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| iVotronic - PEB - why the extra proce... |
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John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 179
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 3 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 8:04 pm: | 
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Grab a cup of your favorite beverage - this one's going to take a bit of thought.
The ES&S iVotronic apparently started it's life as the Votronic from a company called Election Products Inc.(EPI) Reading between the lines, the systems are so similar that the great State of New Jersey though that the iVotronic didn't need certification, but that's another story.
Off to the US Patent office we now go, to have a look at the drawings for EPI's creation, and we find patent number 05583329 which pretty much spells everything out. Now, in the case of Diebold, we already know that their little memory card contains executable code, and we know that no-one's very pleased with THAT. So let's take a look at what ES&S calls their Personal Electronic Ballot or PEB. It's shown in the EPI Patent document as being figure three. Figure three shows each component uniquely numbered - which is important.
The PEB contains memory, a battery, a signal isolator and whoa, a processor? Yes, a processor! According to the patent document, it's the processor in the PEB that updates the
display as the voter makes their selections.
"Processor 31 updates display 25 accordingly as the voter makes selections. When the selections are finalized and the ballot is cast, the processor updates a running tally of ballots cast stored in memory 22 in a random fashion for assuring voter confidentiality."
It's processor 31 and memory 22 that are IN the PEB.
Now, we've been getting upset lately about the executable code stored IN and executed FROM the Diebold memory cards. Should we be similarly concerned about the executable code stored IN and executed and processed BY the ES&S memory cards(PEBs)?
Has THAT code ever been subject to examinaton or certification?
Is the code firmware that is burned into a one-time-programmable processor, or does it get read from the PEB memory at some time?
Why is the running tally stored in the PEB?
When is THAT running tally read, or is it?
Some questions for y'all!!
HG |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1371
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 2:47 am: |
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And if the ballots are stored in a random fashion on the PEB, does that mean the ballots stored on the iVotronic itself are not stored in a random fashion?
This is nowhere as important as what you've pointed out, John, about the PEB having its own processor.
It sure raises lots of questions about what is on the iVotronic compared to what is on the PEB.
Is the PEB used to transfer the iVotronic votes to a central counting computer, or is that done by a different removable media? (or by a networking connection that may or may not exist?)
(Message edited by catherine_a on December 28, 2005) |
Jose Ivey
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Urbanvoyeur
Post Number: 105
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 3:42 pm: |
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Any additional specs on the processor or circuitry? Chip id?
Any idea how they plan to validate whats on this ballot - that what is on the ballot is what you selected which is what is centrally tallied.
Who has access to these cards during the election preparation?
How do they know an PEB iBallot is cleared?
Once again, I am left wondering how much of this error is the naivety of the designers vs intentional hack spots left in by companies who hope no one will notice.
(Message edited by UrbanVoyeur on December 29, 2005) |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3033
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 6:46 pm: |
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(From Bev Harris): I'm sure this is less than fascinating, but here are some rapidly compiled somewhat random notes from an ES&S source that Kathleen and I have worked with. (Kathleen's source, my notes)
- One vendor they use is called Microchip Technologies
- One of the components is the NTE2014 Integrated Circuit 7-Channel Darlington Array/Driver, For 6V to 15V CMOS/PMOS, 16 lead DIP
- The iVotronic products use tadiran batteries
- The PEB battery is purchased direct from the mfr.
- They used to use a votronic Sharp LCD Display but it is now obsolete.
- There was some situation where they wanted to remove the touch-screens. These were stuck to the unit with a gummy adhesive that made them hard to dislodge. One of their engineers came up with some sort of machine to remove the touch-screens from the computers.
- They have tried different touch-screens with varying results. Among the screens they tried was a Bergquest (not sure I'm spelling that right) touch screen but they quit using it because they decided it wasn't any better than the others they'd used.
- They do cannibalize parts from older machines that they can't use any more. They just yank out the parts and keep them in bins and then use them again.
- They have been working on developing a way to convert one of their machines (something called the 2100?) from a punched hole reader to an optical scan reader
- They somehow disposed of or recycled or resold the machines that Venezuela rejected
- There was a bit of a thing with their chief finance guy where he told everyone they were ordered to stop writing off obsolete inventory. He was adamant about this. No questions, no argument, just do it his way and that's that.
Here's an example of an ES&S packing list:
For the state level: 1 server and 3 workstations - Unity with iVIM
For the county level: 2 work stations - Unity with iVim
1 HUB
1 Okidata 9300 DX
4 Flash Card burners
2 Omni drives
10 PCMCIA cards
5 non ADA Ivos
3 ADA ivos
2 Supervisor terminals
1 PEB reader
3 headphones
15 Compact flash cards
2 M100s
2 ballot box (without diverter)
10 power supplies and power cords
3 null modem cabls
1 M650 and table and printer (w. all normal supplies needed for 650)
3 speakers
2 PC modems
2 Switch boxes
2 Monitors
also:
2 compaks
20 PEBs
for demo - phone line simulator
Software: Unity 2.4.2
M650 software: 1.2.0.0
iVotronic software: 8.0.0.0
M100: 5.0.0.0
=========================
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT ES&S OPERATION:
We have accumulated some basic information about the following areas:
- Customer Service
- Engineering
- Field Service
- Finance
- Inventory Control
- Manufacturing
- Purchasing
- Warehousing
Let's start by having a look at the ES&S Inventory control process, which is closely intertwined with the accounting dept.
- Various inventory locations include:
Chicago
Addison
Birmingham
A previous location in St. Cloud MN which moved to Omaha in 2004
They have one which they refer to as the "KOK" warehouse, not sure which that is.
