information.
As such they must be protected with the same care with which physical ballots must be, and are, protected. This protection is implemented through a combination of software and use procedures, and any examination of the system without considering both is necessarily inaccurate.
To alleviate potential concern with the Diebold AccuVote-OS (model D) firmware version 1.96.6, of which the vendor has applied for state certification, the Secretary of State’s office is proposing the demonstration and testing described below. The purpose of this test is to identify security vulnerabilities that may exist that are not effectively mitigated by proposed Use Procedures, to identify security vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated, if any; and to identify additional security measures that can be taken to enhance the security of the Diebold OS voting system. This test will be strictly limited in scope to the real-life conditions imposed on the operation of this system in the proposed California Uses Procedures for the proposed Diebold system.
Representatives will be asked to demonstrate how the Diebold OS system can be attacked and official vote results can be altered without detection via their proposed manipulation of OS memory card.
Proposed Testing Protocol
Pre-Test Equipment Verification
1. Diebold representatives will present a GEMS server and AccuVote-OS v. 1.96.6 equipment, configured in accordance with the system specifications currently pending California certification for use, and in accordance with the proposed Official Use Procedures submitted for certification of this system. The system will be configured for the standard test General election used for California certification testing.
2. After the GEMS server and the OS reader have generated zero reports, a standard logic and accuracy test deck will be processed through the AV-OS reader and the tabulated vote results will be printed out on the AV-OS. The vote results will then be uploaded to the GEMS server and vote results will be printed from GEMS. The vote reports from both GEMS and the AV-OS will be verified.
3. The election will be zeroed and reset on the GEMS server and the AV-OS card will be redownloaded.
Pre-Election Setup & Testing
4. Black Box Voting representatives will be asked to explain and demonstrate how their proposed attack on the system would be conducted undetected.
5. Black Box Voting representatives will then be provided with a freshly-downloaded memory card and allowed a maximum time of (time limit) to manipulate the data on the card, while under observation by Secretary of State and Diebold personnel.
6. The memory card will be sealed in the AV-OS unit using appropriate tamper-evident seals and Secretary of State personnel will set the unit for election.
7. A zero report will be printed from the AV-OS.
8. The standard logic and accuracy test deck will be run through the AV-OS once again. After “closing the polls”, a poll closing summary report will be printed from the AV-OS and compared to the results from the previous test.
9. Vote totals from the altered memory card will be uploaded to the GEMS server. Vote results reports will be printed from GEMS and compared to the report from the AV-OS, as well as the reports from step two, above.
Election & Post-Election
10. Integrity of the tamper-evident seals on the AV-OS unit will be verified.
11. A zero report will be printed from the AV-OS.
12. A set of ballots will be run through the AV-OS machine under supervision. After “closing the polls”, a poll closing summary report will be printed from the AV-OS unit and compared to the actual ballots that were cast.
13. Vote totals from the AV-OS unit will be uploaded to the GEMS server. Vote results reports will be printed from GEMS and compared to the report from the AV-OS.
Detection of tampering at any point by election officials during the test will be considered failure of the attack.
Proposed Test Conditions
1. Prior to the test, Black Box Voting will identify all the attacks they intend to demonstrate.
2. The tests will be private and held on the Secretary of State premises at a time mutually agreeable to Secretary of State and Diebold. The Secretary of State will provide security.
3. Black Box Voting will be limited to three participants at the test. Diebold will be limited to four participants at the test.
4. The test and its results will remain confidential for thirty days or until the Secretary of State publishes its report on the test, whichever event comes first. All participants in the test will sign a confidentiality agreement to that effect.
5. Secretary of State personnel will record the entire test on videotape. One camera will be positioned to record the overall test. A second camera will be used to provide close up recording of Black Box Voting’s actions to read and alter the memory card, as well as any anomalies that occur during the test.
Additionally, the Secretary of State may use still photography to document the test and any problems encountered. Black Box Voting may make no other recordings of the test.
