Citizens Tool Kit Black Box Voting - America's Elections Watchdog Group blackboxvoting.org - caught on videotape
blackboxvoting.org - New Today!
SHORTCUTS: How to find what you're looking for
your donations are always needed and very much appreciated Visa - Mastercard - AMEX blackboxvoting.org - news blackboxvoting.org - investigations blackboxvoting.org Press Kit blackboxvoting.org forums blackboxvoting.org - contact us blackboxvoting.org - home
Navigation
  Topics
  Log In
  Log Out
:
Special Search
  New Today
  New This Week
  Advanced Search
  Tree View

Your Account
  Edit Profile
  Register
  Forgot Password

Tools
  Help/Instructions
  Policies


  ...

5-10-06: As the Emery County findings...  
 

Black Box Voting » Latest Investigations from Black Box Voting » 5-10-06: As the Emery County findings evolve: Diebold's and Georgia's response « Previous Next »

Author Message
Top of pagePrevious messageNext messageBottom of page Link to this message

Bev Harris
Board Administrator
Username: Admin

Post Number: 4546
Registered: 12-2004

Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 3 (A keeper?)

Posted on Wednesday, May 10, 2006 - 2:26 pm:   Edit Post Delete Post View Post/Check IP    Move Post (Moderator/Admin Only)

Before even seeing the Hursti Report regarding the critical security defects built into the TSx and TS6, here is the state of Georgia's response:


quote:

"We are confident the robust and vigorous program of physical and operational security procedures we currently have in place in Georgia- including multiple audits and reviews to assure compliance- erects a strong barrier to prevent outsiders from accessing our voting equipment without our knowledge or without being detected."

"Our county election superintendents (who - unlike officials in other states -- have utilized this system over the last 4 years in hundreds of elections throughout the state) are required to maintain a strict chain of custody on all voting equipment including memory cards."

"At the time they are placed into election mode - at the conclusion of logic and accuracy testing - the cards are sealed into the unit with a numbered seal and that number is recorded. On election morning the numbers are compared with the recorded numbers. If the numbers don't match, the seals are broken or the unit appears to have been tampered with, election workers are to immediately notify the elections office and that unit is to be taken out of service."




Unfortunately for the state of Georgia, this is not about memory cards.

Diebold statements in Emery County

Shortly after being notified that extremely severe security flaws had been found in Emery County, Diebold had this to say to Bruce Funk, Utah state Elections Director Michael Cragun, the Emery County attorney, and county commissioners (taken from audio transcript) Diebold attorneys were reportedly flown to Emery County on the governor's airplane, and David Blackwell is, by law, supposed to be Bruce Funk's appointed counsel -- watch how he represents the other side:

Commissioner Hatch: We need to move to Item 4 to discuss pending or reasonably imminent litigation to discuss character, professional competence or physical or mental health for that individual or any other matters allowed by law.

...

Bruce Funk: Well when you talk about that being standard wording in executive session to discuss attorney/client communications as allowed by law, this is a distinctive difference from impugning my character and my professional competence ... all of you have counsel to represent you, stating that you have counsel and I don't have counsel. I feel like Items 3 and 4 issues on the agenda are headed in my direction and I'm entitled to counsel as an elected official.

David Blackwell, Emery County Attorney: At this point I don't know as we need counsel. We're just here to discuss possible litigation. Where it goes from there... there's a hope of a possibility of discussing an individual which I would not want to disclose.

Bruce Funk: Would you say that individual is not me, though?

David Blackwell: I wouldn't. I will be taking the minutes. I will be doing what the FBI does. 'I can neither confirm nor deny.'

Bruce Funk: [indicates Diebold lawyers] Are they going to be present at this meeting?

...

Diebold Attorney: Let me intervene for a second here. I think we’ve asked and answered your initial questions here, Mr. Funk. We don’t want to go down this path, this rabbit trail, of answering a number of different questions.