And of course, the Omaha warehouse, which stores over 4500 inventory items
- The 2004 inventory value averaged just over $26 million
- Their accuracy in reconciling inventory with accounting has been about 98%
- They use a program called Macola to track inventory movement among locations, along with transactions, proper identification and storage of inventory
Now, inventory is a less than scintillating topic, but one thing we are learning in the partially privatized elections world is that while PUBLICLY held elections materials can be subjected to at least a small amount of citizen oversight, through observations and public records, the privatized vendors aren't subject to such oversight. This has the potential of breaking the chain of custody. As we have seen in King County, the ballot chain of custody is not fully transparent, because a vendor has unaccounted for ballot "spoilage."
How closely does ES&S track their voting machines and parts while in the plant?
According to our sources, they say they do daily cycle inventory counts. There is a schedule that is followed and the parts tracked change from time to time, as we understand it. The schedule works something like this: Let's call the item groups A, B and C.
- They count "A" items every two months. "B" items are every four months, and "C" items every six months.
- I asked what item group the touch-screens are in. Apparently, the "A" Group. The iVotronics are counted about every 2 months, which was increased in 2004 because they used to do it only when they had physical inventory time.
They have weekly Inventory Control meetings and they have a weekly "Macola users" meetings. They run Crystal reports from Macola which, I believe, interface with their financial General Ledger program.
Besides Macola, they also use the Outlook Calendar and Day Planner.
I asked whether all voting machines show up in their inventory. They have "prototype" machines which are assigned a serial number but do not appear in the inventory.
As mentioned above, in 2004, the inventory control group was told to stop writing off obsolete inventory. This bothered some people.
One thing intrigues me. I was told they have to prepare monthly QNX license documentation. As far as I understand it, this is an operating system, and if so, I'm wondering if it is part of what they've had certified, or at least part of the configuration list given to the states.
Another area of interface with the financial department is their purchase order cash flow report, which is touched by both the inventory dept. and the financial dept. as I understand it. They do a monthly open purchase order cash flow report.
Now, I have a note that they do a quarterly report of an "NCEE" deposit account. I wasn't clear exactly what NCEE signifies. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3034
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 6:55 pm: |
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(Bev again) Off-topic I'm sure, but someone slipped us this. The issue was what these pens were being used for.
----------------------
"I [sic] not quite sure why we have a red pen since we can expect it to be invisible to an infrared and visible red read head. I tested the black.
As far as the black inks spectral response to 680nm (red), it is very easily detected. No traces of red dye in this ink. But this ink is nearly invisible to infrared light. So this ink would work fine with M100, M650's and the AutoMark. It should also read very well on the 2100 read head, as long as we continue our plan to put a visible light read head in this unit. I do not think we should even consider infrared in the 2100 at this time. So the only equipment that will not read this is the Eagle and infrared 150/550's. But that is not the equipment this marking device is intended for.
The ink is water based. This ink should not give us any problems with bleed-through on the card stock or any off [sic] our other ballot stock.
With that said, I think this ink is acceptable for it's [sic] intended purpose. If we want to check any other inks they may have that will also be visible on infrared equipment, then that would be fine. But we would only need to use it if for some reason we had to put infrared sensores in the 2100.
I would be very interested in talking to these folks about a custom marking device for the M100. What is the name of this company? Who is their pen and ink expert?
Hand written note at top of memo:
Bob
Our election sensors are infrared ... these pen's ink is not readable. Randy.
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John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 180
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 7:44 pm: |
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BINGO - think back to about year ago (or was that 2 years ago?) Remember my discourse on the use of infrared versus visible light sensors in ballot scanners, and why recounts should always be by hand?
Microchip is a well known manufacturer of both one-time programmable and re-programmable PIC processors - I have a bunch of them in the basement in some projects I'm working on. The actual model number would be VERY useful - 16F88 is an example
Darlington Array/Driver - very common
Bergquest - Bergquist possibly
HG |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 182
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 9:55 pm: |
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2100?
Probably the Precinct Ballot Counter (optiscan)PBC-2100, not to be confused with the PCB 2100 Punch Card Ballot reader. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3035
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, December 29, 2005 - 5:56 am: |
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John -- It is thanks to your work (and the fact that you shared it publicly) that we were so intereted in this memo. I've read the infra-red ink memo several times, but it is quite ambiguous, in terms of whether they are doing something they shouldn't or not.
It does document the importance of hand counting in recounts and spot checks. What is particularly obvious is that absentee votes should not be counted on scanners that use infra-red read heads, because you can't control the ink people use on absentees.
I'll see if I can get some more information out of any of our ES&S sources about specific numbers. The first time, I think the numbers given to us were internal ES&S part numbers, not mfr. product numbers.
Sounds like the 2100 referred to is a punch card reader that they were trying to convert to an optical scan type reader.
Bev |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 183
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, December 29, 2005 - 7:02 pm: |
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Therefore, by direct implication, the ES&S Eagle and infrared 150/550 should NEVER be used in absentee ballot counting. I'm quite sure that there are others out there that should be excluded too.
HG |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3043
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, December 29, 2005 - 7:28 pm: |
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Exactly! John, am I understanding when they say, referring to a black ink pen, "this ink is nearly invisible to infrared light" that a ballot marked with such a BLACK pen will not be read? If so, why would that be, since they say no traces of red ink are detected in it? |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 186
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, December 29, 2005 - 9:53 pm: |
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"...that a ballot marked with such a BLACK pen will not be read?"
The BLACK pen in question will not be read by an infrared reader, but WOULD be read by a visible light (680nm red) reader. If there was red dye in the black ink the response would be less.
Think of writing on white paper with both a black pen and a red pen. Shine a red light on the paper and you can't see the red writing, but the marks you made with the black pen are visible. The red light drowns out the red writing.
HG |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 2
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 30, 2005 - 10:05 am: |
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Yesterday I tried responding to two posts in this thread by email--appears not to have worked. So here are two manual posts.
