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| (NJ) 2/10 - JUDGE RULES (MAYBE) FOR P... |
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Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 10990
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 3 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 12:42 pm: | 
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New Jersey has a tentative ruling that MIGHT result in a paper trail, as described below. But the ruling, and the news article about it, contain many inaccuracies so clarification is in order before celebration.
First, instead of ruling on the public right to have elections that are actually public (ie, processes enabling the public to see and authenticate every essential step of the election), the judge issued a ruling that demands the impossible: Before requiring a voter verified paper trail she asks for a finding as to whether the machines are secure. Of course they are not, since you cannot secure a computer against its own administrator, programmer or custodian. It will never be possible to judge a vote-counting computer to be secure, whether it has a paper trail or not. Someone always has custody of it. Someone always programs it.
The judge continues riffing off the security concept, ruling that machines be disconnected from the Internet. Yikes, that they ever were connected, but bear in mind, this focuses attention on outside hackers while insiders control concealed counting of the vote.
In fact, this decision is a bit of a stunner for pointing out existing procedures:
- "Unlike the panel that currently evaluates voting machines, the new panel must have requisite knowledge of computers and computer security"
- "all voting machines and vote tally transmitting systems be disconnected from the Internet immediately"
- There are currently no criminal background checks for those with inside access to voting machines.
- The ruling says they will "no longer leave voting machines unattended in polling places...currently they are left attended for up to two weeks before and up to two weeks after elections."
The Judge purports to require a new protocol that will ensure that the machines haven't been tampered with. Such a thing is not even theoretically possible when you acknowledge that insiders can circumvent their own protocols.
The saddest comment of all is from Professor Venetis, who spreads this false premise: "A voter-verified paper ballot system would detect tampering, and would obviate the very extensive security measures that the Court ordered."
No voter-verified paper ballot system detects tampering or obviates security measures. It is important to have a voter-verified paper ballot, so that measures can be put in place to reinstate public elections by allowing the public to see and authenticate the count. But just having a paper trail does nothing whatever to make it public, nor does it do anything to require that humans ever lay eyes on it at all.
The real issue is not security (from whom???) which cannot be achieved anyway. The real issue is only partially the "voter-verified paper trail", because though necessary, that does not restore public elections. The real issue, for which a voter-verified paper ballot is a necessary first step, is to reinstate the ability of the public to see and authenticate any essential step of the election -- and that is a necessary part of freedom itself.
It is the public part of "public elections" that makes a system democratic. After all, they have elections in totalitarian countries. Having elections doesn't produce a democracy; having truly public elections is the litmus test which differentiates a real democratic system from a false one.
The ruling provides a glimmer of hope for a first step towards reinstatement of democratic elections. Unfortunately, just as New Jersey might giveth a small part towards making public authentication of the count at least possible, it taketh away by adding concealment of who actually casts the vote. Despite seeing insiders in two NJ counties indicted for inside absentee tampering in June 2009, New Jersey expanded absentee voting by offering no-fault absentee and permanent absentee options, both of which make it impossible to know who actually cast those votes.
NewJerseyNewsroom.com - Feb. 1, 2010, by ANDY LAGOMARSINO
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/judges-ruling-could-cause-new-jersey-to-s crap-11000-voting-machines
Judge’s ruling could cause New Jersey to scrap 11,000 voting machines
Argument for a voter-verified paper ballot system supported when expert witness took just 10 seconds to steal votes
A ruling was issued Monday in a lawsuit challenging computerized voting machines that do not produce a paper record. Mercer County Superior Court Judge Linda Feinberg held that New Jersey's 11,000 voting machines have to be re-evaluated by a qualified panel of experts within 120 days to determine whether they comply with NJ law requiring that they be accurate and reliable. Unlike the panel that currently evaluates voting machines, the new panel must have requisite knowledge of computers and computer security.
Judge Feinberg also ordered that all voting machines and vote tally transmitting systems be disconnected from the Internet immediately. Judge Feinberg also required that criminal background checks be performed on personnel who work with voting machines and all third-party vendors who examine or transport the machines. Currently, no such checks are in place. Judge Feinberg further required that a protocol be put in place for inspecting the voting machines to ensure that they have not been tampered with.
Judge Feinberg found that the State of New Jersey should no longer leave voting machines unattended in polling places, to prevent tampering. Currently they are left unattended at polling places for up to two weeks before and up to two weeks after each election.
