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| 11-30-05: Nope, the hack test won't b... |
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BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2862
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 8:00 am: | 
|
What's going on with California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson?
- He asks Black Box Voting to do a test, but tells the press he's asked Finnish security expert Harri Hursti to do it, before he formally invites Hursti or obtains any agreement from Hursti to do the test;
- He gives Black Box Voting a Nov. 30 deadline, then tells the press he has no idea where the Nov. 30 date came from.
- He asks Black Box Voting to confirm they intend to do the test, they confirm. BBV never hears from the sec. state's office again.
- The participants in the test learn by reading in the newspaper that the test has been delayed (18 hours before it is scheduled to begin).
- In a related matter, while on the radio this week McPherson's office could not answer the simplest of questions about what transpired at a Nov. 21 Diebold hearing.
Here's the correspondence trail -- judge for yourself.
June 16, 2005: Black Box Voting invokes Calif. Election Code 19202, forcing the state to set up a special security test.
Link to 19202 request: http://www.bbvdocs.org/records/19202requestdiebold.pdf
July 2005: Jim March, from Black Box Voting, repeatedly requests a response to the 19202 request. He is assured by Bruce McDannold that the test will take place.
Nov. 5, 2005: March visits the Calif. Sec. State's office to inquire why the 19202 test has not been scheduled. Though the state of California was aware of the security defects exposed by the Hursti test in Leon County, Florida, for the second time after being apprised of critical security defects, the state of California chose to go ahead with a statewide election without correcting the defects, or even informing county elections registrars of the defects.*
Nov. 9, 2005: Harris and March jointly visit the Calif. Sec. State's office to inquire when the 19202 test will be scheduled. The sec. state's office's Bruce McDannold meets with them and says he has been working with Diebold to arrange the 19202 test.
Nov. 19, 2005:
----- Forwarded message from "McDannold, Bruce" <bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov> -----
Date: Sat, 19 Nov 2005 10:12:04 -0800
From: "McDannold, Bruce" <bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov>
To: Bev Harris, Jim March
Subject: Test to demonstrate possible security vulnerabilities with AccuVote-OS
"The Secretary of State would like to afford you a one-time opportunity to demonstrate the security vulnerabilities with the Diebold AccuVote-OS based on the exploits outlined in the Hursti report from this summer. Diebold has agreed to make their equipment and their staff available for such a test on November 30, 2005, at the California Secretary of State's Office, 1500 11th Street, Sacramento. The test would begin promptly at 8:00am. I have attached a document that provides the actual protocol and conditions for this proposed test.
Please advise us as soon as possible if you wish to participate. Feel free to contact me if you have any questions about this."
Nov. 22, 2005: Black Box Voting spoke by telephone with Harri Hursti, our preferred consultant for this matter, who indicated that he had just recieved an informal feeler from David Jefferson, who heads the Calif. technical group evaluating voting machines. Hursti said he had significant concerns and indicated he would not agree unless certain issues were resolved.
Nov. 22, 2005: Black Box Voting received an e-mail from Bruce McDannold, giving a deadline of 10 a.m. Nov. 23 for us to give our response.
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 16:11:54 -0800
From: "McDannold, Bruce" <bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov>
To: Bev Harris, Jim March
Subject: RE: Test to demonstrate possible security vulnerabilities with AccuVote-OS
Bev & Jim-
We have not yet received a response to our offer to participate in this testing next Wednesday. Could you please let us know your intentions by 10am tomorrow morning so that, if necessary, we can make alternate arrangements? Also, please be advised that we will need to reschedule the testing to begin at 10:30am, rather than at 8:00am.
Nov. 22, 2005: Black Box Voting wrote that we wished to participate, and submitted concerns about the testing procedure, which we indicated we were sure we could resolve.
The secretary of state's office has still not answered.
Nov. 25, 2005: The secretary of state's office then told San Francisco Chronicle reporter John Wildermuth that Hursti was going to do the test, tentatively scheduled for Nov. 30.
Nov. 25, 2005: Bev Harris wrote to Hursti to let him know that his name was being splashed across the US by the Associated Press, indicating he had committed to the test. Harris also wrote to the Associated Press and the San Francisco Chronicle to request that they run a correction on their article. Harris spoke to Wildermuth, who said that his information that Hursti was scheduled to do the test was provided by Nghia Nguyen Demovic, a spokeswoman for California secretary of state Bruce McPherson.