This is in response to the post by John Howard on Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 08:04 pm
I could only find one reference to ES&S in the Sept 2005 GAO Report, an entry (p. 104) in the section Reports and Studies that Recommend Practices for Enhancing Security and Reliability of Voting Systems. Specifically: Jones, Douglas W. purposes.Recommendations for the Conduct of Elections in Miami-Dade County using the ES&S iVotronic System (May 30, 2004, revised June 7, 2004).
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/miami.pdf
I am quoting three sections of the report. The first (11) has to do with software control, the second (12) our friend the PEB, while (13) contains a link to another report that documents weaknesses with the iVotronic.
11) Track software version usage.
The canvass for an election should include a record of the firmware and software version numbers of all electronic systems used in arriving at that canvass. These should not be taken from records of the version that was supposed to be installed, but should be taken from the systems themselves.
In fact, even this is inadequate, since a corrupt piece of software can report any version number it wants. There are unsolved technical problems involved in actually determining, to any degree of certainty, what software is actually running on an arbitrary computer. Therefore, for the time being, we must accept the report of the system and hope that the software certification process and the chain of custody from the certification authority to the voting machine are both rigorous enough to defend us against misreported versions.
Status: There are allegations that incorrect software versions may have been used in Miami-Dade County in the past. We know that incorrect versions have been widely used elsewhere in the United States, with solid proof in California, Iowa and Ohio. Tracking the version used in each election as part of the canvass is a strong defense against the temptation to install an uncertified version.
The version number of the iVotronic is reported at the top of the adding machine tapes printed at the precinct, both the zero tape and the poll closing tape (polling location report). I have verified with Steve Bolton at ES&S that hese<sic> numbers represent only the machine used to print the tape at the polls and not the full set used at the precinct, but checking these numbers at the time the adding machine tapes are checked against the canvass should be a straightforward enhancement to the assurances offered by the canvass.
12) Track the source of data used in canvassing.
The iVotronic system offers many ways to extract data for inclusion in the canvass. There are three internal flash EEPROM memories in the machine, from which data may be extracted using PEBs, compact flash EEPROM memory cards or a serial data link. Depending on which extraction path is used, it is possible that different data may be extracted!
Only summary data is extracted to the PEB, but this summary data is committed to paper immediately on the printer at the precinct, so it provides valuable protection against loss or corruption of data in the electronic transmission paths upward through the canvassing process.
As Steve Bolton of ES&S has explained, data extracted via the serial port, for example to a laptop computer, includes all vote image reports and event logs, but all of this data comes from the first of three flash EEPROM chips inside the iVotronic computer. This fact is important in the event that there is any disagreement between these chips.
Data extracted via the compact flash card also includes all vote image reports and event logs, but in this case, this data will come from any one of the three flash EEPROM chips, whichever one the internal firmware judges to be the most authoritative.
Therefore, in the event of disagreement between the internal EEPROM chips, data extracted via the Compact Flash card and data extracted via the serial port may differ, and these two paths are the only ways to extract detailed reports from the machine, as opposed to the summary data extracted via the PEB! Therefore, it is imperative to maintain a record, for each machine, of any alternate path used for data extraction. It is also noteworthy that the integrity of the data extracted may vary depending on the path by which it is extracted.
Ideally, ES&S (and other electronic voting system vendors) should incorporate data path and data source tracking into their systems, so that this information is automatically tracked by the canvassing system, but until this is done, manual records are essential. In addition, even when this is automated, it should be subject to routine testing, and this requires that manual records be maintained during the closing and canvassing of precincts that are subject to audit.
In summary, unless the iVotronic machine indicates a serious error condition because of a disagreement between the internal EEPROM memories, extraction by the serial port is an acceptable path, so long as chain of custody issues are carefully attended to. Extraction of data via the compact flash card should be acceptable once the problems with the Unity election management system are solved; these are the subject of a later section.
Status: Miami-Dade County has shifted from extracting event logs from the I-votronic by compact flash cards to extracting it using the serial link to a laptop computer, all without clear evidence of understanding of the difference between these paths. It is not clear to me that ES&S or, for that matter, the FEC/NASED standards themselves deal coherently with the redundant memory required in the voting system. This issue is at the root of the problems identified in the "E-Gov" memo from Orlando Suarez to Jimmy Carmenate on June 6, 2003, the subject of a later section of this report.
(13) Allow only the minimum necessary software on election computers.)
The Unity election management system makes little or no use of security technology to protect the integrity of election data, and the data downloaded from the iVotronic are similarly unsecured. These weaknesses are documented in the security assessment of the iVotronic system performed by Compuware for the State of Ohio, available on the web at:
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/compuware112103.pdf
It is worth noting, for example, that the database used within the Unity election management system is in dBase format, and files in this format can be manipulated by using Microsoft Excel.
Status: Donald Llopis assured me on June 3 that Excel is not installed on any of the machines used in Miami-Dade County to run Unity. Excel is, however, loaded on the server. I do not know how carefully the Unity machines are isolated from the server, nor how the software on the laptops is managed. As a rule, all machines running Unity need to be minimally configured, with no software installed that is not absolutely necessary. Furthermore, given that these weaknesses of the ES&S system have been disclosed to the public, it is important to make a public record of what software is loaded on a machine prior to using it for election management purposes.
(Message edited by Vern_Reisenleiter on December 30, 2005)
Vern Reisenleiter
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Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 3
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 30, 2005 - 10:09 am: |
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This is in response to a post by BBV Admin on Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 06:46 pm:
Two items in the post caught my eye
- They do cannibalize parts from older machines that they can't use any more. They just yank out the parts and keep them in bins and then
use them again.
- There was a bit of a thing with their chief finance guy where he told everyone they were ordered to stop writing off obsolete inventory. He was adamant about this. No questions, no argument, just do it his way and that's that.