6. Black Box Voting personnel may observe the operation of all Diebold equipment, but (with the exception of step 4 above) may not touch or operate the Diebold equipment during any of the testing. Violation of this provision will immediately terminate the test.
7. All test reports, as well as all recordings of the test will remain the physical property of the Secretary of State. Copies of the reports and the recordings will be provided free of charge to Black Box Voting upon publication of the Secretary of State’s official report of the test, or upon the thirtieth day following the test, whichever comes first. The altered memory card will remain the property of the Secretary of State as well.
8. Upon Secretary of State request, Black Box Voting will provide documentation of any programs or utilities used to alter the memory card for the test, as well documentation of the steps taken to alter the card.
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BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2806
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 1:50 pm: |
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To put this in context, the California Secretary of State did not originate the idea and suddenly decide to invite us to a test.
Black Box Voting formally issued a request for replication of the Hursti findings under California Election Code 19202.
Here is a link to our original request:
http://www.bbvdocs.org/records/19202requestdiebold.pdf
As you can see, this move by the California Secretary of State is nonresponsive to the original request.
---------------------------------------
6/16/05: Request to the California Secretary of State under Election Code 19202
EC19202 reads as follows:
Any person or corporation owning or being nterested in any voting ystem or part of a oting system may apply to the Secretary of State to examine it and report on its accuracy and efficiency to fulfill its purpose. The Secretary of State shall complete his or her examination without undue delay.
Black Box Voting, Inc., a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501c(3) consumer protection organization for elections, requests a formal examination under this statute of a specific Diebold Election Systems component: the programmed “electronic ballot box” memory cards used in optical scan and touch-screen voting systems.
As your office may be aware by now, Black Box Voting, Inc. was allowed to test the Leon County, Florida Diebold optical scan system (firmware 1.94w). During this testing, we proved that Diebold memory cards contain executable code, that the firmware in the optical scan places a “call” to the executable code on the memory card, and that the operation of the election system can be changed in various malicious ways without detection. We succeeded in loading altered code onto the optical scan via the memory card, which altered votes undetectably. We also succeeded in pre-stuffing the ballot box in a way that does not alter the overall number of votes, but flips a predetermined number of votes to another candidate.
We specifically request that the Secretary of State's office evaluate the following:
1.Whether or not executable code is present on these cards;
2.Whether or not the firmware of the touch- screen and/or the optical scan (either precinct count or central count) ever places a call to executable code on the memory card;
3.Under what specific conditions any executable code on the memory card is checked by the firmware for accuracy (via checksums, hashes, file size);
4.Whether or not it is possible to load manipulated code on the memory card so as to perform malicious functions such as vote shaving, vote “skimming,” vote changing, altered reports, altered audit log, pre-stuffing of the ballot box, over-writing results of other precincts, or any other substituted code;
5.Whether or not it is possible to override and invalidate the California certified version of the firmware or software by executing program “updates” via the memory card.
We make this request for:
1.The latest optical scan systems (firmware 1.96.4);
2.The paperless touch-screens as used in Alameda County on Nov. 2, 2004;
3.The new TSx system proposed for certification;
4.Any older optical scan models still in use in California.
Note that on touch-screen precinct terminals, the exact filenames involved on the memory card and the type of executable may be different than those on the optical scan systems. The call to the executable may be obscured in Dynamic Link Library (“.dll”) files. We have found references to this under the name “abc.” All files under the name “abc,” AboBasic,” “AccuBasic,” and “ABasic” should be examined to determine exactly where they are invoked in system designs for all Diebold voting equipment.
We also have evidence that altered code can be centrally loaded on ALL cards from GEMS by altering files at the C:\PROGRAM FILES\GEMS\ABASIC directory, propagating the “hack” either county-wide or to hand-selected precincts as a batch. We believe the altered code can be linked to a specific day, can be loaded months or even years prior to elections, and can be constructed so as not to appear during pre-election and post-election Logic and Accuracy tests.
Both of us have personally witnessed Diebold employees, other contractors, and even local volunteers handling Diebold memory cards, unsupervised by county officials.