Nov. 26, 2005: Hursti wrote that, though a preliminary feeler had been sent to him by David Jefferson, no formal invitation/protocols had been submitted to him by the state of California, and he had not agreed to either the date or any procedures.
Date: Sat, 26 Nov 2005 19:34:23 +0200
From: Harri Hursti
"Bev & team,
...invitation / proposal for protocol was not even ever presented to me - my answer to preliminary question for 30th day availability was negative and the only response to that was along the lines "30th was only proposal".
Nov. 28, 2005: It is now a matter of some confusion as to whether Hursti will be performing the tests as a representative of Black Box Voting or as a representative of the state of California.
It is clear that the Calif. Sec. State's office originally put the testing under Black Box Voting, but then told the media that Calif. had put the testing under Harri Hursti.
It is also the case that Black Box Voting would have brought in Hursti in as our representative, though we had not notified the sec. state of such, because acceptable procedures had not yet been negotiated and we would need Hursti's agreement to any procedures before committing him to the project as our representative.
from testing protocols sent by Bruce McDannold to Black Box Voting on Nov. 19, 2005:
1. Prior to the test, Black Box Voting will identify all the attacks they intend to demonstrate.
2. The tests will be private and held on the Secretary of State premises at a time mutually agreeable to Secretary of State and Diebold. The Secretary of State will provide security.
3. Black Box Voting will be limited to three participants at the test. Diebold will be limited to four participants at the test.
4. The test and its results will remain confidential for thirty days or until the Secretary of State publishes its report on the test, whichever event comes first. All participants in the test will sign a confidentiality agreement to that effect.
5. Secretary of State personnel will record the entire test on videotape. One camera will be positioned to record the overall test. A second camera will be used to provide close up recording of Black Box Voting’s actions to read and alter the memory card, as well as any anomalies that occur during the test. Additionally, the Secretary of State may use still photography to document the test and any problems encountered. Black Box Voting may make no other recordings of the test.
6. Black Box Voting personnel may observe the operation of all Diebold equipment, but (with the exception of step 4 above) may not touch or operate the Diebold equipment during any of the testing. Violation of this provision will immediately terminate the test.
7. All test reports, as well as all recordings of the test will remain the physical property of the Secretary of State. Copies of the reports and the recordings will be provided free of charge to Black Box Voting upon publication of the Secretary of State’s official report of the test, or upon the thirtieth day following the test, whichever comes first. The altered memory card will remain the property of the Secretary of State as well.
8. Upon Secretary of State request, Black Box Voting will provide documentation of any programs or utilities used to alter the memory card for the test, as well documentation of the steps taken to alter the card.
Nov. 28, 2005: Black Box Voting sent another, more formal letter to the Calif. Sec. State:
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2005 13:18:31 -0600
From: bev@blackboxvoting.org
To: "McDannold, Bruce" <bmcdanno@ss.ca.gov>
We need to clarify and formalize the details of your invitation
Dear Mr. McDannold,
We were surprised that we did not hear back from you last week, in response to our reply to you on Tuesday night, prior to your deadline on Wednesday at 10 a.m.
We were even more surprised to see that the secretary of state's office apparently represented to the media that you have "hired" Harri Hursti to do this test.
In correspondence from Hursti sent to me on Saturday Nov. 26, he says that he never received an invitation by the secretary of state's office, nor had he received any formal list of testing protocols, nor had he agreed to come on
Nov. 30, nor had any date been agreed to.
I hope you'll agree and promptly confirm the next step:
The test, which of course was in response to the California Election Code section 19202 request which your office received from Black Box Voting on June 16, which you represented to Jim March in July would indeed take place, and which you represented to both Jim March and I during our visit to the Secretary of State's office on Nov. 9 would take place, and that you were "working with Diebold" on it -- at the behest of Black Box Voting, we are requesting that the
tester be Mr. Harri Hursti.
Black Box Voting will discuss the most important points of testing protocol shortly, and we will all agree upon them. At that time, Black Box Voting will notify you that Mr. Hursti, and only Mr. Hursti, representing Black Box Voting and his own interests, will negotiate all further steps in the testing protocol with an individual you select. The most qualified individual for your side is, of course, Mr. David Jefferson.
The time will be mutually agreed upon so that Mr. Hursti and Black Box Voting, represented by Bev Harris and Jim March, will be able to attend.
Can we agree that California will accept Mr. Harri Hursti as the representative of Black Box Voting, and will conduct the negotiations on procedure and timing with Mr. Hursti following our notice to you that we have come to agreement with him on the protocols?