If true, these indicate that this company is not on a path to achieving zero defects.
What do your souces have to say about quality control practices in their companies? Could they provide as of dates? I recall Diebold and or their apologists having said something to the effect that D's problems were a thing of the past. Maybe some of the other outfits did too. It isn't that easy. A company doesn't cure quality control problems with a press release or an assertation by the CEO. It takes time and the commitment of all levels of management.
Vern Reisenleiter
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Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 4
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 30, 2005 - 5:31 pm: |
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This gets back to John Howard's original questions on the Personal Electronic Ballot (PEB). Partial answers only.
I skimmed the Compuware Report to the Ohio SoS, now two years old, which evaluated DRE Voting Systems from four vendors (The ES&S hardware/software system examined was: iTronics version 7.4.5.0, Unity Election System (UES) software version 2.2.)
Once again here is the URL for the report.
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/compuware112103.pdf
Two brief comments on the ES&S system follow, one on the PEB and the other on Risk Assessment. (Risk was one of several areas evaluated by Compuware.)
PEB
There are two versions of the removable PEB, Supervisory and Voter, which enable different activities. A Work Flow/Process Model diagram on p. 84 of the report shows, at a high level, the role of the PEB--a proprietary device running proprietary software. Here are a some comments from the evaluation.
- No access to the PEB could be gained. The PEB is a sealed unit. It uses an infrared port to connect and will not connect to a normal Windows, Linux or Mac machine.
-We were unable to load a counterfeit program onto a PEB to complete this test. The PEB is a proprietary hardware interface and we could not purchase tools to assist in programming or modifying of the PEB.
-The compact flash would not upload a malicious program into the iVotronic.
-Using a supervisor PEB, we can vote multiple times. Using a voter PEB, the voter can vote only once.
-The infrared used in the supervisor PEB could not be recognized by Windows or Linux operating systems. The company uses a proprietary protocol for transferring information using Infrared. So the tester was unable to modify the vote count on the PEB.
-Unable to duplicate the Supervisor PEB. It uses Infrared protocol with proprietary software. Windows or Linux operating systems could not recognize the Infrared. PEB are of a proprietary design and cannot be purchased from computer vendors.
-The iVotronic allows access to Supervisor screens with the use of a Supervisor PEB and passwords. The passwords are hard-coded in the firmware and are only three characters in length. (Compuware recommend SoS insist on programmable passwords with six digits each.)
Did Compuware really have the resources (info from ES&S) to run a tough hack test? It appears to me that an outsider would find it very difficult or impossible to get into the PEB. How about an insider?
Risk Assessment
Compuware essentially gave the ES&S system a pass. Their assessment showed Low risk on 20 evaluation elements and Medium risk on four. The assessment looked at three evaluation factors for each element--Threat Source, Motivation and Actions.
IMHO Compuware, at one point lobbed, a softball. Specifically, the Threat Identification for Insiders (poorly trained, disgruntled, malicious, negligent, dishonest, or terminated employees) did not list vote fraud as a Motivation. As a consequence, Threat Actions was mute on on that subject. That is, they concluded that an insider might interfere with the election but would not try to steal an election. (I'm guessing here, but it appears that Compuware used an industry standard threat assessment that is OK for many IT systems, but would likely not address election fraud.)
(Message edited by Vern_Reisenleiter on December 31, 2005)
Vern Reisenleiter
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Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1397
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 30, 2005 - 6:19 pm: |
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Vern,
Thanks for posting all these comments. They raise lots of questions about the ES&S iVotronic. The issue you mention about the potential ease of insider manipulation seems particularly important.
Their reliance on proprietary code seems like a weak security tactic, since many employees would have access to this and we all know how information such as this can "leak" out of an organization.
The iVotronic 3-character password and the Compuware recommendation for only a 6-character password are both eyebrow-raising.
What's the implication of the 3-digit password being "hard-coded in the firmware"? Does that mean it's impossible to change the password? Or is the firmware of the kind that can be upgraded?
I hope some election officials will come forward to submit their ES&S systems to a higher degree of scrutiny. |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 5
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, December 31, 2005 - 9:43 am: |
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In response to a post by Catherine Ansbro on Friday, December 30, 2005 - 06:19 pm:
Catherine, I'll try to answer
Hard coding. As I understand it the programmer (indirectly) defines memory locations for the three passwords and also defines the passwords themselves. An example from Basic
Dim Password(2) As String ; Define variable
...
Passwords(0) = "123" : Passwords(1) = "456" : Passwords(2) = "789" ; Populate with values
In that situation the User (BoE staff) would not be able to change passwords. The Compuware assessment recommended that the Ohio SoS require that the vendor develop a User interface that would allow election officials to modify the default passwords. (Any bets on whether Blackwell followed through.)
Can the firmware be upgraded? I have to shrug my shoulders on that one, because I'm not sure whether the PEB qualifies as firmware. All I can say is that Compuware thought that (with the proper tools) they should be able to modify the code resident in the PEB.
Higher degree of scrutiny for ES&S. BradBlog and VoteTrustUSA have joined in an effort to ask the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to reinspect Diebold's source code and to decertify Diebold if their software contains interpreted code. (A violation of the old voluntary standards.) The open letter says, Oh by the way look at the other vendors.
The VoteTrustUSA article, which includes a helpful block diagram, gives a pretty fair description of the Leon County, FL hack, including how the firmware and memory card work together in the Diebold machine. There may be some parallels to ES&S and its PEB.
Here are the links to the two articles and to an open letter to the EAC/ITA.
http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00002214.htm
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=645&Itemid =26
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=646&Itemid =914
(Message edited by Vern_Reisenleiter on December 31, 2005)
Vern Reisenleiter
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Linda Franz
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Linda_franz
Post Number: 175
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 1, 2006 - 10:29 pm: |
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John,
I just skimmed this post so maybe this was covered.