We are convinced that a design which invokes executable code on a memory card is unsupportable in a certified software environment where security is of critical importance. This code is allegedly “certified,” but if a standard feature exists within the design allowing alteration of code on removable modules, long after certification and even during the middle of elections, the intent appears to be to provide a vote-tampering mechanism. This Diebold design clearly sacrifices security for “flexibility” – and in the election environment, that translates to “quick and easy tampering.”
We ask for a timely response on this matter. Regardless of what you find, we request that a formal report be issued to address these issues as soon as possible.
Jim March
Member of the Board of Directors
Black Box Voting, Inc.
Bev Harris
Executive Director
Black Box Voting, Inc. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2807
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 2:05 pm: |
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And now for a word about the importance of framing the issue:
What Diebold is attempting to do is re-frame the issue of using tamper-friendly software into a new one:
- If we make NEW systems which correct defects (which we have lied to elections officials about)
- If you test for the defects we believe we have corrected, and only those defects
- There is no problem (and we'll never admit the problems existed in the first place)
A more appropriate frame
- To create trust in the system, you must test the system actually being used. (The systems proposed in the testing protocol are not currently in use.)
- Regardless of whether defects were corrected in a new version, we need to know how and where the testing and approval system broke down.
If we don't know what went wrong we haven't solved the root problem.
- As Diebold's own release notes show, fixing one problem often breaks something else. Therefore, if you are testing an "improved" version you have to do a complete test, re-testing things that once worked properly to make sure they still work.
Analogy
Secretly fixing problems after you get caught is like returning a stolen car after making a few repairs for damage you caused.
Those aren't the ethics we want controlling our voting machines. |
John Gideon
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johngideon
Post Number: 182
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, November 25, 2005 - 9:40 am: |
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I understand from today's news that the state agrees with BBV regarding the machines to be used in the test and there will be a machine picked at random from one of the counties. Is this true.
I hope that everyone understands that we have as much to lose as does Diebold. If this test fails to prove a problem Diebold, and all of their customers, will be able to use that as proof that there are no problems with their voting machines.
I hope that BBV is ready, willing, and able to walk away from this if there is any feeling on their part that this is a set-up. It would be far better to do that than to give Diebold a PR coup.
My fingers will stay crossed until this test gets done. I will be thinking good thoughts for all of you.
Information Manager, VotersUnite.org
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BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2815
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, November 25, 2005 - 11:48 am: |
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John,
The reporter did not check his facts. We have heard nothing from the state of California in response to our letter; furthermore, as of Tuesday, they had not firmed anything up with Hursti, or BBV either. Hursti had not yet cleared his schedule because the details were not formalized. Had any of us heard back from the secretary of state Wednesday, when we expected to recieve a reply to our requests for clarification, it would be a lot more reasonable. As it stands now, it is almost impossibly inconsiderate to finalize details -- assumedly on Monday -- then expect someone who is running five businesses to suddenly hop on a plane for a 20-hour trip from Helsinki.
The secretary of state is behaving very oddly, if this reporter got his information from the sec. state. If Hursti had not yet confirmed (because he didn't have confirmation on protocols from sec. state), why is the sec. state reporting that he has?
If they have agreed to randomly select the machines, why have they not told us anything at all -- yes, no or maybe? It seems odd to issue press releases to the media without discussing anything with the parties who are supposed to be doing the test.
If you look at the protocol, you can see that they left things blank -- like "there will be a time limit" but they give no indication whether that is to be 30 seconds or two weeks. Obviously, that information needs to be provided before anyone can expect Hursti to jump on an airplane.
Bruce McDannold was not answering his phone or email on Wednesday; yesterday was Thanksgiving, nothing heard then; I'm working today, checking my email a lot, but haven't seen any response from California, nor has Jim.
I did notice they said the date was tentative. That indicates to me they may delay it. Under the circumstances, that would be appropriate.