Please let me know as soon as possible, as we are receiving many calls from the press and want to advise the media as accurately as possible.
Bev Harris
Jim March
Black Box Voting, Inc.
We have received no response to this correspondence.
Nov. 28, 2005: Bev Harris interviewed by Thomas Garvin (KNTV). He reported that he had just spoken to the secretary of state's office, who claimed they had "no idea where the Nov. 30 date came from."
Nov. 28, 2005: Secretary of State Bruce McPherson announced to the media that the testing would be expanded to include other vendors, not just Diebold.
Nov. 29, 2005: Black Box Voting read in the San Francisco Chronicle that the test has been delayed. Still no word from the secretary of state.
Nov. 30, 2005: Harri Hursti, who has several businesses in Finland, has been in the midst of merger/acquisition talks that have just been consummated:
STOCK EXCHANGE ANNOUNCEMENT
F-SECURE ACQUIRES ROMMON OY
Translation from Finnish
November 30, 2005 at 15.00
F-Secure Corporation has acquired ROMmon Oy, a Finnish company that provides network level malicious traffic control solutions for ISPs...
It is therefore highly unlikely that over the U.S. Thanksgiving weekend he was concurrently negotiating procedures or making commitments to the California secretary of state.
Next steps
1. It needs to be clarified whether Hursti is acting as an agent for the state of California or as an agent for Black Box Voting. This confusion was produced by the secretary of state's handling of this matter, not by Black Box Voting.
2. If the state of California wishes to contract with Hursti directly, they'll need to arrange the paperwork accordingly and cover his expenses. If California engages Hursti's services directly, Black Box Voting will accept this as a reasonable response to our section 19202 requirement, providing that the testing procedures fully complies. Note that our 19202 letter requires both touch-screens and optical scans to be tested, using every version currently in use in California.
2. If the state of California asks Hursti to participate in the testing as a representative of Black Box Voting, we will formally ask Hursti to conduct the negotiations on our behalf pertaining to testing procedures.
3. In a related matter, Black Box Voting is requesting the full transcript of the Nov. 21 public hearing on Diebold certification, and we are creating a transcript of the secretary of state's spokesperson's radio interview relating to this public meeting, which will be made available at the BlackBoxVoting.org Web site.
Significant concerns have arisen about inappropriate responses made by Bruce McPherson's spokesperson to questions relating to the Nov. 21 hearing.
-------------------
* In August 2004, Bev Harris, Jim March, Pat Vesely, former King County supervisor of elections Julie Anne Kempf, attorney Lowell Finley, and security expert Dr. Herbert Thompson met with several members of then-secretary of state Kevin Shelley's staff, including Dr. David Jefferson, Assistant Secretary of State Mark Kyle, the attorney for the secretary of state, another attorney from the state attorney general's office, John Mott Smith, and a Certified Public Accountant for the secretary of state's office. At this time the Diebold GEMS defect was discussed and demonstrated, and Dr. Thompson explained that election results could be altered by a visual basic script.
These findings, originally published by Black Box Voting, were then corroborated by an independent study commissioned by Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell, in the second report by CompuWare Corp., received by Blackwell by Aug. 18, 2004 but hidden from the public by Blackwell.
According to public records requests obtained by Black Box Voting, Blackwell never notified the EAC (the federal regulatory body responsible for overseeing US elections), nor did he notify any other secretary of state, nor did he inform his own Ohio elections directors who were responsible for running secure elections on Diebold.
California is currently attempting to mitigate the GEMS defect by altering the way Windows operates, and according to the most recent report from California's consultant Steve Freeman, this has not entirely succeeded yet. Ohio is currently attempting to mitigate the GEMS defect by installing a third-party software program called Digital Guardian. In both states, and in the other 30 states that use Diebold, the GEMS defect remains unresolved.
Dr. Herbert Thompson demonstrated the visual basic script attack of Diebold's GEMS software at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. in Sept. 2004, before the 2004 election. Several congressional staffers attended, along with a reporter for the Associated Press, the New York Times, Reuters, and many other large news organizations. Despite these efforts by Black Box Voting to ensure that all elections officials knew of the problem, Diebold represented to its customers that the GEMS defect was not a problem. Diebold admitted that GEMS could be used to alter elections by way of a Visual Basic script like that performed by Dr. Thompson. Diebold told elections officials that the "poll tapes" (the vote reports printed from its voting machines) prevented this risk. However, at the same time, Diebold provided absentee counting machines that did not produce any results tape, entrusting the entire set of absentee votes to the defective GEMS program.