Wasn't it carbon content that was the issue about some black ink working and some not?
I keep going back to instructions I remember that always said to use pencil- but most people voting would want ink so changing someone's ballot wouldn't be so easy. |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 188
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 2, 2006 - 5:01 am: |
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Yes, carbon content is key to visibility under infrared.
Red dye content is key to INvisibility under visible RED light. |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3061
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 2, 2006 - 6:49 am: |
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John,
Can you elaborate on this sentence, from the ES&S memo:
As far as the black inks spectral response to 680nm (red), it is very easily detected. No traces of red dye in this ink. But this ink is nearly invisible to infrared light.
This indicates that this black ink is invisible to infrared light even though it has no red dye in it.
Thanks,
Bev Harris |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 189
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 2, 2006 - 7:22 am: |
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A black ink that is dye based rather than pigment based, will typically be invisible under IR light. IR light is reflected by most inks but is absorbed by carbon based (pigmented) inks.
A voter provided with a dye-based black pen with which to vote, will unknowingly cast an undervote if the scanner relies on IR read heads.
In the same way, a voter provided with a red pen with which to vote, will unknowingly cast an undervote if the scanner relies on RED visible light. RED appears to be the most common (cheapest) color used for visible light ballot scanning.
On a related note, if a jurisdiction is going to use a high-resolution full-image digital scanner, the light source must not just be visible light, but visible white light. That way the image that is captured will not be given a particular color cast that could otherwise influence its interpretation, regardless of whether or not the interpretation is done by eyes or machines.
HG |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1409
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 2, 2006 - 8:09 am: |
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So if IR light reflects a dye you don't see that dye under the IR light--right?
About dye-based inks vs. pigement-based inks (and clearly there are implications for the kind of paper used):
http://www.it-enquirer.com/main/ite/more/single_versus_multi_ink/
Pigments versus Dyes
Pigment inks are based on pigments which are microscopically small grains of colour. Pigments have a high colouring value, but cannot be entirely dissolved in water or any other liquid. In other words, in the best case scenario, pigments will float freely in their liquid environment and will attach to the printing surface due to the addition of glue-like substances.
Pigments have some advantages like longevity (typically an 80 to 100 years time span) and a decreased susceptibility to humidity damage. A pigment-ink print can be touched with the fingers within seconds after it has been printed.
Pigments have disadvantages as well. Because of their graininess, colour prints will lack sharpness and brilliance. Pigment-based photo prints always somewhat look like silver halide prints on matt paper. Pigment-based inks are used throughout the Epson range of inkjet printers. Some other vendors like Agfa also use Epsons pigment inks for their inkjet products, but these products fall outside the range of what we are discussing in this paper; they are large-format (A2 and bigger) proofing inkjets where colour accuracy and workflow are more important than sharpness, glossy characteristics or even longevity (a typical contract proof will be used for a few weeks, and will last for a few months, although here as well, vendors different offerings vary).
Dye inks are liquid and can be easily dissolved in water. They therefore have a much less visible grain, resulting in sharp, vivid and bright colour prints. Dye inks are ideal for glossy prints. The disadvantages of dye inks are their vulnerability to humidity. The user must wait a few minutes before he/she can touch the print surface without smearing. Another disadvantage of dye inks is a reduced life span, but this has been improved and for example the latest HP ink types match or even better the life span of pigment ink prints (between 80 and 115 years, according to Wilhelm Research). Dye inks can be found in HP and Canon photo printers.
It will be obvious from the above that dye inks are better suited for photo printing than pigment inks. Dye ink based photo prints will come closer to a silver halide prints quality than a pigment ink photo simply because of the physical characteristics of the colorant itself.
However, other factors play a role in determining the quality of an inkjet photo print.
http://www.promarketinc.com/technical/pig_dye_inks.html
Pigmented Inks vs Dye-based Inks
If you're new to printing, or haven't really given it much thought before, you may now be wondering what is the difference between dye-based inks and pigmented inks. The answer, simply enough, is in water resistance and color quality.
Dye-based inks are the most common, and nearly every consumer and professional inkjet printer uses dye-based inks by default. In fact, only a few companies offer pigmented inks in the original cartridge for their consumer level printers. Dye-based inks are basically made from de-ionized water, alcohol (which speeds the drying of the ink), and a dye to provide the color. This basic formulation yields inks that are inexpensive but yield good color and resolution. Other chemicals are added to the formula to increase factors such as gamut, resolution, or vibrancy. However, to use this formulation the dye's must be water soluble, and as a result any prints using dye-based inks that get wet are likely to bleed, stain, and run.
Enter pigmented inks. Instead of using a dye dissolved in water, pigments rely on microscopic pigmented particles suspended in a solution. As a result, they tend to have more water resistance with some manufacturers warranting that their prints will be waterproof. Additionally, the smaller particle size and lower surface tension of the solutions used allow for finer droplets and thus higher resolution. But pigmented inks are not without their set of troubles. Black, an essential color (or non-color) tends to come out as a very dark charcoal color in pigmented inks, and only very good inks can deliver true black tones.
So when and why should you use either? When water resistance is a factor, and gamut isn't quite as important, go with pigmented inks. Such applications include outdoor displays and signage, or prints that will be in a very humid or wet environment. On the other hand, when water resistance is not a factor, but rich color is, you would want to consider dye-based inks. Photo-realistic portraits, indoor signage, and fine art prints often call for dye-based inks. Even with that recommendation, it's not a solid choice. Many manufacturers offer dye-based inks with some level of water resistance. By the same token, several pigmented inks can now boast of a true black, such as Piezography inks (Piezography BW inks are in fact designed for Black and White photo printing applications, and deliver "unusually" long dynamic ranges on prints).
http://www.paperzone.com/Crafter_Corner/cornereveryday3.htm
Dye vs. Pigment Ink
Choosing which ink to use for your stamping projects is very important. There are big differences between pigment inks and dye inks, and here is a cheat sheet to help you decide which type of ink is right for your projects.