It would be appropriate to get the details worked out (duh). It is clear that there is a slight problem with communication and coordination, and it is on the part of the secretary of state's office. We met the deadline they provided us with. Now they are silent -- any delay is caused by them.
Thanks for the kind words.
Bev
P.S. I will say that other details remain to be worked out as well.
Among the other details -- the way the protocol reads, the public won't be permitted to view, the media won't be permitted to attend, we can't bring our lawyer or a court reporter, we aren't allowed to keep a record of what happened, we can't take video or record anything, we can't photograph anything, we can't keep a copy of any of our own work done in preparation for the demonstration, and we won't be allowed to talk about it.
This opens the door for Diebold to spew forth more misrepresentations and lies to all the elections officials. Thank goodness we have the video of Leon County, and thank heavens we were allowed to retain our own work product. If Diebold was so blatant, even knowing we had proof, can you imagine how over the top their denials would be if we could not prove what happened?
This, and the specifics of access, supervision and timing will need to be pinned down to something that at least approximates appropriate protocol. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1215
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, November 25, 2005 - 11:01 pm: |
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Something else that concerned me was that Diebold was requiring that BBV reveal to them in advance all the exploits that would be attempted.
I can hardly imagine a less appropriate set of procedures than what Diebold/SoS proposed to BBV.
The whole thing looks like a PR gimmick--especially with someone rushing to publush a news story before anything was agreed. A story like that spreads misinformation like crazy--and it appears deliberate to me. I find it hard to imagine a reporter would write a story based on such inaccurate information without a lot of active encouragement from somewhere. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2820
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 6:22 am: |
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Yes. But you see, California had no choice but to do something. The section 19202 request that Jim and I filed in June 2005 requires that they must perform the tests -- SHALL, the law says. It is not discretionary.
They ignored us for five months, but then we started visiting the secretary of state's office -- Jim visited on Nov. 5 to inquire about the status of our section 19202 request. Jim and I both visited on Nov. 9 to ask again.
This invitation to test the machines appears to be an attempt to conform with the 19202 law (although it doesn't, really) and spin it off as something else. Instead of referring to the test as compliance with a formal request to replicate the Harri Hursti study -- no good way to spin that, is there? -- they decided to spin the test as an especially diligent procedure for certifying the TSx package.
You can see from the letter from the sec. state above that the invitation is clearly addressed to Black Box Voting. Yet, according to John Wildermuth of the San Francisco Chronicle, whom I spoke with yesterday, the SoS told him their invitation was to Harri Hursti, not Black Box Voting. Curious, since Harri told me he heard about it through a third party, and we've seen no evidence that such an invitation was ever extended to Hursti.
The Associated Press reported that California says they have "hired" Hursti to do the test, which is certainly not true. Hursti is an entirely free spirit who did not put himself up for sale to the state of California.
I recommended to the Chronicle reporter that he get back to the S.o.S. office with their letter to Black Box Voting in hand and some follow up questions, including questions about their odd and nonresponsive approach to the 19202 request, which I also forwarded to him. FYI, Wildermuth is a senior political reporter for the publication which spearheaded the Kevin Shelley smears. One must be realistic about the lay of the terrain here.
That being said, the test will proceed, once appropriate details on the protocol have been agreed upon.
While it may not happen on Nov. 30, I have confidence that a meaningful examination will take place in December.
Note that the sec. state is now waffling on the Nov. 30 date -- although the sec. state's office had time to talk on the phone with the San Francisco Chronicle Wednesday, they seem not to have had the time to confirm the details for the Nov. 30 test with any of the participants.
The expected delay of the Nov. 30 date is on the part of the secretary of state, not Black Box Voting. The S.o.S. apparently told reporters that it might be delayed because they still hadn't "lined up a room" or a place to do the test. To that, one can only say "huh?"
We know Diebold was very involved in this, because when Jim and I last visited, Bruce McDannold said, in response to our question about when the 19202 exam would take place, and I quote, "We've been working with Diebold on that."
When the test protocols look like a turkey shoot, one must take a close look at the aim.