The lawsuit was started in 2004 by Rutgers Clinical Professor Penny Venetis, co-director of the Constitutional Litigation Clinic, who filed suit on behalf of a group of voting rights advocates led by the Princeton-based Coalition for Peace Action. Evidence was presented during the 15-week trial, held between January and June 2009, showing that the voting machines were not properly examined and that they were insecure.
Although the Court did not de-commission the machines, as Plaintiffs requested, the panel of qualified experts Judge Feinberg ordered to re-evaluate the voting machines can recommend that they be de-commissioned. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Princeton Computer Science Department Chair Professor Andrew Appel, who evaluated the machines, created a fraudulent chip that stole votes and installed that chip in less than 10 seconds. The voting machines could not detect the fraudulent chip. The Plaintiffs fully expect that the panel of experts convened to evaluate the voting machines will study Professor Appel's report and consult with him.
The trail was the culmination of a 5 and a half year effort by the principal plaintiffs, represented by Professor Venetis and the law firm of Patton Boggs LLP, to improve election security in New Jersey. Venetis is pleased with the ruling, but disappointed that the Court did not go far enough. "We proved at trial that the voting machines we use cannot be trusted, and must be evaluated by knowledgeable computer security experts. It is unfortunate that the Court did not believe it was her place to order the State to immediately enforce the 2005 state statute requiring that all voting machines produce a voter-verified paper ballot. A voter-verified paper ballot system would detect tampering, and would obviate the very extensive security measures that the Court ordered."
Although happy with the new security requirements, Plaintiff Stephanie Harris believes that "until a voter-verified paper ballot system is in place, I cannot fully trust that NJ's Sequoia voting machines are counting my vote properly."
The Plaintiffs in the case are: The Coalition for Peace Action; Stephanie Harris, who attempted to vote on a Sequoia Advantage voting machine in 2004, but received no indication that her vote was recorded after multiple attempts; Assemblyman Reed Gusciora; and New Jersey Peace Action. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 5636
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 1:12 pm: |
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quote:The real issue is only partially the "voter-verified paper trail", because though necessary, that does not restore of public elections.
Missing a word after restore? |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 10994
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 1:19 pm: |
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U.S. Rep Rush Holt (D-NJ) statement on the New Jersey decision:
The Holt statement, below, starts out auspiciously. "There is simply no such thing as a voting system that is impossible to manipulate," he states. Correct. But then he goes off track.
"...the court and the citizenry should want the possibility of audits capable of detecting and mistakes or misbehavior," he says. Here's the problem: After-the-fact spot checks (they are not in any way audits and the use of that term is misleading) will not reliably detect misbehavior, and the spot-checks in Holt's bill are a straight-up joke. First, they announce which locations they want to spot-check, giving insiders with custody of the ballots time to create a matching set in the tiny number of selected precincts; next, they omit any mention whatsoever of securing chain of custody, and it all becomes ludicrous when they require no accounting for or examination of the blank ballots.
In essence, the Holt Bill will require a cumbersome and expensive process, run by cronies selected by state election officials, mislabled an audit, whereby some friends of insiders will hand count ballots without any way of knowing they are the original ballots. They'll be counting a tiny sample of something without knowing the origin of the items they count.
Some tell me this is a first step, to which I reply it is a misstep because (1) it calls a defective spot check procedure an "audit", creating false confidence, and (2) Holt represents that these audits will ensure a correct count. At one point, on videotape, Holt has said that it doesn't matter what the vote counting software does, because of his audits.
In this press release, Holt says he has "introduced legislation in Congress to create a national standard of voting to help ensure that every vote is recorded and counted as intended." The problem is, his legislation is simply an extension of an exceptionally dangerous piece of legislation, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), and his legislation not only does not achieve what he says it does, but adds additional items that increase centralization of control.
Instead of focusing on how to enhance the HAVA requirements, we need to take a hard look at why HAVA is even allowed to stand. That horrible bill exploits the disabled to create a misused concept of equality that is very like "everyone must walk with a cane because some people walk with canes", and "everyone must wear eyeglasses because some people wear eyeglasses". No civil right exists for everyone to use assistive devices because some people use assistive devices.
This exploitation of and misuse of the concept of equality for the disabled was used to remove public elections from America, forcing the counting of the vote into concealment and creating a crucial obstruction of the public right to see and authenticate the count, essentially, removing our democratic system and replacing it with pseudo-democracy and concealed election processes controlled by insiders.