Though the risk had been explained in person to key members of the California secretary of state's staff, had been rated "high, high, high" (see excerpt: http://www.bbvdocs.org/reports/GEMS-RISK.pdf) by the independent report commissioned by the state of Ohio, not a single one of the 1,200 jurisdictions running elections on this elections software has yet resolved the issue, and Diebold continues to sell this defective software.
The 2004 election was run with at least two stunning security defects -- both exposed in work sponsored by Black Box Voting, through consultants Dr. Herbert Thompson (GEMS defect) and Harri Hursti (defect in memory card architecture). Thirty million votes -- one-third of the 2004 presidential election -- were counted on defective voting systems.
Full Aug. 18 2004 Compuware report: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/diebReasses081804.pdf
More on the GEMS defect:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/13037.html
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/14296.html
The Harri Hursti report (http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf) demonstrated an entirely different flaw in Diebold's voting system. Simply by swapping a credit-card-sized ballot box, using materials that can be purchased off the Internet for under $500, poll workers, temporary employees working in the warehouses, and other elections workers can alter election results.
Despite this information, elections officials have allowed poll workers expanded access to the machines with the credit-card-sized ballot boxes inside. San Diego County sent voting machines home with 713 poll workers before the election, giving them unsupervised access for days.
Although Secretary of State Bruce McPherson was aware of Hursti's study, he made no attempt to replicate it, verify it, or even to set procedures to lessen the risk of election tampering (like prohibiting elections registrars from sending voting machines home with thousands of poll workers).
In some ways, voting machines are no different than cars, cribs, or hamburgers
Except that you, the taxpayer, must foot the bill.
Black Box Voting is noticing that -- although voting machines are a consumer product produced by private for-profit corporations -- standard consumer protection and liability laws don't seem to be on the radar screen of most elections officials.
Sure, it's awkward when you find out three months before a presidential election that your voting software is defective. That doesn't mean you hide that information from the public and do nothing until after the election takes place.
Yes, it's not good when someone gains control of a voting machine simply by swapping a credit-card sized object. That doesn't mean you deny that it's a problem until after another election goes by.
When a car's gas tank explodes, the manufacturer must recall it. Not a year later. Not after they finish a new sales contract. NOW.
When you have been informed that your baby crib is strangling infants, you don't get to hush it up in order to preserve good PR. Nor should you lie about it. You must recall those cribs. Not later. NOW.
If you learn that someone is slipping poison into your Tylenol bottles, you don't quietly, behind the scenes, take them off the shelves without informing the public. You have to disclose it and succumb to whatever investigation follows.
If your hamburgers are giving people e-coli, you can't say "well, we buy our meat from sources approved by federal testing labs." You have to get the meat off the retail lines and disclose.
When it comes to consumer protection law and liability, there is no difference between a voting machine and a Ford Pinto, bottle of Tylenol, or Jack in the Box hamburger. Those companies handled it. Now it's time for public officials and Diebold to do the same.
Permission to reprint granted, with link to http://www.blackboxvoting.org |
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 1990
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 22 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 10:27 am: |
|
A HOLIDAY WISH
In North Carolina they told the state no
When the state said they had to place code in escrow
That makes me wonder just how it will go
When they find out that here their code they must show!
My wish is away they're going to slither
Their sales will die off and their business will wither
If that is the outcome I think it'd be great
Through the absence of Diebold may God bless my state!
Happy Holidays!
VOTING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Any new voting system to be considered for certification for use in California elections will be required to have the following features:
1. An application that includes proof of federal certification, (i.e. copies of the United States Election Assistance Commission [EAC] approved
Independent Testing Authority [ITA] reports and certification number issued by the EAC).
2. All applications must include full documentation, including technical and operational specifications, operating and maintenance manuals,
training materials, and copies of all promotional materials from the vendor.
3. Each system must have comprehensive use procedures applicable for use of the system in California elections in conformance with state
law and Secretary of State guidelines for voting system use procedures.
4. Each vendor must establish a California County User Group and hold at least one annual meeting where all California users and Secretary of State staff are invited to attend and review the system and ensure voter accessibility.
5. In addition to depositing the source code in an approved escrow facility, each vendor must deposit a copy of the system source code and binary executables with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State reserves the right to perform a full independent review of the source code.
6. Voting system vendors shall provide to the Secretary of State, on request, a working version of the components, including all hardware, software and firmware, of the voting system that is proposed for use in an election, for the purposes of analysis and testing. These components shall be maintained in working order by the vendor.