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John Gideon
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johngideon
Post Number: 184
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 10:18 am: |
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I am being told that someone (my source) from the state has talked to Harri. Harri is just getting over a dose of the flu and an eye problem (infection). There have been no formal decisions made on whose machines would be tested or any of the rest of the parameters of the test. There will probably be no test, if it happens at all, for another 3 to 4 weeks.
Information Manager, VotersUnite.org
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BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2830
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 1:58 pm: |
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I just received word from Harri. As of Friday, he had not been invited by Calif. As of Friday, he had not received protocols or entered into any negotiations.
The invitation was to Black Box Voting and a representative we select -- obviously Harri would be the ideal choice, but (speaking of protocol) -- the California Sec. State told the media (but not BBV and not Hursti) that he would be conducting the test.
Seeing his name plastered all over the Associated Press Friday spurred Harri to make some phone calls to California.
Harri then notified BBV and submitted some rough sketch parameters for the testing, which correspond perfectly with those we had sketched out in meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday.
Harri and BBV will have a short conversation tomorrow, and then we'll limit the number of cooks in the kitchen to Hursti and Jefferson -- Hursti being our choice to negotiate the terms, and Jefferson (reportedly, according to what has now been told by the S.o.S to the press, the individual chosen to handle negotiation on the protocols for California.
I believe the test will take place in December, as long and reasonable testing protocols can be agreed upon, and Black Box Voting will be a party to this testing.
Calif. got this thing off to a very shaky start. Given this track record, one of our negotiating points will certainly be that this must be opened up to the public.
Bev |
Edward Robles
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Tedeger
Post Number: 2
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, November 27, 2005 - 8:28 am: |
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Sent this to three local papers today - thought you might be interested
One of the scariest headlines in a long time appeared in a recent edition of a local paper. “New Voting Machines coming soon.”
Two adages apply; the first, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” is quite logical. The existing machines have served yeoman duty for years; yes, they are possibly getting “Long in the Tooth,” and you can’t correct a mistake, but no-one, to my knowledge, has inveighed against their accuracy, which, to anyone who has been following the 2002 & 2004 voting-machine related scandals, is a point in their favor. The second, “Eternal vigilance is the price of Liberty,” is even more important. The “Help America Vote Act” (HAVA) was simply an open invitation to certain firms to steal, and they took advantage of it in a big way. There is no point in beating on the issue; almost everyone knows, and the rest suspect, that disgraceful vote theft through hacking or outright manipulation, even to changing the totals AFTER they had been cast, not only occurred but was rampant. As Josef Stalin said, “Who casts the votes is unimportant; the important thing is, ‘who counts the votes!’”
The statement “Touch-screen voting machines (are) reliable” is at least questionable. As a case in point, a person we know in Georgia, voting in the 2004 election, “Touched” one candidate, and the screen “Showed” that she had voted for someone else. She erased the error, and tried again. THREE TIMES! Not being one to allow her vote to be stolen, she charged out of the booth and demanded that the (censored) machine be repaired or removed. The officials tried to “Hush” her, but she would not be “Hushed.” They finally let her vote on another machine, which duly showed what she wanted (whether it actually recorded the vote that way or not, is unknown), and “Promised” to take the “Malfunctioning” machine off line. Any bets?
The important thing is not only the “Paper Trail,” although that is absolutely essential; the important thing is OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE! The manufacturers of these machines claim “Confidentiality” and :Trade Secrets,” when in fact without open source software the opportunity for outright theft is irresistible.
NO State which allows casino gambling allows proprietary, unexaminable software in computerized slot machines; SURELY our vote, our most precious possession, is at least as important as protection against dishonest gaming devices! The FACT that certain manufacturers of touch screen machines refuse to open their software proves beyond doubt the INTENT to defraud the electorate.
Also, State after State has decertified certain “Touch-screen machines” because of INACCURACY! This fact gives the lie to the idea that the machines are infallible.
