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CT: UCONN Pre-Election Audit of Memor...  
 

Black Box Voting » Document Archive » Reports and Studies » Connecticut Reports » CT: UCONN Pre-Election Audit of Memory Cards Report « Previous Next »

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christine c reid
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ctwatcher

Post Number: 45
Registered: 12-2007

Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?)

Posted on Saturday, January 26, 2008 - 8:50 am:   Edit Post Delete Post View Post/Check IP    Move Post (Moderator/Admin Only)

Dr. Alex Schvartsman's report on Connecticut's pre-election memory card audit report has been released - see link above.

Excerpt:
The total of 522 cards were received and tested by the VoTeR Center, out of which 378 cards
were received before the election. Out of the total number of cards, 18 cards, or 3.5% were found
to contain “junk” data, that is, they were unreadable, which is easily detected by the tabulators as
such, and could not have been used in the election. The rest of the cards, or 96.6%, were found
to have been properly programmed for election. These cards contained valid ballot data and the
executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code on the cards.
About half of the cards were found to have been tested and set for election—the intended state
of the cards following the prescribed testing procedure. Most of the remaining cards were tested by the towns but not set for election; while this is not a problem, this suggested that the relevant towns/districts either misunderstood the instructions or did not follow the instructions. One card was found in the state set for election but with non-zero counters, indicating that the district tested
the card in election mode and did not reset the card. This is a potentially problematic, but detectable situation, since proper procedures require that the “zero counter” report is produced at the start of the election1.
END QUOTE

http://www.ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/audit07mc.pdf

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The public must be able to see and authenticate these four essential steps for an election to be public, democratic, and valid: (1) Who can vote (voter list); (2) Who did vote (3) The original count; (4) Chain of custody.