7. Multiple independently tested and certified voting systems may be used together to meet federal and state requirements so long as their interface is limited to exchange of aggregated vote totals and/or ballot layout.
8. Components of a certified voting system may not be combined with components of a previously but separately certified system without certification by the Secretary of State as an entirely new system.
9. The vendor for each system that utilizes paper ballots will be required to provide printing specifications for those ballots to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State will certify printers to print ballots for each system based upon their demonstrated ability to do so. Vendors
may not require exclusivity in ballot printing and must cooperate fully in certification testing of ballots produced by other ballot printers.
10. All systems will be subject to volume testing as defined by established Secretary of State standards prior to certification in California.
10/5/05
PAV ;-) |
BBV Admin
Board Administrator
Username: Admin
Post Number: 2863
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 10:38 am: |
|
Ah, yes, the North Carolina thing appears to be a sham, since Diebold has already agreed to escrow their source code in California and also sent their source code to Los Angeles County.
So what's really behind their objections? Notice what else Diebold does not want to disclose in North Carolina, resulting in their pullout from the state:
The names of the programmers.
As we all know, there's a good reason for that, starting with the prison records of Jeffrey Dean and Diebold ballot printer/programming facility John Elder:
Prison records: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/2197/14318.html |
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 1991
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 11:50 am: |
|
Yes, let's not forget that Microsoft routinely hands out their source code to third party developers who design applications that run on their operating systems. Typically it requires one to sign a non disclosure agreement but I don't think that would be a big deal for the state.
Also keep in mind that the source code for any software I've ever seen (including Diebold's) has the name of every programmer who originated or revised it. That would seem to shoot down their argument that it would be "impossible" to compile a list of the programmers. I'm fairly certain that a company like MS would make their programmers sign their work product.
Additionally, since Diebold claims to use the OS as 'COTS' (Commercial Off The Shelf) software with no modifications, it seems to me that any fair minded judge would give them a waiver as provided in the NC law. I believe there is language that allows the company to 'explain' why certain software was omitted from the submission. COTS that is not designed or modified by them would be a reasonable explanation.
So it begs the question, what's the difference between the software they were willing to give up here in California, even though they knew it actually stands a chance of being independently reviewed and tested, and the software that they refused to place in escrow in NC?
One possible explanation might be that they struck a deal with the SoS here and know up front that it will never happen. Another is that it was submitted before the new rules took effect and is immune from them.
Time for a PRR seeking all documents related to their software - escrow arraignment in California?
I guess this means I won't be getting my holiday wish. Bummer.
PAV ;-) |
Edward Robles
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Tedeger
Post Number: 10
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 1:07 pm: |
|
But apparently a NC judge would not grant Diebold a waiver, so Diebold is not going to participate in the voting machine sales in NC. Good - maybe. But are ES&S and Sequoia going to participate? They're tarred with the same brush.
A young programmer I know has told me as follows;
"1. The "Software" they don't want you to examine is such an unwieldy kludge they are ashamed to admit that elections hang on it.
2. Give me fifteen minutes alone with one of these machines, or let me have a telephone, and I'll elect Mickey Mouse to any Office you care to name.
3. Whenever there's a program with millions of lines of code where the job can be done with a few thousand, there is room for all kinds of mischief; opening the software won't necessarily help; what has to be done is to have the software written by competent programmers, and then beta tested in the furnace before it ever goes into a real machine.."
I think the kid (he's 17) knows what he's talking about. |
Vickie McCullough
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Vifran
Post Number: 1
Registered: 07-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 1:47 pm: |
|
It is one thing to get Americans to go to the polls and vote but to feel or wonder if your vote actually got counted and tallied correctly is a growing trend among Americans. Expecially after the Ohio mess in 2004 and the previous national frenzy over the Florida mess in 2000. And both of these states were the deciding states for the presidental election. But what followed was certain to raise some eyebrows: Florida's 2000 mess was eventually recounted and many disturbing counts were tallied incorrectly as was the case in Ohio.
And needless to say it is something that really demands investigation it demands extensive scrutiny. There are no perfect software packages! Say it one more time to yourself. That is scary? Yes!
Simply put: man/women create software packages, there for the software can only be as perfect as the developers of that software: which can never be perfect.
And Edward is right even a 17 old kid could elect Goofy or whoever.
Also The owner of Diebold contributes to the Republican party. Diebold writes software for ATM machines as well. I think there is a lot of something going on with our voting system that is not impartial.