To get an overview of what is going on, and has gone on, visit http://www.blackboxvoting.org ; if you are not incensed by the proven shenanigans of some of the manufacturers, you should be. It is a total disgrace that our elections can be blatantly stolen, and nothing can be done against the thieves. This is not a matter of political parties; ANY reasonably intelligent computer whiz kid can alter the vote to suit himself. A young programmer I know told me that if he could have just a few minutes alone with a machine – or even a telephone, in some cases, he could “Elect” Mickey Mouse to any Office in the land!
Bottom line. Touch Screens WITH paper trails MAY be Okay - but until the software is opened, the makers will be suspect. AND – there MUST be some sort of Hacker protection at least as good as that which the Military uses; as of now, there is none.
If your vote means anything to you, DEMAND of the “Certifiers” that Software be open and examinable, The vote you save may be yours. |
Edward Robles
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Tedeger
Post Number: 7
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 5:37 am: |
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Oh - and speaking of California: is it true that the Governator himself was almost denied the right to vote on his own propositions by a DRE machine? If so, one of the predictable enemies of accuracy may be hot to trot to get the mess cleaned up! |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1222
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 6:26 am: |
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It's great that you're taking the initiative to send info to your local papers. Keep us posted here how things develop. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2839
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 8:23 am: |
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Hi, Edward --
Well, the elections registrars have the most inside access, and some of the Calif. registrars are about as secretive, obstructive, and belligerent as it gets.
The elections registrars hated the fact that Arnold wanted to do this special elections, and they never want it done again. And it certainly did flop, didn't it? It would be interesting to look at the results county by county, with the personality of the registrars in mind alongside the demographics of the voters.
In California, the elections registrars, led by Los Angeles's Conny Drake McCormack, have control over many things they should not -- including, apparently, some politicians.
We have received reports from numerous highly credible sources that the governor has had a policy not to talk to the secretary of state about voting machines unless Conny Drake McCormack is on the line.
We received a report that Conny Drake McCormack was also inappropriately involved in certain aspects of the current invitation-only national "best practices" summit in California, which is possibly the biggest collection of election crooks and bad actors (sprinkled with a few good guys) to take place in months. |
Voice of Reason
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Voiceofreason
Post Number: 4
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 11:55 am: |
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You don't know any of these people, nor have you every actually worked side-by-side with any of them. Try working an election before you profess to protect MY vote. I have worked my local polling place for years and nothing but the highest respoect for my county election official.
Also, a DRE does not GRAT nor DENY someone the ability to vote. Nutty Cal Voter spokewoman said the DRE told Arnold he had already voted, when in fact, DRE's contain NO VOTER INFORMATION! It was the paper roster that said he had already voted. |
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 1977
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 12:15 pm: |
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Voice of Reason? What an inappropriate screen name.
Perhaps something like this better suits you.
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Boredtodeath Donating Member (1000+ posts) Click to send private message to this author Click to view this author's profile Click to add this author to your buddy list Click to add this author to your Ignore list Wed Nov-23-05 08:05 AM
Response to Original message
6. Put up or shut up time for Bev Harris
This should be interesting.
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Sounds a lot like you. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1235
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 2:23 pm: |
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VoiceofReason: "You don't know any of these people, nor have you every actually worked side-by-side with any of them. Try working an election before you profess to protect MY vote. I have worked my local polling place for years and nothing but the highest respoect for my county election official."
What makes you assume no one at BBV knows "any of these people"???
What makes you assume that no one at BBV has worked at polling places?
Surely there are many wonderful election officials. BBV mentions many examples of this. If you read the wide range of posts here you would realize this. (And you'd also realize there are some that leave a lot to be desired.)
Tells us who your county election official is so they can get a well-deserved round of applause. Good officials deserve to be recognized and appreciated. |
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 1982
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 5:37 pm: |
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California Elections Code Section 19205
19205. The Secretary of State shall establish the specifications for and the regulations governing voting machines, voting devices, vote tabulating devices, and any software used for each, including
the programs and procedures for vote tabulating and testing. The criteria for establishing the specifications and regulations shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) The machine or device and its software shall be suitable for the purpose for which it is intended.