Michael Cragun: It’s interesting that we find ourselves in this position. If Mr. Funk had just raised these questions with either the vendor or the Lieutenant Governor’s office, they would have been answered. The reason that we’re here today is because Mr. Funk, on his own, has gone outside that system and compromised the integrity of not only Emery County’s elections, but also the State of Utah and any other jurisdiction of the United States that is using this equipment, simply because he wouldn’t call and ask these questions that these people and the Lieutenant Governor’s staff know the answers to. It seems to me it’s inappropriate to be in this meeting now answering these questions he should have asked before he compromised the integrity of this system.

Bruce Funk: I have to say that I don’t feel like I’ve affected the integrity of these machines. Let me go to the second one. Are there any non-native programs residing in the software, such as a macro?

Drew Kahl (Diebold): There is a ballot station software, WindowsCE.

Bruce Funk: The what?

Drew Kahl: WindowsCE operating system and the ballot station software.

Bruce Funk: Can I put a macro on those?

Drew Kahl - Diebold: I do not...[becomes inaudible].

Bruce Funk: I think you brought this whole question out, Drew. Remember when you were here and I said how do I really test these machines because, in my opinion, they're either going to fold in the first 24 hours, the first hour and that, what did you tell me you can do?

Drew Kahl: That’s part of the ballot station software where you go through and test.

Bruce Funk: It’s a macro.

Drew Kahl - Diebold: That’s the ballot station software.

Bruce Funk: But it’s a macro that you can put on there and pound that machine, as you told me, until it runs to the end of the tape.

Drew Kahl - Diebold: That’s a part of the ballot station software that’s built in, you cannot put it on there.

[PER BBV STUDY FINDINGS: YES, YOU CAN.]
...

Bruce Funk: Can you put in writing the reason for the low storage back-up memory of 4 MBs?

Drew Kahl - Diebold: Yes.

Bruce Funk: And give that to me?

Drew Kahl - Diebold: Sure can. I don’t see why not.

...

Bruce Funk: I guess the other thing is, I’m not part of that, there is another report coming and I’m only the messenger boy. And I guess the other thing I’m wondering is, it is my understanding that I don’t know whether Diebold or the elections office but I’m understanding there are changes in the security process to implement some things and that you are doing some stuff to reallocate the memories of, I say, I understand that there’s some work being done by some of you people about security to plug some holes, to reallocate, like the 4 MB memories.

Drew Kahl - Diebold: We are not working on anything to beef up the security or close holes. As far as the 4 MBs of memory just for your edification, the reason why some machines have 4 MBs of memory instead of 26 MBs of memory is the configuration on WindowsCE and were initially used for September extra needed font files along with it and that’s what’s eating up that extra memory. By going in and removing the un-needed font files, it frees up [unintelligible] and that’s what Diebold will do. We discussed with the State in October and November of last year and we decided to put that process into your internal [unintelligible] prior to the election.

Bruce Funk: So, is there anything in that program that we’ll be able to examine the program itself? How should you do that, so that it will be available to look at it and verify what you’re doing is ok and you’re not--

Drew Kahl - Diebold: It will be verified by the state and approved by the state.

Bruce Funk: Can I have it verified by an independent source?

Drew Kahl - Diebold: No. It’s proprietary software.

Bruce Funk: Ok. If you’re willing to do that, that’s what I need to answer those five questions.

Commissioner Hatch: Well, I think he already answered most of them, but that one--

...

Bruce Funk: And I feel good about what I did. You guys can judge me how you want.

Commissioner Hatch: I don’t think anyone is judging you at this point and time. What do you need in writing from these folks other than what they have said here?

Diebold Attorney: I think there’s only one thing that’s going in writing from us, I think that had to do with memory.

Bruce Funk: This letter was addressed to the Commissioners and it said Diebold must certify to the Emery County Auditor before [unintelligible] 2006, the following items, and then I wanted those items specifically in writing. So, if you’re, I don’t know any other way to certify it other than to put it in writing.

Commissiner Hatch: What’s that?