And last: it makes one ponder to think that our voting system worked before 2000 or did it? See we will never know will we? |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1260
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 2:48 pm: |
|
You said it!
Have a look at Edward's post here: http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/show.cgi?tpc=8&post=14587#POST14587
He says this happened nearly 40 years ago, which would make it the late 60s. And it appears that this kind of electronic voting machine fraud was going on then!!! |
John Gideon
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Johngideon
Post Number: 189
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 3:31 pm: |
|
Let's not count out Diebold in NC yet. They have not pulled-out of the running. The State Board of Elections is trying to figure out a way to get Diebold in. Hart InterCivic did not file for certification in NC because of the source code laws.
Information Manager, VotersUnite.org
|
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 1994
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 4:04 pm: |
|
Hi Vickie! Welcome to Black Box, great first post. 
I had my first glimpse of how fair our elections were over 40 years ago at PS 27 in Queens New York. We used those behemoth 'lever machines'. I wandered into the school gym while they were setting up for an election and watched as they opened the machines to reset the mechanical counters on the back.
I was fascinated by the hundreds of push rods, levers and interlocks that made the thing work. I was pestering the poor technician who very kindly took the time to show me everything I wanted to see about how it operated. He showed me how the candidate interlock worked so you couldn't pull down more than one lever in any given race. He showed me how the main interlock worked that kept you from voting more than once. He demonstrated how the main lever that opens and closes the curtain resets the candidate levers and increments the candidate counters. It was all very impressive.
I said something about how you couldn't cheat with a system like this and he quickly replied, "I didn't say that".
He pointed to a series of small gears on a shaft that drove the candidate counters, picked up an allen wrench, and proceeded to loosen the set screw on one of the gears. Not all the way, just enough for the screw to just hang on the edge of the flat of the shaft. He invited me to feel how the screw just caught the edge and with just the slightest amount of pressure would slip past it. He then handed me a spare counter and let me feel how it took more and more pressure each time you rolled over another column in the counter. He pointed out that if you loosened it too much the counter would read zero and people would get suspicious but if you had just the right touch.......
It was only recently that I read a study of lever type voting machines that confirmed my worst fears. According to that research the most often reported number on the candidate counters of these type of machines is 99.
Paper ballots, helping to curb election fraud since 139 BC !
PAV ;-) |
Bruce Sims
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Ubetchaiam
Post Number: 657
Registered: 06-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 4:28 pm: |
|
CA Election code says 'all components' of a voting system must be 'safe from fraud or manipulation' but the SOS office, in their reply to one of my election complaints 'disagrees' that Windows is not safe from 'fraud or manipulation'; they refuse to answer why so many ongoing security updates are released from Microsoft for the operating system/browser if Windows is 'safe from fraud or manipulation'. "Just because you say 2 and 2 are 4 Mr. Sims doesn't mean we have to agree with you and since we are the ones's deciding what systems you can vote on, our perceptions are the correct one, not yours !!"
Sheesh. |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 175
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Wednesday, November 30, 2005 - 8:33 pm: |
|
Microsoft doesn't release its source code to developers, it releases specifications. The specifications let you know how to mesh with their code. As a developer, you don't get to see their actual code, trust me. This is part of why they were sued, they explained Windows internal code to Microsoft applications developers better than the explained it to outsiders (Netscape, etc.) and developed an unfair advantage that way. Developers don't get to see the source code in any case. |
Ginger Lee Babin
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Swimperson
Post Number: 2
Registered: 08-2005
Best of Black Box? 
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, December 1, 2005 - 12:04 am: |
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Maybe the lady from China who bought the Diebold code from Diebold's programer had to make sure George W. Bush would win the election. Why? Her backers decided to loan money to Bush so he could finance the war in Iraq--the same way big corporations loaned money to third world countries so they could take them over when their governments couldn't make good on the loans. Is this why Bush is trying to bankrupt America? Did he and his cronies make a sweetheart deal with Shanghai? |
Jose Ivey
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Urbanvoyeur
Post Number: 17
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, December 1, 2005 - 12:04 pm: |
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Brant
Actually, you can see Microsoft source code if:
(1) You are very high tiered Microsoft development partner. Over the years this circle has included IBM, HP, NVidia, ATI, Computer Associates and Apple among others. Access is limited to specific products or OS's
(2) If you are very large and/or important customer. Some very large banks, investment houses and retailers have been allowed to examine and audit the source code of various MS projects.