Germany, it should be noted, ruled that its equivalent of HAVA is unconstitutional and blew their own HAVA-like monster to smithereens. Instead of glorifying HAVA by extending and enhancing it, as Holt's bill does, we need to say what we want: Public elections, as evidenced by the public being able to see and authenticate every essential step without need for special expertise.
This is a human rights issue, not a security issue.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 1, 2010
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nj12_holt/febvoting.html
HOLT STATEMENT ON NJ COURT DECISION ON PAPER BALLOTS
(West Windsor, NJ) – Rep. Rush Holt (NJ-12) today responded to the New Jersey Superior Court decision, which failed to require the expeditious deployment of paper ballots voting systems in New Jersey. The ruling found that “[s]ecurity vulnerabilities are present, to some degree, in every voting system. There is simply no such thing as a voting system that is impossible to manipulate.” Yet, the ruling allows for the continued use of New Jersey’s unauditable touch screen voting machines.
“If, as the court acknowledges, security vulnerabilities exist, then the court and the citizenry should want the possibility of audits capable of detecting and mistakes or misbehavior,” Holt said.
Holt has introduced legislation in Congress to create a national standard of voting to help ensure that every vote is recorded and counted as intended. The bill would require paper ballot voting systems accompanied by accessible ballot marking devices and require routine random audits of electronic voting tallies.
“The fundamental purpose of the lawsuit has been to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the vote tallies by requiring the use of paper ballots as the basis of those tallies,” Holt said. “Until New Jersey implements a paper ballot voting system, we will have faith-based voting,” Holt said.
Although the ruling requires New Jersey’s 11,000 voting machines to be re-evaluated by a panel of experts within 120 days to determine whether they are accurate and reliable, requires increased security measures, and prohibits connecting computers that are used for election duties from being connected to the Internet, the results they produce cannot be independently audited. |
Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 10995
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 1:22 pm: |
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Woops, Catherine, thanks for catching that. Deleted the extraneous word "of" |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 5638
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 4:40 pm: |
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Bev,
Your observations and warnings about Holt's statement are brilliant in their reasoning and clarity of expression. They deserve to be noted wide and far.
The time is ripe to press our legislators to get rid of HAVA--not try to "improve" it.
As you put it, "This is a human rights issue, not a security issue." |
Phillip Caine
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Phillip_caine
Post Number: 65
Registered: 3-2008
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 5:44 pm: |
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Holt's problem is he's attacking the problem from the point of view of assuming an electronic vote tabulation device doesn't have a broken chain of custody beginning at the chips manufacturing plants (plural) the moment the doping process is finished.
That's why ALL Holt's bills will be bad.
The proper way to solve this problem is to
outlaw electronic vote tabulation devices and electronic poll - voter registration books (both have the same doping/hidden malicious logic flaw) All such devices would have to be destroyed by the destructive reverse-engineering process.
(in other words a real audit, which still might not prove anything)
Feel like buying new machines each election? Machines that have to be destroyed to be trusted?
Such flawed thinking not only allows for problems but wastes financial resources trying to audit devices which can not be audited in the first place.
He admits it's FAITH BASED VOTING.
If you have paper ballots and you use humans 24/7 to maintain the chain of custody, then you now have an unbroken chain of custody and no need for an audit.
In this light Holt looks more like a corrupt official who is simply supporting bills written by felons and other corrupt officials. |
Brian Cady
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Briancady413
Post Number: 2
Registered: 6-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, February 4, 2010 - 9:28 am: |
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Isn't it possible to give a 'Friend of the Court' brief to the Judge? Has this been already done here? |
V. Kurt Bellman
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Formerelecdir
Post Number: 3422
Registered: 4-2006
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 5, 2010 - 6:15 am: |
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Actually Brian, the court case is essentially over. It has been punted back to localities for implementation.
The machines have been adjudicated to be, after some new safeguards are put in place, legally "safe and secure". Now factually? You mileage may vary, and won't matter much.
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"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." - Carl Sagan
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Dale McClain
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dale
Post Number: 124
Registered: 10-2008
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, February 5, 2010 - 1:12 pm: |
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Quote:
The machines have been adjudicated to be, after some new safeguards are put in place, legally "safe and secure". Now factually? You mileage may vary, and won't matter much.
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This sounds like the machines have been on trial
and found not guilty…… Case closed!
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I disagree with this line of reasoning.
Put the shoe on the other foot :
If an individual voter is put on trial for
some infraction of the election laws you
may rest assured he or she will do Jail time.
Dale McClain |
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