(b) The system shall preserve the secrecy of the ballot.
(c) The system shall be safe from fraud or manipulation.
It would seem that the burden of proof lies with the State.
Dear Bruce,
Please legally prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Diebold machines in use in the State of California meet sub section 'C' of section 19205 of the California Elections Code.
Thanks,
PAV ;-)
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/votemeth/systems/syssearch1.asp
Leon County Voting System Information
Vendor: Diebold
System Title: Global AccuVote ES 2001 B (blended)
Precinct Tabulation Method: AccuVote OS
Precinct Voting Method: MarkSense
Absentee Tabulation Method: AccuVote 0S
System Certification Information:
Number: 0110Global-02
Date: 10/13/01
Information: GEMS AccuVote Election System 2001B (blended) GEMS Software, Release 1-17-17;, one or more Accu-Vote ES 2000 Firmware Version 1.94-w and VLR firmware 13.9. SYSTEM OPTIONS: The system may be optionally configured with one or more Accu-Feed Units, Revisions D or E.
Status: hAcK3d bY hArR1 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/certified_vs.pdf
VOTING SYSTEMS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN CALIFORNIA
As of August 3, 2005
Diebold Elections Systems, Inc.
4720 Brand Way
Sacramento, CA 95819
AccuVote-OS (previously known as AccuVote 2000)
GEMS V. 1.18.18 (certified 11/20/03)
GEMS V. 1.18.19; Firmware 1.94w and 1.96.4 (certified 8/18/04)
GEMS V. 1.18.19; Firmware 2.0.12 (certified 9/28/04)
AccuVote-HS V. 1.0 |
Michelle Smith
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Galfromcal
Post Number: 8
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 5:46 pm: |
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Pat,
Can you help me understand these systems listed as "Voting Systems Crtified for use in California"?
If there is falure of these systems.
Now, you need to note I am not too savy on the "tech" side of things.
Could you explain how these systems are okay to use?
Thanks!
The people who cast the votes decide nothing.The people who count the votes decide everything-Stalin
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Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 1983
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, November 28, 2005 - 6:16 pm: |
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Sure Michelle, in a word, they're NOT OK to use. Period. At least in my humble opinion.
I posted the list of Diebold equipment that has been 'certified for use' in the state to highlight the hardware (AccuVote-OS) and firmware (1.94w)that is known to be exploitable as per the test done in Leon County, Florida.
The GEMS software version is different, however, the notes in the source code that show what changes have been made in each subsequent release will prove that no changes have been made to address the attack vectors exposed by Harri Hursti and Dr. Herb Thompson.
They now know (or should know) that the system may be at great risk of being exploited and under the state election code it should be de-certified until they can prove that it meets the provisions of 19205 (c).
That's my story and I'm sticking to it!
PAV ;-) |
Craig Lister
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Voiceofreason
Post Number: 9
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 9:35 am: |
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I have met and spoken with many of you. Of those I have met I only know 1 person who actually worked an election in a pollin place. Please correct me if I am wrong and tell me where you have worked and for which county. |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 276
Registered: 04-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 9:42 am: |
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John Washburn. Washington County, Wisconsin. Went through all the poll worker training. But was was not called to serve as Germantown had enough volunteers and I had the lowest senority under WI 7.30 rules.
Is that close enough? How about this: My mother has been the town clerk for 4 years. My mother and father in-law have both worked the polls in Appleton, WI for the past 5 years.
I am very familiar with Wisconsin election procedures.
John Washburn
Only bad software is delayed by good testing.
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Craig Lister
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Voiceofreason
Post Number: 11
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 9:45 am: |
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So John, what is your take on the elction officials in your town? Do you trust them? If not, why are you not working hard ot get them replaced. Everyone on here seems to agree that inside security is the biggest threat, so where is the focus? |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1251
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 10:21 am: |
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Insider threats can come from many directions, not just election officials. For example, vendors and their subconstractors are typically allowed lots of access to machines, even on election day. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1252
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 10:30 am: |
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And pollworkers are another potential insider threat, as someone pointed out on a different thread. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2853
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 10:35 am: |
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Craig,
It might interest you to know that an elections worker in John Washburn's town was indicted for election fraud after the 2004 election, so maybe asking him to "trust" all his election officials is not going to be fruitful.