(3) You are a goverment entity with specific valid reasons (US CIA/NSA/FBI) or enough clout (US Defense department, New York State MTA)
So yes, there is well established precedent where even a company as tight as Microsoft will allow source code access to key partners, favored customers and goverment entities.
(Message edited by UrbanVoyeur on December 01, 2005) |
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 1999
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Thursday, December 1, 2005 - 12:35 pm: |
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That would explain why I got to see it. I worked for a 'Fortune 100' disk drive manufacturer for a number of years. Our engineers were more security conscious about the MS source code than our own intellectual property. It was fully encrypted and forbidden to be viewed on any computer with network access. No copies were allowed of any of it, even on paper, ever. Very few people were allowed to even see it and fewer still to sign it out of the safe.
PAV ;-) |
Brant Lamb
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Brantl
Post Number: 185
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 2, 2005 - 7:56 am: |
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The exceptions kind of prove my point; very few people get to see it. And essentially only with monetary leverage. I doubt they're going to be interested in letting it be divulged for voting machines. Especially for people as sloppy as Lie-Bold. |
Jose Ivey
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Urbanvoyeur
Post Number: 21
Registered: 11-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 2, 2005 - 8:29 am: |
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Microsoft does allow source code access to govenerment entities. In the case of voting machine certification, if a government agency is aksing, I believe they will listen. |
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 2004
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box?
Votes: 1 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 2, 2005 - 11:36 am: |
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LOL! Look at what I just found.
http://www.middletownpress.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=15678463&BRD=1645&PAG=461&de pt_id=10856&rfi=6
Council opposes re-vote despite flawed machine
By MELISSA BAILEY - Middletown Press Staff
12/02/2005
MIDDLETOWN -- No one who gazed into the back of voting machine 150051 Thursday could deny that the machine was flawed. As voting moderators walked in and simulated a vote, pushing down the lever for Common Council Candidate David Bauer, the wheels stuck. In each of 50 repetitions, Bauer’s vote was not recorded.
Despite being informed of this glaring mechanical flaw, common council voted Thursday night to support election results as they stand.
They also decided to oppose a re-vote for those who used the faulty machine on Election Day this year.
Council members would not reveal the reasoning behind this opposition: The decision was made behind closed doors, to enable them to talk freely about legal tactics as they defend themselves from a lawsuit that Bauer has filed.
Bauer, a Republican, claims the broken lever undermined his chances at winning a council seat: He lost the final seat on council to Republican V. James Russo by 102 votes.
<more>
http://www.middletownpress.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=15678463&BRD=1645&PAG=461&de pt_id=10856&rfi=6
The more things change, the more they stay the same!
PAV ;-) |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1265
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 2, 2005 - 12:00 pm: |
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I wonder whatever happened with Bauer's legal case. My search only revealed articles written around the time of him filing his lawsuit, but nothing since.
This is an excellent example of my posting elsewhere today under "General Discussion" that the real problems we face are social/ethical--and technology of any kind will not solve these problems.
It will take public will--a sea change that will occur when enough people are sufficiently informed, aware, responsible, motivated and involved--to bring about the fundamental changes in mindset that are needed. Without this change in the public mindset we will not see the kinds of far-reaching changes in government, justice and ethics.
Without changes in these areas, we won't get real changes in elections. The problems we are seeing with our elections are symptoms of an uninformed, uninvolved public together with with business, legal, judicial and governmental systems that are corrupt and/or incompetent. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1269
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 2, 2005 - 2:45 pm: |
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I couldn't resist sending this to the Editor of the Middletown Press:
Dear Editor,
Thanks for reporting this riveting story ("Council opposes re-vote despite flawed machine" 12/02/2005").
It is absolutely extraordinary that the Common Council has voted to try to keep the results as they are under the circumstances in which a machine has been proven to be defective. And this Council expects voters to believe it has a democratic mandate?
No wonder there is so much rightful distrust about electronic voting machines. At least in Middletown everyone could open up the machine, test it out for themselves, and see that it wasn't recording votes correctly. When there's an electronic voting machine that degree of scrutiny is not possible. And as the Common Council members so clearly demonstrated, there is pressure to convince the public and the judiciary that citizens should meekly accept results that are obviously flawed.
I am glad that David Bauer is standing up for his rights to an accurate vote count. If we aren't willing to take action when there's clear proof of an election problem, and when the problem could obviously have changed the results, what hope do we have trying to find and correct problems experienced by users of electronic voting machines elsewhere in the country? And what if there are other machines with similar problems that have not been diagnosed? It is worrying that this problem has apparently been around for years, disenfranchising lots of voters--and no one even noticed. And when they do notice, the Council doesn't care!