What stamp pad should I buy?
PIGMENT BASED
* slow drying
* great for embossing
* permanent once heat set
* softer look
* color sits on top of the paper so the colors stay truer
* will show up on dark colored paper
* wide range of metallic colors and white
* wider range of colors
* stamp pad doesn't dry out (store upside-down for optimum use)
DYE BASED
* fast drying
* cannot emboss with
* inks tend to bleed
* takes on the paper's color
* most are not light fast...the color will change over time
* won't show up much on dark colored paper
* cannot get metallic colors and white
* stamp pad can dry out
* great for quick, easy, multiple prints
http://www.normankoren.com/paper_ink.html
Making fine prints in your digital darkroom
Papers and inks
by Norman Koren
* Dyes are chemicals that come dissolved, usually in water. Dye-based inks are less expensive than pigment inks and tend to have larger color gamuts, but they are less lightfast and chemically stable. Early dye-based inkjet prints faded very rapidly-- in months, but newer dye-based inks have much better lightfastness-- 25 years or more when displayed under glass. Dyes can interact chemically with coatings on papers-- you should always make sure a paper is compatible with your inks. Many dye-based inkjet prints are susceptible to rapid, unpredictable chemical fading caused by oxidation from air pollution. Ozone (a strong oxidant) usually gets the blame, but it's not the only culprit. This is the cause of the notorious red shift in Epson and Canon prints, at least for inksets prior to 2005. It tends to be worst in standard glossy or semigloss papers. Swellable polymer papers such as Epson ColorLife (semigloss surface) or Ilford Galerie Classic (gloss and pearl surfaces) last much longer. Dye-based inks are still improving. The definitive source on print longevity is Wilhelm Imaging Research.
* Pigments are tiny particles that come suspended in the solvent-- they aren't dissolved. Pigment inks tend to be more expensive than dye inks, but they are much more lightfast and chemically stable. Lifetimes are estimated at 80 to 200 or more years. Early pigment inks had poorer color gamuts than dye inks (in part because pigments tend to be more opaque than dyes), but recent pigment inks are competitive. Early pigment inks also tended to clog printer nozzles, but newer pigment inks are much improved. Epson is currently the only supplier of pigment-based inkjet printers, but several independent ink manufacturers supply pigment inks. Because pure pigment inks have a difficult time achieving high Dmax (deep blacks), dyes are often added to pigmented inksets. Fortunately, black dyes tend to be more stable than colored dyes. |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 6
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 2, 2006 - 8:39 am: |
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This is fast moving thread.
Here is a quote that I picked up from an article on mark-sense ballots by Douglas Jones at the University of Iowa titled Counting Mark-Sense Ballots: Relating Technology, the Law and Common Sense.
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/optical/
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The classic instructions for mark-sense forms say "use number two soft lead pencil". This instruction is safe because pencil graphite is equally dark in the visible and infrared wavelengths. The same is true of india ink, but this cannot be said of inks based on organic dies. A black ink made from a mixture of red, blue and green organic inks may look identical to black india ink, but it may be invisible to an infra-red sensor.
If voters always voted using the marking device provided at the polling place, this would not lead to problems, but absentee voters frequently reach for any available pen or pencil, and if the point breaks off of the pencil provided in the voting booth, voters will frequently use their own pens or pencils, particularly when lines are long and the polling place officials are harried.
The solution is obvious! We can replace the infra-red light-emitting diodes and phototransistors in the mark sensor with light-emitting diodes and photosensors that work with visible light.
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The article is about three years old, but it gives a pretty fair overview of ballot scanning technology. Near the end of the article there is a long section on legal considerations and another reccomending standards for voting machines (scanners) that would require vendors to disclose information about scanners, including its spectral response.
Vern Reisenleiter
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John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 190
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 2, 2006 - 9:34 am: |
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"So if IR light reflects a dye you don't see that dye under the IR light--right? "
Well, I know what you mean, but to be precise, it's the other way around.
To start with, regardless of the type of ink, you or I won't see IR light - because IR is outside of the spectrum of colours that WE can see. (folks from other planets may be able to see IR but WE humans can't) This is one of the reasons that IR-emitters are used on many/most TV remote controls.
In the context of ballots and scanners, when IR light is directed at a clear spot (and yes it is only a spot, more on the spot later) on a paper ballot, it will reflect and be detected. When IR light is directed at a spot covered in carbon-pigmented (black) ink - or pencil, the carbon ABSORBS the IR light, and doesn't reflect it back to the detector. The process used to determine whether or not an appropriate mark is on the target area looks like this:
light IS reflected = no mark
light is NOT reflected = mark
As for those spots, have a look at a ballot for scanning. On the sides, you'll see a group of black lines, called timing marks. These define the height of the spots that the scanner will 'look' at. To the best of my knowledge, the width of the spots is fixed by the manufacturer of the scanner. It's usually about the width of the oval or 'fill-in' area.
While we're on the topic of IR and inks.... ballots need to be produced with an ink appropriate of the type of scanner being used. Can you imagine the confusion that would occur if the ballot for an IR scanner was printed on a laser printer? Regardles of the brand, laser toner has one principal component - carbon. Hmmmmmmmm....... ever seen the toner flake off from a sheet of paper and end up in the wrong place on the page? According to the Diebold memos, even Diebold was worried about THAT!