Also, our election system has not, in the past, required citizens to "trust" officials only. We have, in the past, been able to observe and verify.
A short Lexis-Nexis search with the words "indicted" and "election" will yield a shocking number of elections officials who were indicted, sometimes took plea bargains, often went to jail on election fraud and voting machine fraud charges. That, combined with the criminal histories of the programmers, stockholders, ballot printers of Diebold really should rule out the argument that elections should be based on trust.
Elections should be based on public oversight, proper checks and balances, and full transparency. Nowhere do you see the concept of basing an election on "trust."
Bev Harris |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 281
Registered: 04-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 5:10 pm: |
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RE:So John, what is your take on the elction officials in your town? Do you trust them? If not, why are you not working hard ot get them replaced. Everyone on here seems to agree that inside security is the biggest threat, so where is the focus?
Depends on the municipality. Appleton, Wisconsin's 5th largest city, only had 4 felons vote; No other voting irregularities noted. Madison, Racine, and Kenosha (#2, 3, and 4) all violated WI election law as codified in chapter 7 of WI state statutes; Specifically all stuffed the optical scanners, all allowed for fraudulent voter registration; all had at least 10% of the reporting precinct fail to conduct a legal local board canvass as laid out in WI 7.51.
Milwaukee (most populous city and 1/10 votes cast in whole state are cast in the city of Milwaukee) was a force unto itself. There are no less than 20 distinct forms of voter and election fraud documented to date. The most Eggregious is the stuffing of 4600 extra ballots into the optical scanners. The ballot box stuffing was confined primarily to 10 wards of the 312. In ward 260 of the 473 ballots cast into the optical scanner 200 were from ballots not handed to an elector. This is a ballot box stuffed by 42% by an election official.
In my hometown (Germantown WI) the election officials in 2 elections (Nov. 2, 2004 and April 5, 2005) failed to hand count the ballots as required by WI 7.51(2)(f) since the machine FALSELY claimed more ballots were scanned than were actually scanned. Thus, the presumption of correctness under 7.51(2)(h) is fatally pierced.
If you would like to see an enumeration of the results of "trusted" officials on optical scanning equipment see: List O' Problems
My trust of local election officials is thin to say the least. My trust in security via people, policy, and procedure is non-existant.
As to replacement that would require the local District Attorney, "Let 'em go" Mike McCann to proscecute. This is unlikely. In November 2000 he had election bribery on video tape which was broadcast on 2 local television stations. He did not prosecute. The nickname "Let 'em Go" Mike is well-earned.
I currently have 2 complaints before the state elections board from March and February of this year seeking just such relief (replacement/firing or election officials). Bothe are still pending. In fairness to the SEB the authority at the state level to remove local election officials is weak.
(Message edited by johnwashburn on December 04, 2005)
John Washburn
Only bad software is delayed by good testing.
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Jose Ivey
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Urbanvoyeur
Post Number: 57
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, December 7, 2005 - 10:56 am: |
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Could you elevate these to the Feds?
Isn't election tampering a federal crime? |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 284
Registered: 04-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 9, 2005 - 8:23 am: |
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Only in a federal election. An only under the 1965 Voting rights act. Remember the phrase "Times and Manner of Elections" from the Constitution?
But, yes it has been elevated to the feds by the local federal prosecutor who is bucking for a bigger job. Biskupic has convicted 3 city alderman, 1 state senator, 2 attorneys and some private citizens on various corruption charges. the land fraud he uncovered and documented to the local DA with the county board chairman is beyond the federal statute of limits.
The FBI/milwuakee PD task force is still investigating as we speak.
John Washburn
Only bad software is delayed by good testing.
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