The Common Council is setting a terrible example for American democracy. I hope they wise up and begin to take their responsibilities to citizens more seriously. I hope the Middlesex Superior Court has more sense.
Sincerely,
[etc.] |
Glenn McGahee
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Glennmcgahee
Post Number: 1
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, December 3, 2005 - 8:21 am: |
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I found this link today Dec.3.
http://www.insidebayarea.com/oaklandtribune/localnews/ci_3256676
So is the test rescheduled? |
Pat A. Vesely
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Pat_vesely
Post Number: 2010
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Saturday, December 3, 2005 - 9:38 am: |
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Hi Glenn, Welcome to Black Box Voting. I checked your link and under todays date but just above the title of the article I noticed this.
"Article Last Updated: 11/27/2005 07:35:13 AM"
Keep checking back. I'm sure Bev will post something as soon as the details have been worked out.
PAV ;-) |
David Bauer
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Dpbauer
Post Number: 1
Registered: 12-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 30, 2005 - 5:24 pm: |
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Hi,
I want to thank Catherine Ansbro and the others that took an interest in my case in Middletown, CT. The deluded City Common Council did appeal the Superior Court decision to order a re-vote in one voting district to the CT Supreme Court. Less than 15 minutes after hearing oral arguments, the CT Supreme Court gave an oral ruling ordering a complete citywide re-vote.
Being a long time follower of Electronic Voting issues, I am elated that my case will help set a precedent that screwing up the vote has some potentially severe consequences.
Given that it is the Holiday season, it may take a little longer than usual to get the final written ruling from the Supremes - but it should make for some very interesting reading around the end of January.
Keep checking MiddletownPress.com and Courant.com (sorry for the archive stuff after 10 days) as this story continues....
This is going to be some very good legal news for voters' rights!
All the best,
David P. Bauer |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1398
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Friday, December 30, 2005 - 7:04 pm: |
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Hi David,
Thanks for what you're doing as a candidate to do everything in your power to keep our election systems fair.
I was amazed to see the Middletown CT goings-on. Just imagine--that lever machine had obviously not been working correctly for years! (For those who haven't read the news reports, when they looked back over previous years' elections there was a persistent anomaly--a certain lever machine would only register a handful of votes on candidate position 4, whereas every other position on that machine and on all the other machines would register several hundred votes. When they examined the machine they demonstrated that it had a mechanical fault that caused it to consistently underrecord votes cast for whichever candidate was in the position of that particular lever).
It was highly instructive to see how the City Common Council responded--they tried to prevent a re-election, even though the amount of the undervotes was clearly enough to affect the election results.
It's a cautionary tale of relevance to those concerned about electronic voting (or any aspect of election reform). In electronic voting, the same issues come up--there is evidence of numerous cases of various kinds of election equipment malfunctioning leading to improper or incomplete recording of votes, but the official response is to claim "results weren't effected" and to resist recounts (when such are even possible), to resist recounts that look at the actual paper ballots (again, when such is even possible), and to resist any suggestion of a re-election. And NO ONE allows the actual voting machines to be inspected--which is glaringly inappropriate, since the most obvious first step would be to carry out an immediate forensic examination of any machines which reported unusual behavior, malfunction or a questionable repair/access history.
People of all political parties should be concerned when irregularities are not put right. You're setting a wonderful precedent and hopefully others will be encouraged and inspired by your persistence and your efforts on behalf of democracy.
Please keep us informed of any new developments. I hope the re-vote goes smoothly. Will you have the chance to inspect any/all lever machines in advance?
Middletown voters and democracy are the real winners, regardless of which individuals eventually win the Common Council election. |
Bob Fleischer
Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Rjf7r
Post Number: 43
Registered: 09-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Monday, January 2, 2006 - 10:15 pm: |
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Catherine, it's rather obvious that elections in this country are treated as a sham, or worse. There is no wonder that every attempt to impose a meaningful check on the validity of an election, or to be able to challenge an election meaningfully, is beaten back. |
Catherine Ansbro
Frequent Voting Rights Forum Participant
Username: Catherine_a
Post Number: 1416
Registered: 12-2004
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?) | | Posted on Tuesday, January 3, 2006 - 12:51 am: |
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At least there is a good judge in Middletown CT.
Pity we don't have more like her. |
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