HG |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 3124
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, January 6, 2006 - 12:14 pm: |
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I added some more information into the general information posted at the link above, about how the inventory department functions. |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 10
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 8, 2006 - 9:40 am: |
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This goes back to our 30 December discussion of Risk Assessment. The Compuware assessments done for the Ohio SoS are based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems Publication 800-30. As I suspected, the methodology does not directly address the possibility of insiders (whoever they might work for) manipulating the election. Here is an extract from Table 3-1 Human Threats.
| Threat-Source | Motivation | Threat Actions | | | Assault on an employee | | | Blackmail | | | Browsing of proprietary | | | information | | Curiosity | Computer abuse | | Ego | Fraud and theft | | Insiders (poorly trained, | Intelligence | Information bribery | | disgruntled, malicious, | Monetary gain | Input of falsified, corrupted data | | negligent, dishonest, or | Revenge | Interception | | terminated employees) | Unintentional errors and | Malicious code (e.g., virus, logic | | omissions (e.g., data entry | bomb, Trojan horse) | | error, programming error) | Sale of personal information | | | System bugs | | | System intrusion | | | System sabotage | | | Unauthorized system access | |
I'm willing to bet that the ITA is using this same standard in their certifications. If so, they will not be dealing with the real threat until they amend their procedures.
Vern Reisenleiter
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Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1475
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 8, 2006 - 9:51 am: |
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Where did this table come from? The publication 800-30? You said NIST & Compuware are using this publication and so too do the ITAs (probably).
Yet you said "the methodology" does not dealing with inside threats--and this table is all about inside threats. Whose methodology are you referring to? |
Vernon Reisenleiter
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vern_reisenleiter
Post Number: 11
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 8, 2006 - 10:35 am: |
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The table is an extract from Pub 800-30.
Compuware's methodology does indeed deal with insider threats. However, this is what I said in my 30 December post before I looked at the NIST pub.
"IMHO Compuware, at one point, lobbed a softball. Specifically, the Threat Identification for Insiders (poorly trained, disgruntled, malicious, negligent, dishonest, or terminated employees) did not list vote fraud as a Motivation. As a consequence, Threat Actions was mute on on that subject. That is, they concluded that an insider might interfere with the election but would not try to steal an election. (I'm guessing here, but it appears that Compuware used an industry standard threat assessment that is OK for many IT systems, but would likely not address election fraud.)"
The next to last sentence in that quote should have said--Although they concluded that an in insider might somehow interfere with the election, Compuware never addressed the possibility of vote fraud.
Whose methodology...? Take your pick. Compuware is using the NIST pub. At this point I'm assuming that ITA also uses it in their work. So I say again "they [ITA] will not be dealing with the real threat until they amend their procedures."
That is if this is, in fact, a real problem.
Vern Reisenleiter
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Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1476
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 2 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Sunday, January 8, 2006 - 11:03 am: |
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Now I get it. Since NIST never considered "election fraud" a possible motivation in its generic risk-assessment guide, they also didn't include procedures to address the range of threat actions resulting from this unique motivation.
Motivators such as monetary gain could be considered a possible equivalent, and the Threat Actions such as "Input of falsified, corrupted data," "Interception," "Malicious code," or "Unauthorized system access" would be relevant to elections.
But the "mechanics" of the Threat Actions for election systems would be unique, or at least different from the more usual scenarios that the NIST guide is meant to address. This is because of the uniqueness of the election environment. Elections are unique one-day-only events; they are always different; polling places differ; there is no practical way to double-check all code for every piece of electronic equipment in use; poll workers have access to equipment; there's a huge amount of power and money at stake; a partisan environment can bias procedures; etc.
For these reasons the guidelines and potential mitigations in the NIST 800-30 guideline are inadequate for addressing the far wider range of threats applicable to elections. The ITAs and other entities such as CompuWare urgently need a different risk assessment protocol in order to discover and mitigate against election-specific threats not covered by the standard NIST guidelines. |
John Washburn
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johnwashburn
Post Number: 337
Registered: 04-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 9, 2006 - 7:50 am: |
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A black ink that is dye based rather than pigment based, will typically be invisible under IR light. IR light is reflected by most inks but is absorbed by carbon based (pigmented) inks.
A voter provided with a dye-based black pen with which to vote, will unknowingly cast an undervote if the scanner relies on IR read heads.
And the best combination is to pre-paint the ballot with an IR absorptive (IR dark) security ink/pigment which is optically transparent and give the voter an pen with IR reflective ink/dye (IR invisible) but which is optically dark. No matter where the voter marks with the IR-invisible pen, the optical scanner IR read-heads will read the mark made by the IR-dark security ink.
An IR-enabled Sony handy cam should be able to "see" this.
Here are some illustrative links:
Home page
Inks page
the ink for this
This works even better if I can recover the IR-invisible pens and replace them with pens with proper IR-dark and optically dark ink/pigment at some point during the election day. Preferably after I know all my pre-painted ballots have been handed out and placed in the op scanner.
(Message edited by johnwashburn on January 09, 2006)
John Washburn
Only bad software is delayed by good testing.
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Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1484
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 9, 2006 - 8:15 am: |
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Except for mail-in ballots (where various pens will be used--even if you sent them the correct one in the mail). Actually, even in a poll booth some people might choose to use their own "better" marking pen rather than what's provided.
Makes hand-counting look better all the time. |
John Howard
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Harmonyguy
Post Number: 207
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 9, 2006 - 6:40 pm: |
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Since you brought it up.......here's a chunk from a piece I wrote about a year ago.
Also remember that the digital printers used to print a substantial number of ballots in the USA, can also print optically invisible but IR visible marks directly on documents. The machines are DESIGNED to do it. These marks can be anything from IR barcodes to 'security marks' or job jumbers, or whatever else that's specified. Wouldn't it be convenient to have a black oval on a ballot overprinted with an optically transparent but IR absorptive filled oval?