Bruce Funk: A through D on this letter of mine.

Commissioner Hatch: Ok. They’ve answered. All terminals are unused. Alright, there are no non-native programs residing within the motherboards. They’ve answered that one. The same software, now what else? The low back-up storage.

Diebold Attorney: Wait a second. I would propose this, Commissioners. Mr. Funk, I think this is on the record. I don’t see that there is any need to provide you with a separate letter, since we’ve already answered these "on the record".

...

What has resulted from Bruce Funk's courageous decision to have his machines tested is that he has been locked out of his office, his pension may be in jeopardy, while at the same time Diebold has confirmed the existence of a major security hole to Dr. Michael Shamos in the state of Pennsylvania, and to the California Secretary of state. Emergency security measures are now being invoked in states across the nation in response to findings in Emery County which were known by Diebold, but not disclosed.

See this article: http://www.insidebayarea.com/argus/localnews/ci_3804675 "Voting Glitch Said to Be Dangerous"

Hursti Report coming out in less than 24 hours.

PERMISSION TO REPRINT WITH LINK TO http://www.blackboxvoting.org
Top of pagePrevious messageNext messageBottom of page Link to this message

Bruce Sims
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ubetchaiam

Post Number: 763
Registered: 06-2005

Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?)

Posted on Wednesday, May 10, 2006 - 3:02 pm:   Edit Post Delete Post View Post/Check IP    Move Post (Moderator/Admin Only)

Re the InsideBayArea report:
" California elections officials told those counties Friday that the risk from the vulnerability was "low" and that any vote tampering would be revealed to voters on the paper read-out that prints when they cast their ballots, as well as to elections officials when they recount those printouts for 1 percent of their precincts after the election.

"I think the likelihood of this happening is low," assistant Secretary of State for elections Susan Lapsley said. "It assumes access and control for a lengthy period of time."

In San Diego, the Poll Workers left the cover down on the AVVPAT's AND did NOT inform voters that they could verify their votes on the AVVPAT.
And the machines are given to the non-background checked poll workers up to 3 weeks before an election; in any event, what constitutes "a lengthy period of time." ?
Top of pagePrevious messageNext messageBottom of page Link to this message

Edward Robles
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Tedeger

Post Number: 40
Registered: 11-2005

Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 2 (A keeper?)

Posted on Thursday, May 11, 2006 - 4:35 am:   Edit Post Delete Post View Post/Check IP    Move Post (Moderator/Admin Only)

But ir was in GEORGIA that our daughter tried to vote for Kerry and the screen kept saying "BUSH!" But I told you that story - I am certain that Diebold has got it wired now so that something like a quarter of the votes cast for "A" are recorded for "B" without showing on the screen - it seems to me that the leopard does not change his spots.
Top of pagePrevious messageNext messageBottom of page Link to this message

Bruce Sims
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ubetchaiam

Post Number: 766
Registered: 06-2005

Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?)

Posted on Thursday, May 11, 2006 - 11:31 am:   Edit Post Delete Post View Post/Check IP    Move Post (Moderator/Admin Only)

AS a rhetorical question: why isn't the infomation the CA SOS spokeperson stated in the 'insidebayarea' story posted on the CA SOS website? Nothing in the SOS 'news' section or under 'voting systems'; hmmmm.
Top of pagePrevious messageNext messageBottom of page Link to this message

Joseph Hall
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Joehall

Post Number: 81
Registered: 01-2005

Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?)

Posted on Thursday, May 11, 2006 - 2:15 pm:   Edit Post Delete Post View Post/Check IP    Move Post (Moderator/Admin Only)

Hi, it would be great to get a citeable version of the Georgia statement. Is that available on the web? Is it a press release or something else? I still don't seem to be getting email from bbvforums, so I'll check back soon.
 

The public must be able to see and authenticate these four essential steps for an election to be public, democratic, and valid: (1) Who can vote (voter list); (2) Who did vote (3) The original count; (4) Chain of custody.