As printing plants look for ways to streamline their operations, printing and publishing systems that offer invisible ink have become more common, especially with with print-personalization and print-on-demand systems, which are the mainstay of the direct mailing and pre-sort business. The IR ink is used to print invisible, but machine readable, marks such as bar codes to identify individual print runs or to help pre-sort documents for mailing.
As ballots are printed, it would a simple matter to add an invisible mark over the bubble next to a specific candidate or measure. Since invisible printing would be a standard step in the handling of print jobs, no-one would see anything out of the ordinary.
Invisible IR ink is also used in the security printing business as a measure to prevent document fraud in important documents such as bank notes, traveller's checks, and stock certificates. The technology is already there, it's in place in many mail-services and printing plants, and if not in place, is quick and easy to install.
Remember that the technology used to print ballots is the same technology used to print-on-demand or personalize print jobs. It would be incredibly easy to 'help' every third or fourth ballot in a particular precinct 'lean' towards a particular candidate.
All it would take is one- JUST ONE - crooked individual in a print shop, or in a pre-sort mail house to influence heaven-knows how many precincts in how many states.
Know of any print shops that have hired any individuals of less-than-stellar character?
Know of any mail-sorting plants, with questionable individuals on staff?
Methinks you're on the right track!
HG |
Joseph E Hadley
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Just_joe
Post Number: 1
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 10, 2006 - 1:12 am: |
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Appearing in the Anderson Indiana Herald Bulletin today 1/8/2006
Casting ballots to change
By KEN de la BASTIDE
When voters in Madison County go into the polling both this year they will be using a new system of voting for the first time since 1979.
As a result of the federal Help America Vote Act passed following the contested Florida votes in 2000, Madison County has purchased a new touchscreen voting system.
Since 1979 Madison County has used a punch-card ballot with the results tabulated by computer. It was those punch-card ballots that created the term hanging chads during the 2000 presidential election.
The county has purchased the Votornic system from Election Systems Software. The company is the same one that provided the software for the system used in the county for the past 26 years.
Commissioner Paul Wilson, D-South District, said the county has purchased 410 touchscreen voting machines and software for use starting with the May primary.
The system cost approximately $1.5 million. Wilson said the federal government provided $1 million and the county borrowed $500,000 to purchase the new system. That loan will be paid back over five years.
We cant use the punch cards any longer, Wilson said. The federal government required the change.
Wilson said the new system takes Madison County to the next level when it comes to technology.
Ludy Watkins, Madison County clerk, said the new system will tabulate the votes electronically, but that paper ballots can be printed if necessary.
She explained that each of the 86 voting locations will have a minimum of four machines, with one being handicapped accessible.
Watkins said blind people will be able to listen to the names on the ballot and be able to cast their votes with a toggle switch. She said a person can also request that someone assist them with the voting process.
The names of candidates will be displayed on an electronic screen and votes are cast by touching the screen. In case of a wrong vote, all a voter has to do is retouch the screen.
Watkins said with the new system it is impossible to vote for more people than eligible for any office.
There are several times during the process that the computer will ask the voter if they want to cast the ballot or make changes, she said. There is also the capability for write-in ballots on the screen.
Watkins said representatives from Election Systems Software will create the ballots and several will be in Madison County to assist during the primary.
Everyone working in a precinct will be required to take training on how the system works.
We took into accounts comments from the people in the county that tried the different systems, she said. We believe people will be happy with the new system.
County officials are taking the new voting system to several locations to allow people to try the new way to cast a ballot.
Mary Retherford, the election room clerk, said company officials have predicted the results will be known in a couple of hours after the polls close.
She explained a computer module with the results from each precinct will be transferred into the main computer and counted.
Retherford said the results will remain in the portable computers and main computer until the next election.
Wilson said the goal is to have the election results immediately available on the Internet.
The computers are being stored in a building at the Madison County Highway Garage and are charged through an electrical outlet. Each of the machines taken to the precincts have a battery back-up.
Madison County officials looked at several different systems before deciding to purchase the Votornic system.
I would like permission to direct readers to this discussion.
Thanks, Joe
Arabs gave us our numbers. Try doing long division with Roman numerals. Kurt Vonnegut
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Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1487
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 10, 2006 - 2:01 am: |
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Thanks, Joe.
"The computers are being stored in a building at the Madison County Highway Garage." Maybe it's just me but this sounds odd. But it's probably perfectly secure, like all the other places voting machines are stored. 
Wilson is repeating the common misinformation that the government required a change--implying that the change had to be to an electronic machine, which simply isn't true.
Joe, is there much local awareness of the problems? What are your local election officials like? Do you think they might be interested in carrying out an independent security test of their new equipment?
How do you feel about the decision-making process that was followed? Did people have any opportunities to give feedback before a decision was made?
You might also want to post a link to the article in the Indiana Forum. |
William Brandes
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Williambrandes
Post Number: 32
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, May 12, 2006 - 9:29 pm: |
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\\\\Wilson is repeating the common misinformation that the government required a change--implying that the change had to be to an electronic machine, which simply isn't true.\\\\\\\\\
I think I brought this up somewhere else on this forum/grin. But, the previous post was exactly the line of events traveled by our BOE in purchasing these machines and selling them to the community. This is the company strategy, since it obviously was used sameo-sameo in two different locations.
Now, Diebold is on the ropes. I mean, they and their machines are getting discredited daily. How about ES&S? Will they be given a clean bill of health by default? Is their methodology for creating the electronic vote "better" so, they will be given a pass? I would like to know, because I am sick of the waste in dollars and time and apathy to the democratic processes in this country. And, I lay alot squarely on the shoulders of our local officials who seem to perpetuate this gluttony of waste by parroting this misinformation. There is a better way; pen, paper and hand count. It will get US back into the democratic process. William |
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